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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
l. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to relate ethical issues in modern 
city planning in the United States and the emerging context of choice in urban 
society to a systematic ethical framework which can serve as a normative foun-
dation for responsible urban planning. The physical, social, and cultural di-
mensions of urban life are increasingly subject to control by decisions which 
persons make individually and collectively. As urban technology, culture, and 
social organizations become more complex, the consequences of choices become 
more far-reaching and intricate. Planning has emerged as an effort to estimate 
consequences and clarify and bring coherence to choices. 
The basic concern of this dissertation is with the ethical dimensions 
of planning, i.e., with the normative framework that guides not only the con-
tent of choices with which urban planning is concerned but also the process by 
which planning takes place. Planning is seen in its relationship to social 
organization and as a part of the development of modern urban society. 
The ethical framework which is developed in this dissertation seeks to 
relate the general theory of action developed by Talcott Parsons, the system 
of moral laws of Edgar S. Brightman, and the idea of the responsible society 
which has emerged in recent Christian social thought. This ethical framework 
is used as a basis for clarifying and systematically relating the ethical 
issues in modern urban planning and development. 
l 
2 
2. Definitions 
Several basic concepts in this dissertation require definition. 
"Ethics" is the "normative science of the principles (or laws) of the best 
l 
types of human conduct." A science is characterized by a limited field, the 
use of particular methods of observation and seeks to organize experience and 
f lt . "l 2 ormu a e prlnClp es. A normative science is concerned with values, princi-
ples, and obligations. Ethics is concerned with the systematic study of the 
''good, n "ought, n and principles of right conduct. 
For ethics to have any meaning, man must be viewed as an evaluative 
creature. 
Man is that being who not only acts and brings about changes in the 
world of things and events; he is the being who is aware of the moral qual-
ity of his actions. In reflecting upon ourselves, we are able to evaluate 
our actions and thus estimate the extent to which they fall short of a 
norm or ideal. Evaluation is more than self-consciousness; it is self-
judgment .3 
Ethics is the systematic study of these evaluations and self-judgments. An 
ethical idea or principle becomes an "issue" when it becomes the subject of 
discussion, debate, or general concern. 
"Urban" becomes increasingly hard to define because in contemporary 
society it is increasingly characteristic of the whole society. The older dis-
tinction between 11 urban'' and n rural" has lost much of its value. 
Ours is an urban world. In a way that has never been true in the past 
we have given all of our hostages to the encompassing fortunes of great 
cities. Imperial Rome under the Augustans may have been as much as 10 per 
~dgar Sheffield Brightman, Moral Laws (New York: Abingdon Press, 
1933), p. 13. 
2Ibid., p. 24. 
3John E. Smith, "The Concept of the Moral, Moral Relativism, the Nature 
of Moral Norms and the Sources of Moral Authority," an Address to the National 
Convention of the Religious Education Association (Chicago, Ill.: The Conven-
tion, 1962), p. l. 
3 
cent urban; America today is over 60 per cent urban and nearly half of 
the urbanites live in metropolitan areas with populations of over one 
million. 1 
For purposes of this dissertation, "urban" will refer to the metropol-
itan complex in contemporary society, including the central city, the suburban 
rings, and the "exurban" fringe. It is within such a social unit that most 
intense interaction, contact, and movement of people occurs. 
"Planning" is an effort to develop and project a course of action. It 
becomes a specialized activity in highly differentiated social systems, and 
may perform an integrative function in seeking to relate the activities of 
many parts in a unified program of activity. 
City planning has changed dramatically during the past century in the 
way in which it is done and the kinds of concerns with which it has dealt. For 
this reason, the concept of "development" has been included in the title. "De-
velopment" indicates a process of change and growth, and an effort will be made 
to relate the emergence of urban planning to the change and growth of urban 
society. 
3. Previous Research in the Field 
While the ~uantity of materials growing out of study and research in 
modern city planning are beyond the reading ability of the most prodigious 
scholar, the materials which have a distinctively ethical focus are very lim-
ited, indeed. There has been only limited study of the history of modern city 
planning, and no major work has been done in the historical development of 
ethical ~uestions in city planning. Nor have there been major efforts to de-
velop a basic ethical framework for responsible planning from the perspective 
of contemporary Christian social philosophy. This section will indicate, 
1scott Greer, The Emerging City: Myth and Reality (Glencoe, Ill.: 
Free Press, 1962), p. l. 
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however, some of the most relevant sources for the field of study of this dis-
sertation. 
For the history of ethical issues in modern city planning, one of the 
most significant papers is by William Kolb in which he examines the problems 
of value theory in urban sociology. 1 While this paper contributes many sug-
gestive insights, it is very limited in scope and does not explore the rela-
tionship of value theory and urban sociology to city planning. The sources 
for historical study of modern city planning will be examined more fully in 
the next chapter. 
Probably the best single volume on the modern city has been written by 
2 Scott Greer. Greer summarizes much of the recent empirical research and 
analyzes many of the basic problems facing the future development of the city. 
More to the point for purposes of this dissertation, however, is Winston 
White's study of critiques of American society by intellectuals during the 
l950's.3 White not only analyzes these critiques, but develops an alternative 
interpretation of changes in American society. 4 He then interprets the criti-
cisms of the society by the intellectuals in terms of the strains created by 
social change. Although there is no discussion by White of urban planning, 
his discussion of the relationship of freedom and order in a complex and dif-
ferentiated society will be useful in clarifying these issues in city planning. 
~illiam L. Kolb, "Sources of Presuppositions in Urban Value Theory." 
(Mimeographed, 1958.) 
2 Greer, op. cit. 
3winston White, Beyond Conformity (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961). 
4
white's interpretation draws heavily on the social theory of Talcott 
Parsons. See The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), and Struc-
ture and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960). 
5 
There are, of course, a number of other general studies of the city, 1 but they 
give only limited attention to the problems of planning. 
Ethical issues in planning have come into sharper focus during the 
past few years. The Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their 
Relation to the Democratic Way of Life has recently published a volume of 
essays on ethical problems in large-scale organizations. 2 While many of the 
issues discussed are relevant to the concerns of this dissertation, the only 
essay immediately relevant to the problems of metropolitan or urban planning 
is a discussion by Paul N. Ylvisaker of diversity and the public interest.3 
Ylvisaker looks at the conflicts of value systems and the problems of finding 
a public interest which will unite self-interests in two cases: a mayor's re-
sponse to proposals for metropolitan government, and the response of an urban 
renewal executive to conflicting claims of race and class in a new housing de-
velopment. Ylvisaker notes that the diversity of the metropolis creates a 
situation in which 
it is not surprlSlng that men within the diversity of the metropolis 
--at least in the short run before the melting pot has brewed a new 
1
cf. Wilbur C. Hallenbeck, American Urban Communities (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1951); H. Warren Dunham, et al., The City at Midcentury 
(Detroit, Mich.: Wayne University Press, 1957); Lewis Mumford, From the 
Ground Up: Observations on Contemporary Architecture, Housing, Highway Build-
ing and Civic Design (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1947); Edward C. 
Higbee, The Squeeze: Cities without Space (New York: Morrow Press, 1960). 
The nine volumes of the New York Metropolitan Regional Study, published by 
Harvard University Press, 1959-61, are the most comprehensive study of a metro-
politan region ever attempted and have almost everything except an articulate 
social philosophy. 
~arlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), Ethics and Bigness: 
Scientifi~Academic, Religious, Political and Military, Published by the Con-
ference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic 
Way of Life, Inc. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962). 
3Paul N. Ylvisaker, "Diversity in the Public Interest: Two Cases in 
Metropolitan Decisionmaking," found in Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Aca-
demic, Religious, Political and Military, ed. Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. 
Lasswell (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), pp. 235-57· 
6 
homogeneity--should have great difficulty finding a common code of behavior 
and criterion of the general interest. Their attempts to do so are really 
what the current metropolitan ferment is all about. So far, this rising 
concern has been contained within the limiting form of debates over tan-
gible problems such as metropolitan government, urban renewal, and commuter 
transportation. Inevitably they must take on the ethical dimension which 
the theme of the Conference suggests, and rise to the plane of discussion 
where Plato long ago discovered the meaningful relationship between man and 
his urban environment.l 
It is this ethical dimension which this dissertation seeks to explore. 
The sources of ethical thought used to develop a framework for planning 
will be noted in more detail in Chapter IV. There has been no previous effort 
to relate Parson's theory of action to Brightman's moral laws or the idea of 
the responsible society. The application of such an ethical framework to the 
problems of responsible planning has not been attempted. 
There has been, however, concern for the implications of Christian so-
cial thought for urban planning. 2 In The Church and the Change, the Reverend 
Robert G. Howes calls for the exploration of the significance of the natural 
law ethic of Roman Catholicism for city planning. He explores the relation-
ship of the church to city planning from this perspective, and notes that the 
church is particularly concerned with the goal formulation aspects of plan-
ning.3 Another Roman Catholic, Dennis Clark, also suggests that the mission 
of the church ought to be related to the social philosophy which guides plan-
ning. 
It is imperative to the mission of the Church in America that these 
new currents of energy (i.e. in civic readjustment) be guided by a sound 
social philosophy. The new profession of urban rebuilder must be pene-
trated by many competent and apostolically-minded Catholics. It is 
1Ibid.' p. 236. 
2 Robert G. Howes, The Church and the Change (Boston, Mass.: Daughters 
of St. Paul, 1961). 
3Ibid., p. 96. 
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evident that this whole movement is weakest in the area of social policy 
and basic goals.l 
There has been considerable discussion of the problems of planning and 
urban renewal by Protestant writers, but in no case has there been an effort to 
develop a systematic ethical framework. 2 In addition there are a number of gen-
eral sources on problems of ethics in urban life. 3 While none of them deal in 
a systematic way with the ethical issues in urban planning, illustrative mate-
rial and ideas from these sources will be used both in the historical and sys-
tematic sections of this dissertation. 
4. Limitations 
The limitations of this dissertation are seen in several dimensions. 
The time span covered in the chapter on the development of modern city planning 
is largely restricted to the period from 1893-1960. The literature and experi-
ence of city planning and the ethical issues involved are drawn primarily from 
1Dennis Clark, Cities in Crisis (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 
p. 103. 
2 Cf. John Osman, "A City Is a Civilization," in The City Church, IX, 
No. l (January-February, 1958), 205; Robert C. Hoover, "The Church in a Plan-
ning Society," in The City Church, XI, No. 5 (November-December, 1960), 2-7; 
Lyle E. Schaller, Urban Renewal and the Church, Report #5 (Cleveland: Regional 
Church Planning Office, May, 1961); National Council of Churches, Metropolis, 
U.S.A. (series of articles originally appearing in The City Church and reprinted 
for the National Council of Churches; New York: Office of Publication and Dis-
tribution, 1960); Perry L. Norton, "The Churches' Concern for the Urban Renais-
sance," published for the Department of the Urban Church, National Council of 
Churches (New York: Office of Publication and Distribution, n.d.); Harry A. 
Boswell, John D. Lange, Perry L. Norton, Dennis O'Harrow, and Meryl H. Ruoss, 
"The Churches and Urban Redevelopment" (panel discussion reprinted from The City 
Church, May-June, 1957; New York: Department of the Urban Church, National 
Council of Churches, n.d.); Howard G. Hageman, "The Theology of the Urban 
Church" (reprinted from The Church Herald, November 7, 14, 21, and 28, 1958; 
New York: Board of Domestic Missions, Reformed Church of America, n.d.). 
3An excellent collection of essays is found in Democracy in Urban 
America: Readings in Government and Politics, ed. Oliver P. Williams and 
Charles Press (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961). Also see Robert Cooley 
Angell, Free Society and Moral Crisis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 195 
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the United States. The discussion of urban society as the context of ethical 
choice similarly focuses on the United States. 
Important limitations are imposed by the methodology and scope of this 
dissertation. In the effort to be synoptic in fields as broad as urban plan-
ning and ethics, there are serious limits to the amount of detailed analysis, 
supporting evidence, exploration of alternative positions, or defense of a 
stated view which can be presented. 
The limited attention to defense or criti~ue of alternatives is partic-
ularly evident in the development of a constructive ethical framework for re-
sponsible planning. Further, the theological and philosophical foundations of 
the moral laws are not developed, although the importance of these foundations 
is noted. Rather, the focus of attention is on the task of developing a con-
structive interpretation of modern city planning, developments in urban society, 
and an ethical framework for responsible planning. 
5. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation will be developed in three main stages: 
first, an historical survey of ethical issues as they have emerged in modern 
city planning in the United States; secondly, an analysis of the basic elements 
involved in the context of ethical choice in contemporary urban society; and, 
finally, the development of a systematic ethical framework for responsible urban 
planning. 
The methodology of the dissertation seeks to relate empirical and theo-
retical materials, factual and normative studies, and to include both analysis 
and synthesis. The basic concern throughout is for emerging empirical coher-
ence. 
CHAPrER II 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN CITY PLANNING 
On Thursday, December 14, 1961, Grandma Moses died. Dorothy Adlow, 
writing in the Christian Science Monitor, said: 
Grandma Moses was a characteristic woman living down country, preoc-
cupied with her family, with farm chores, with religion. It was in char-
acter for a woman like this to be exceedingly modest. To Grandma it was 
no more important to paint a picture than it was to cook a batch of berry 
jam, or to embroider a fine piece. 
In her rural, domestic, happily unsophisticated world there was no di-
vision between major or minor art, between the status of the brush or the 
needle. She had a sound, wholesome, healthy standard of values, her own 
definition of what was good and beautiful. 
To Grandma a picture was good when it was "pretty." A picture was a 
recording of what she saw, what she knew, a remembrance of times past, of 
the beauty of valleys and hills seen from a window in the farmhouse; a 
snowstorm, in which she diligently filled out all the spaces with downy 
white snowflakes; springtime on the farm, the livestock, the industrious 
farmers plowing the good earth. Grandma painted railroad trains, and the 
old-time automobile. 
In her pictures there was a good deal of fun, picnics, skating, coun-
try fairs. She painted farmhouses, barns, and the white church with its 
tall spire; she painted the picket fences.l 
On the same page of the Monitor were the following headlines: "U.S. 
to Boost Aid to VietNam," "Lawyers Strive for World Peace," "Panama Breaks 
Ties with Cuba," and "Red Plan Told in Viet Nam." Advertisements on the page 
included real estate, clothes, Christmas cards, jewelry, pre-cast stone build-
ing blocks, electrical-radio-television service, plumbing-hot water-general 
2 heating repair, and "puncture-proof luggage by Skyway." This single page of 
1
christian Science Monitor (Boston), December 15, 1961, p. 8. 
2Ibid 0 J p 0 8 0 
9 
10 
a newspaper indicates the extent to which the world of Grandma Moses has been 
transformed. 
This dramatic transformation of American society has left no phase of 
living untouched. Regardless of which way society is sliced and labeled, de-
velopment is evident. Use of figures on population growth has become a ritual 
when discussing the past century or projecting the next one. Characteristic 
adjectives used to describe the emerging society frequently include: modern, 
industrial, democratic, bureaucratic, mass, complex, interdependent, rapidly 
changing, and urban. 
Not only has the external environment and social organization changed, 
but the world of meaning has changed also. The sense of what is good, pretty, 
sound, healthy, or wholesome is no longer so obvious or secure. Perhaps this 
helps to explain why Americans have come in the past twenty years to look 
wistfully at the paintings of Anna Mary Robertson, and why she has become 
11 Grandman to a nation. 
But during this past century there have been significant developments 
in ideals as well as ideas, in standards of right and wrong as well as stand-
ards of efficiency or structural strength. And the history of ethics as they 
relate to the developments in city planning may help to provide a better per-
spective for formulating our present-day goals, ideals, and standards. 
City planning and urban sociology have both attempted to view the de-
velopment of the past century from a perspective near the top of the grand-
stand, but have often found themselves caught in the dust and grime of the 
arena. Nowhere is this more evident than in the analysis of the ethical per-
spectives within which these disciplines have tried to work. The main lines 
of conflict and tension in American political philosophy, social and economic 
thought, and theoretical ethics can be seen in the development of planning 
ll 
theory and urban sociology. Further, the theoretical developments have inter-
acted with historical events and trends. 
A definitive history of modern city planning has yet to be written. 
The long sweep of urban life in human history has recently been portrayed by 
Lewis Mumford. 1 The genesis of modern town planning in England has been ex-
amined.2 Thomas Adams work on the history of planning in the United States up 
to the New Deal era remains a classic.3 
the United States was written by Robert 
A survey of 
4 A. Walker. 
modern city planning in 
Christopher Tunnard and 
Henry Reed analyzed the development of American cities with particular emphasis 
on architecture and urban form in the broad setting of technology, political 
and social factors, and population growth. 5 Recently the American Institute 
of Planners has initiated study of the emergence of planning as a profession. 6 
In addition, there have been a variety of articles and commentaries in special 
phases of urban development closely related to planning. A concise listing of 
"Landmarks" in the history of planning was included by Harvey Perloff7 in his 
discussion of education for planning. 
1Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, 
and Its Prospects (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961). 
2William Ashworth, The Genesis of Modern British Town Planning: A 
Study in Economic and Social History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1954). 
3Thomas Adams, Outline of Town and City Planning: A Review of Past 
Efforts and Modern Aims (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1935). 
4Robert A. Walker, The Planning Function in Urban Government (2d ed. 
rev.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950). 
5Christopher Tunnard and Henry Hope Reed, American Skyline: The Growth 
and Form of Our Cities and Towns (New York: The New American Library of World 
Literature, Inc., 1956). 
6American Institute of Planners, "The Professional Status of Urban 
Planning," Professional Document No. 6 (Washington, D.C., 1961). 
7Harvey S. Perloff, Education for Planning: Cit~ State, and Regional 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957). 
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A statement of current perspectives and problems is given in The Future 
Metropolis. 1 Miss Jane Jacobs has written a critique of the planning ideas of 
2 
the past half-century. 
While these various surveys of the history of planning contain much 
relevant factual material, there is a noticeable lack of a unifying theoretical 
perspective. For instance, the role of the conflicts in the value systems of 
the various groups in American life and the developments in social theory are 
largely unexamined. Further, the role of religion and religious institutions 
as opposition, support, or guidance for planning has received casual treatment 
by most writers. To understand this failure to examine the role of values and 
beliefs in shaping the history of planning, it will be useful to note some as-
pects of nineteenth and early twentiety century social thought. During this 
period theology, economics, biology, technology, and ethnology each contrib-
uted to the tendency to ignore the role of values and systems of meaningful be-
liefs in the shaping and molding of society. 
From a particular strand of Puritan theology came the doctrine of Di-
vine Providence working itself out as the hidden hand of God which takes the 
consequences of individual action and weaves them into the good of the whole 
community. Taken over into economics, this became the basis for the liberal 
view that each person or economic unit pursuing its own profit would by a nat-
ural harmony of interests contribute to the highest level of production and the 
best allocation of resources. It was assumed that the market operated as an 
automatic self-regulating mechanism, and that land, labor, money, and organiza-
tion of production should be free from all restraints except those of the market. 
1Lloyd Rodwin (ed.), The Future Metropolis (New York: George Brasiller, 
1961) . 
2Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: 
Random House, 1961). 
13 
Opposing the natural hannony of interests was the Marxist view of the 
dishannony of interests or class conflict. Similarly, Darwin, taking his cue 
from the views of Malthus on the problem of population growth and poverty, 
suggested that a natural disharmony of interests accounts for the survival of 
the fittest in the process of biological evolution. This principle could be 
applied to society as it was by Spencer and the social Darwinists. Here it 
was interpreted to mean that those who succeeded economically were obviously 
the "fittest" and those who succumbed were the weak and unfit. Thus was 
progress made. 
Piotr Kropotkin, Patrick Geddes, and others suggested, however, that 
an equally subsocial process of "symbiosis" or mutual aid which could be ob-
served among animal and plant life was the true explanatory principle. A nat-
ural hannony of interests was again projected. They argued that cooperation 
rather than competition should be enhanced. Ecology, a biological term, was 
applied to the relation of human life to its natural surroundings. 
Whether the social process was viewed as a result of the competition 
of the free market or the symbiosis of the division of labor, the result in 
terms of the role of values in social development was similar. Social develop-
ment was seen as the result of unintended consequences of human action. Human 
ends, whether random, "irrational," self-regarding, or other-regarding could 
be regarded as given. For explanatory principles of social development, it 
was thought necessary to look elsewhere. 
From technology and engineering came the view that the social process 
could be treated by an orderly, rational, calculating method such as "scien-
tific management" which was pioneered by Frederick Taylor in 1907. Just as 
the organization of production in a large industrial plant was a masterpiece 
of engineering "efficiency," so could society be ordered. The problems of 
14 
ordering human values or end choices was "solved" in production by setting as 
a target the objectively verifiable goal of profit. Why could not the same 
process be used in human engineering? Thus, again the problem of human choices 
and values were ignored in the pursuit of efficient means. 1 
Ethnology represented a somewhat different approach to the problems of 
values and ethical choice. It soon became evident that values held by various 
societies and cultures were different. The differences were interpreted to 
mean that values are purely relative, and that there is no basis for choosing 
between them. Cross-cultural similarities of basic thematic values were over-
looked. Thus, whether values were a product of culture, or simply a matter of 
taste, there was no basis for rational ethical choice. 
It is not necessary here to examine the elements of self-contradiction 
in the positions of those who held various aspects of the above views. Nor is 
it necessary to indicate the course of development of research and theory that 
led to a different approach to the methodology of the social sciences. Talcott 
2 Parsons has traced some of the main lines of this development. 
What is significant for the present effort is to note that since World 
War II, social science has had an increasing concern for the social conse-
quences of values, norms, and systems of meaningful beliefs. This has been ac-
companied by a growing interest in the sociology of religion, the processes of 
decision-making, and power structures in society. It is obvious that if human 
values, norms, and beliefs make a difference in shaping social structure, insti-
tutions, economic development, land-use, and political decisions, then those 
1James G. March and Herbert A. 
oration of Harold Guetzkow (New York: 
Simon, Organizations, with the collab-
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 12-22. 
2 Talcott Parsons, Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., Inc., 1937). 
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factors which influence values including social roles, family, religion, 
ethics, social class, and communications systems are significant for all as-
pects of social science. 
That this perspective emerged only recently helps to explain why a 
history of modern city planning which relates the growth of city planning to 
developments in social theory, the value systems, religious institutions, 
meaningful beliefs, and the power structures and conflicts within American 
cities has yet to be written. Such a comprehensive history is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. However, it will be useful to examine some of 
the main lines of this historical development as a background for_ the analysis 
of the context of ethical choice in contemporary urban life and the formula-
tion of an ethical framework for planning and decision making. 
1. Historical Development 
David Riesman suggests that the 
. present state of American experience and imagination is . . . encased 
in an additive or extrapolative mode of perception. When we have a problem, 
we have a standard remedy: More, we add a road, a wing to a school, a new 
department or government agency. Seldom do we rearrange the givens so that 
they become tokens in a new configuration as was done, for notable examples, 
in the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Marshall Plan. 1 
Although the history of city planning has generally been viewed from 
the "additive" perspective, it is important to view the significant changes in 
"configuration" that have taken place. While some of the same elements such 
as real estate interests social reformers, or ethnic groups have been present 
in each new configuration, their relationships to what was expected and accom-
plished by city planning has changed significantly. 
However, before exploring the patterns or configurations SliTrounding 
1David Riesman, "The Suburban Dislocation," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXIV (November, 1957), 127. 
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city planning in twentieth century America, it is necessary to note some of 
the significant developments in the nineteenth century. 
i. Nineteenth Century Backgrounds 
The modern industrial city in America emerged during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. Factors affecting this growth included developments 
in the technology of agriculture, transportation, and manufacturing, the ar-
rival of seventeen million immigrants ready to work, a land rich in mineral and 
agricultural potential, and a social system free of traditional restraints and 
geared to a market economy. 
Steam power opened a new system of technology, industry, transporta-
tion, and cit~- building. Coal and iron were needed. Railroads opened the 
Midwest. Chicago grew from 4,000 in 1840 to over 1,000,000 by 1890. 1 Other 
cities, at different periods, underwent a similarly rapid rate of growth. When 
and where they developed depended in part on the general east-west movement of 
population, transportation networks, mineral wealth to exploit, a hinterland 
to service, or a distinctive function to perform. In 1850, 5.1 per cent of the 
population lived in the six cities of 100,000 population: This had grown to 
2 18.1 per cent living in thirty-eight cities with 100,000 by 1900. The total 
population increased from 5 million in 1800 to 23 million in 1850 and to 76 
million in 1900. 
It was during and after the Civil War that industry developed rapidly, 
using new techniques of machine production organized in factories. Concentra-
tions of wealth grew rapidly based on real estate speculation, railroads, 
shipping, city transportation systems, commerce, manufacturing, and above all, 
~allenbeck, op. cit., p. 22. 
2Ibid., p. 25. 
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banking. As Karl Polanyi1 has pointed out, land, labor, and money were all 
subject to the free market. Traditional restraints were off. The liberal 
economic views were in control. Government, far from regulating economic 
life, was responding to the need of dominant economic interests. Nowhere was 
this more true than in municipal government. 
The conditions in American cities by 1890 and 1900 were ripe for the 
pens of the "Muckrakers." Jacob Riis, Lincoln Stephens, Ida Tarbell, and 
others made use of the booming circulation of middle class magazines to de-
scribe the living conditions, economic insecurity, and political corruption of 
the cities. Lewis Mumford has recently written a vivid description of these· 
cities. 2 The sheer ugliness of these cities was such that the viewing by 27 
million people of a civic center built for the Columbian Exposition of Chicago 
in 1893 helped to touch off the "City Beautiful" movement. However, before 
examining this aspect of early city planning it is useful to note the main cur-
rents in the social thought of the nineteenth century. 
Social thought can usefully be view~d in terms of the strains and 
stresses which different persons and groups experience in their roles in so-
ciety.3 Characteristic strains in late nineteenth century America were found 
along the lines of major social change. These included: (l) the rapid indus-
trialization and urbanization in a previously rural and small town society; 
(2) growing concentrations of wealth and corporate power alongside the poverty 
~arl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 
p. 201. 
~umford, The City in History, op. cit. 
3Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed.; Glencoe, 
Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 4.57-88. 
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and insecurity of the urban laboring classes; (3) increasing numbers of Roman 
Catholic immigrants entering a predo~inantly Protestant nation; (4) the chal-
lenge to traditional Christian theology by science and particularly the idea 
of evolution; and, (4) the shake-up of traditional patterns of morality which 
was occasioned by social dislocation and the awareness of cultural differences. 
These strains took place within the framework of the emerging American 
social structure which was characterized by the differentiation of the basic 
institutions of religion, government, law, and economic life. The kinship 
nexus which had provided the unifying element in the social structure of medi-
eval Europe no longer served this function. An aristocracy based on family 
which had unified the institutions of economic, political, and religious life 
did not become the dominant feature in America. Instead there emerged a pat-
tern of constitutional law, separation of church and state, a free market 
economy, and a nuclear family unit with limited functions. The status struc-
ture which emerged was largely based on occupational or financial achievement. 
The differentiation of the basic social institutions created a situa-
tion in which each institution developed considerable autonomy. The courts 
under the Constitution could establish the framework of limitations under which 
the political and economic structures must operate. The churches were free of 
government regulation, but could criticize or support government policies. 
With industrialization, the family ceased to be the unit of production except 
on the family farm and some small businesses. Economic activity was largely 
free of government intervention, although for a time the reverse was certainly 
not the case. 
This, then, is part of the background against which must be viewed the 
growth of a highly complex, interacting, and interdependent urban industrial 
society. There were problems of cooperation and conflict between the different 
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institutional structures and the functions they performed or the values persons 
and groups sought to achieve through them. The ways in which persons sought 
to achieve cooperation or participate in conflict, the goals they were seeking, 
and the reasons they gave for what they were doing help us to understand de-
velopments in social thought. 
In discussing the similarities of Protestant Christianity and the 
American democratic faith during the middle period of the nineteenth century, 
Gabriel finds five parallel doctrines. 
The doctrine of the fundamental moral law is related to that of the 
law of the divine monarch in the early Protestant version of the Kingdom 
of God. American constitutionalism owes a debt to John Calvin's insist-
ence upon the restraint of evil, whether it results from the activities of 
individuals or of governments. The doctrine of the free individual, post-
ulating the gradual escape of men from external political control, as they 
learned to obey the moral law, had its counterpart in the emphasis of the 
Evangelicals upon the freedom of the regenerated man from the terrors of 
that Old Testament code framed for the curbing of unruly and sinful gener-
ations. The philosophy of progress was similar to the Utopian hopes of the 
millenarians. The mission of American democracy to save the world from the 
oppression of autocrats was a secular version of the destiny of Christianity 
to save the world from the governance of Satan.l 
Thus, the faith in a fundamental law as the basis for order and the 
free individual acting outside government control, achieving progress toward a 
mission of high significance, was a basic foundation of the American value sys-
tem. That the values of order, freedom, and responsible goal-seeking could be 
the basis for conflict in a newly emerging urban civilization seems evident. 
Early efforts were made to harmonize Roman Catholic thought with the 
democratic faith by Orestes Brownson and Isaac Hecker. Brownson argued that 
authority and the moral law were needed, and that authority could be found in 
the Roman Catholic church. Hecker emphasized the doctrine of two realms. In 
one realm there was democratic politics; in the other an authoritarian church. 
1Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought (2d ed. 
rev.; New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956), pp. 37-88. 
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While Hecker failed to convert many Protestants, this doctrine did become im-
portant in the later development in the Roman Catholic Church. 
To this earlier pattern, the latter part of the nineteenth century saw 
~ 
the addition of the gospel of wealth and social Darwinism. The gospel of 
wealth viewed the individual as a free agent whose rewards were consistent 
with his merits. Prosperity was a sign of goodness, and poverty a temporary 
badge of failure. The new economic elite found this a convenient interpreta-
tion. Further, they viewed the state as having the negative utilitarian police 
function, plus an occasional service to the needs of industry. There was, how-
ever, a considerable emphasis on stewardship of wealth and its use for the wel-
fare of the community. 
Social Darwinism arrived with the teachings of Herbert Spencer. 
Hofstadter notes that Darwinism was used to support the conservative outlook. 
The idea of struggle and "survival of the fittest" suggested that the " .. 
best competitors in a competitive situation would win, and that this would 
lead to continuing improvement." 1 The slow pace of progress indicated that 
" all sound development must be slow and unhurried." 2 
William Graham Sumner said that men should simply face up to hardship, 
while Herbert Spencer believed that the whole process was headed for a glori-
ous consummation. In both cases it was suggested that efforts to alter social 
process was futile. 
While these views were given a secular cast, they did represent some-
thing of a" ... naturalistic Calvinism in which man's relation to nature is 
as hard and demanding as man's relation to God under the Calvinistic system." 3 
1Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (4th ed. 
rev.; Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960), p. 6. 
3Ib id . , p . 10 . 
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In terms of an economic ethic, the consequences were much the same as 
those Max Weber noted in his study of Protestantism and early capitalism. 1 
Hofstadter notes the relevance of the social Darwinist view to the economy of 
the time. 
This secular piety found its practical expression in an economic ethic 
that seemed to be demanded with special urgency by a growing industrial 
society which was calling up all the labor and capital it could muster to 
put to work on its vast unexploited resources. Hard work and hard saving 
seemed to be called for, while leisure and waste were doubly suspect. 
The economic ethic engendered by these circumstances put a premium on those 
qualities that seemed necessary for the disciplining of a labor force and 
a force of small investors. In articulating those needs, Sumner expressed 
an inherited conception of economic life, even today fairly widespread 
among conservatives in the United States, under which economic activity was 
considered to be above all a field for the development and encouragement of 
personal character. Economic life was construed as a set of arrangements 
they offered inducements to men of good character, while it punished those 
who were, in Sumner's words, "negligent, shiftless, inefficient, silly, and 
imprudent . "2 
The characteristic virtues preached by the social Darwinists sound much 
like the early Puritans. 
The virtues that Spencer and Sumner preached--personal providence, 
family loyalty and family responsibility, hard work, careful management, 
and proud self-sufficiency--were middle-class values.3 
However, there is little doubt that these views also served a convenient ideol-
ogy for the wealthy elite who were coming under increasing attack. Criticism 
of the injustices of the emerging social order went hand-in-hand with criticism 
of the gospel of wealth and social Darwinism. 
The careful student of ideas will find other trends beginning to emerge 
prior to 1893. However, this background of the American democratic faith, in-
dividualistic Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholicism, the gospel of wealth, 
~ax Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. 
Talcott Parsons (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930). 
2 Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 10. 
3Ibid., p. ll. 
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and social Darwinism helps to set the stage for the "City Beautiful" and the 
Age of Reform. 
ii. The City Beautiful and the Age of 
Reform: 1893 to World War I 
The beginnings of modern city planning are generally seen as emerging 
in the twenty year period preceding World War I. The shape of the new urban 
industrial society was emerging more clearly. The reaction of various aspects 
of society to the free play of the market were beginning to be felt, and with 
this reaction carne major developments in social reform and social thought. 
Religious institutions, theology, and social teachings were undergoing signif-
icant changes. New expectations of municipal government were emerging, and 
conflict between the immigrant groups who were predominantly Roman Catholic 
and the Protestant middle and upper classes was becoming more evident. An ex-
arnination of these factors is necessary to establish the basic configuration 
of the "City Beautiful" movement. 
By 1893 the autonomy of the economic sphere of society was threatening 
to create structures of economic power which would dominate all other aspects 
of society. The social consequences of this domination produced a wide range 
of responses. Karl Polanyi suggests that the self-regulating market was able 
to survive longer in the United States than in Europe because of the readily 
available supplies of abundant land and labor and relative freedom from the 
necessity to maintain stable foreign exchange. 
As long as these conditions prevailed, neither man, nor nature, nor 
business organization needed protection of the kind that only gcvernment 
intervention could provide. 
As soon as these conditions ceased to exist, social protection set in. 
As the lower range of labor could not any more be freely replaced from an 
inexhaustable reservoir of immigrants, while its higher ranges were unable 
to settle freely on the land; as the soil and natural resources became 
scarce and had to be husbanded; as the gold standard was introduced in 
order to remove the currency from politics and to link domestic trade with 
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that of the world, the United States caught up with a century of European 
development: protection of the soil and its cultivation, social security 
for labor through unionism and legislation, and central banking--all on 
the largest scale--made their appearance.l 
Increasing numbers of immigrants were entering the rapidly growing 
cities where land and labor were treated as commodities with no protection 
from the insecurities of the market place. That this misunderstands the func-
tion or values of land in human society seems evident. 
The economic function is but one of many vital functions of land. It 
invests man's life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is 
a condition of his physical safety; it is the landscape and the reasons. 
We might as well imagine his being born without hands and feet as carrying 
on his life without land. And yet to separate land from man and organize 
society in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of a real-estate mar-
ket was a vital part of the utopian concept of a market economy.2 
Similarly the commodity theory of labor ignored the fact that the man 
goes with his labor, and that labor, unlike physical goods or money, cannot be 
withheld from the market to be sold later at a higher price. The day's work 
must be done each day or it is irretrievably lost. The assumption that the 
market alone should govern meant that all other aspects of life must accommo-
date themselves to the conditions of the market. 
To separate labor from other activities of life and to subject it to 
the laws of the market was to annihilate all organic forms of existence 
and to replace them by a different type of organization, an atomistic and 
individualistic one. 
Such a scheme of destruction was best served by the application of the 
principle of freedom of contract. In practice this meant that the non-
contractual organizations of kinship, neighborhood, profession, and creed 
were to be liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual 
and thus restrained his freedom. To represent this principle as one of 
noninterference, as economic liberals were wont to do, was merely the ex-
pression of an ingrained prejudice in favor of a definite kind of interfer-
ence, namely, such as would destroy noncontractual relations between indi-
viduals and prevent their spontaneous reformation.3 
1Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
~avid Riesman, Selected Essays from Individualism Reconsidered 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955), p. 178. 
3Ibid., p. 163. 
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Unable to protect or secure from the market place values which they 
held to be essential, it was not surprising that persons turned to other in-
stitutions, notably government, to meet their needs. 
Although Polanyi traces the response to the treatment of land, labor, 
and money to the insecurities of the self-regulating market, he fails to notice 
an equally significant development. The organization of the production and 
distribution process itself seeks protection from the insecurities of the mar-
ket. The growth of the large corporation can be viewed as the effort to elim-
inate from within the production process the disorder and insecurity of the 
cash nexus. The producer sought to guarantee his supply of materials by pur-
chasing the firm of his suppliers and his means of distribution by dominating 
the retail outlets. Equally important, of course, was the effort to achieve 
security in the final market by reducing or eliminating competition. Whether 
by design or the "laws of economics," this was the outcome for major segments 
of industry. 
While the effort to obtain governmental regulation of the abuses of 
economic power was of considerable significance for the cities, the major bat-
tles were fought of necessity at the national level. l As Hofstadter notes, 
the Populist movement, which supported William Jennings Bryan for the presi-
dency in 1896, grew largely from the small town and country-side, was opposed 
to business generally, was distrustful of city machine politics, and had a 
strong nativist element which opposed immigration and feared the Roman Catholics. 
Its efforts were primarily oriented toward regulation and restraint, seeking 
to extend the police function of government rather than asking for government 
services. 
1Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 
1960), pp. 60-93· 
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Progressivism, in contrast, was related to the reform movements in the 
cities. This can be interpreted as a result of the status revolution. 
The newly rich, the grandiosely or corruptly rich, the masters of 
great corporations, were bypassing the men of the Mugwump type--the old 
gentry, the merchants of long standing, the small manufacturers, the es-
tablished professional men, the civic leaders of an earlier era. In a 
score of cities and hundreds of towns, particularly in the East but also 
in the nation at large, the old-family, college-educated class that had 
deep ancestral roots in local communities and often owned family busi-
nesses, that had traditions of political leadership, belonged to the 
patriotic societies and the.best clubs, staffed the governing boards of 
philanthropic and cultural institutions, and led the movements for civic 
betterment, were being overshadowed and edged aside in the making of basic 
political and economic decisions. In their personal careers, as in their 
community activities, they found themselves checked, hampered, and over-
ridden by the agents of the new corporations, and corrupters of legisla-
tures, the buyers of franchises, the allies of the political bosses. In 
this uneven struggle they found themselves limited by their own scruples, 
their regard for reputation, their social standing itself. To be sure, 
the America they knew did not lack opportunities, but it did seem to 
lack opportunities of the highest sort for men of the highest standards. 
In a strictly economic sense these men were not growing poorer as a class, 
but their wealth and power were being dwarfed by comparison with the new 
eminences of wealth and power. They were less important, and they knew 
it. 1 
Further, it is significant to note that the leaders of the progressive move-
ment, though urban and middle class, were individualists who had not known 
the disciplines of large organization. Their ideas still represented an 
earlier, rural viewpoint. 2 
Although the recession of 1894 quickly dampened much of the enthusiasm 
generated by the Chicago Columbian Exposition of 1893, the City Beautiful move-
ment did bring a renaissance of classical and Baroque architecture in the con-
struction of many public buildings. These were frequently grouped around a 
park or formal garden. The L'Enfant plan for Washington, D.C., was revived in 
1901. The park system of Boston grew from 1900 acres in 1893 to 13,000 acres 
1Ibid., p. 137. 2Ibid., pp. 144-45. 
of park land plus 19 miles of ocean beach for public use. Similar develop-
1 
ments took place in cities across the land. 
While developments had some significance for the future of city plan-
ning, developments in other areas of Ameri~an life were of much greater poten-
tial impact . 
Not only was the nation being unified by the financial control of the 
large corporation, but a new social elite was being created. The first volume 
of the Social Register appeared in 1888 in New York, and this listing of 
"society" soon spread to other cities. 2 Qualifications for listing included 
not only wealth, but the proper style of life. Gifts to public cultural in-
stitutions, parks, or gardens were appropriate. Interest in beautifying the 
city developed as an important status symbol for the new national elite of 
great wealth as well as the lower-upper class whose prestige was tied to their 
home city. 
In addition, the reference group of American society was being extended 
to the aristocracies of Europe. This is reflected in the remarks of Frederick 
Ford, City Engineer of Hartford, Connecticut. 
One cannot think of Berlin without the Unter den Linden. The Ring-
strasse lined with imposing public buildings is the chief glory of magnif-
icent Vienna; the harmonious grouping of state and municipal buildings 
about s~uares and upon tree-lined boulevards makes Paris the most attrac-
tive city of Europe. Does not our Capital-crowned Bushnell Park likewise 
give Hartford the right to claim high rank among the beautiful cities of 
America? Here we have a striking example of a magnificent building made 
more imposing by the beauty and harmony of its setting.3 
l Tunnard and Reed, op. cit., pp. 142-53-
~- Digby Baltzell, '"Who's Who in America' and 'The Social Register': 
Elite and Upper Class Indexes in Metropolitan America," Class, Status and 
Power: A Reader in Social Stratification, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymore 
Martin Lipsit (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 175-76. 
3Frederick L. Ford, "Connecticut's Opportunity," The Grouping of Public 
Buildings, Bulletin No. 2 of the Municipal Art Society of Hartford, Conn. 
(Hartford: Published by the Society, 1904), p. 7-
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Ford buttresses his appeal for puchase and redevelopment of a railroad 
roundhouse site by pointing to its value in preserving present investment, re-
duzed fire hazards, yearly tax savings, increased efficiency in heating of 
state capitol, increased efficiency of state departments by close grouping, 
and "preservation of the exterior features of the state capitol." 1 
Social thought was undergoing significant changes filled with implica-
tions for future development. On the conservative side was the emergence of 
a more articulate defense of classical free enterprise and the application of 
social Darwinism to group, racial, and national life. But reform was in the 
wind. In religion, the social gospel of Protestantism was matched by the new 
social pronouncements in Roman Catholicism. Empirical social research was be-
ing developed as a tool of reform, and sociology was beginning to offer a ra-
tionale for reform. In the disciplines of history, economics, law, philosophy, 
and education a "revolt against formalism" 2 was underway. Because these devel-
opments are part of the background of the new configuration which developed 
during and after the New Deal, they need to be examined more closely. Signif-
icant perspectives can be grouped in three categories: (l) non-intervention, 
(2) radical intervention, and (3) democratic reform. 
l. Non-intervention.--A more articulate defense of the economy domi-
nated by the large corporation was being developed in response to the attack 
by social reformers. Economists accepted the necessity of maintaining the gold 
standard, limited government, and the self-regulating market economy. This was 
elaborated into what Sutton has called the "classical" ideology of the American 
business creed. This ideology holds that the free play of the market under 
1Ibid., p. 20. 
~orton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism, 
with a new preface and an epilogue (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). 
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rigorous competitive conditions will result in an optimum allocation of re-
sources, labor, and productive capacity in a way perfectly "responsible" to 
the wants of persons in the community. 1 That these rigorous conditions were 
seldom met tended to be overlooked. 
As noted earlier, this view argues that whatever "is" the result of 
the market forces "ought" to be. This meant that " . . the theory does not 
provide, without further argument and the introduction of specific value judg-
ments, any basis for evaluating one way or the other the existing distribution 
of income. "2 That this would be more readily acceptable to those who were fa-
vored seems evident. 
This "classical" view of the economic system has been the main line of 
defense of those who opposed any "intervention" of the government in economic 
life. Elaborated in various forms, 3 it has been the central line of argument 
against "planning." However, the ethical principles which undergird this view 
have undergone some change as will be noted later. 
Social Darwinism also developed along new lines as a conservative doc-
trine. These included the application of social Darwinism to national and 
racial questions. However, new research in eugenics was used as a basis for 
social thought. 
Doubtless the rapid urbanization of American life, which created great 
slums in which were massed the diseased, the deficient, and the demented, 
had much to do with the rise of eugenics. The movement was also favored 
by a growing interest in philanthropy and increasing endowments for hos-
pitals and charities and appropriations for public health. Especially 
stimulating to the study of mental disease and deficiency was the rapid 
~rancis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, and James Tobin, 
The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 
p. 132. 
3cf. Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 19 9 . 
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expansion of American psychiatry after 1900. As more and more diseased 
and defective families in great cities came to the attention of physicians 
and social workers, it was easy to confuse the rising mass of known cases 
with a real increase. The influx of a large immigrant population from 
peasant countries of central and southern Europe, hard to assimilate be-
cause of rustic habits and language barriers, gave color to the notion that 
immigration was lcwering the standard of American intelligence; at least 
so it seemed to nativists who assumed that a glib command of English is a 
natural criterion of intellectual capacity. The apparent economic deceler-
ation at the end of the century was also seen by many observers as the be-
ginning of a national decline; and it was in accordance with the habits of 
a Darwinized era to find in this apparent social decline a biological de-
terioration associated with the disappearance of "the American type."l 
With the growing diversity of ethnic groups in the cities, intergroup 
attitudes affected social and political behavior in a wide variety of ways. 
The relation of ethnic group patterns to the politics of city planning has not 
been ade~uately explored. The relation of rackets, politics, and the social 
mobility of ethnic groups is discussed by Daniel Bell, 2 though the implications 
for the history of city planning are not mentioned. However, the rationaliza-
tions of older ethnic groups in their exclusion of newer groups from full par-
ticipation in economic or political life have been continuing themes of con-
servative social thought. 
2. Radical intervention.--In opposition to those elements in social 
thought which defended the status ~uo, there developed attacks upon the exist-
ing order which sought a variety of changes. Among these were the revolution-
ary socialists. Marx and Engels had called attention to the conditions of the 
working class and the range of conse~uences that were emerging in their day 
from the growth of industrialism. They had re-emphasized the ~uestion of power, 
rejected the idea of a natural harmony of interests in favor of a conflict of 
interests along class lines, contributed to historicism, and proclaimed that 
~ofstadter, The Age of Reform, op. cit., pp. 162-63. 
2Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political 
Ideas in the Fifties (2d ed. rev.; New York: Collier Books, 196~pp. 127-50. 
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the purpose of knowledge is not to describe the world but to change it. How-
ever, they viewed the bourgeois state as being simply a police function used 
by the ruling class. The socialist attack on the bourgeois state make them a 
threat not only to the aristocracy but to the growing middle class as well. 
That the radical interventionists never achieved much influence in the 
United States is no doubt due to a variety of factors including: (l) the lack 
of a rigid hereditary class structure; (2) the relatively high rate of social 
mobility; (3) the opportunity for political action; (4) the idealization of 
the principle of equality of opportunity by the upper as well as the lower 
classes; and (5) the awareness by some business leaders that reforms might be 
good business. However, fear of radical intervention no doubt played a part 
in persuading the middle and upper classes to yield on many issues of social 
reform. Also, the identification of planning with socialism and communism and 
especially with the Soviet system has no doubt led many "planners" to try very 
hard to prove that they are not radical interventionists but are just trying 
to apply "good business principles" to the limited activities of government. 
3. Democratic reform.--The main stream of American thought supported 
the gradual development of what can be called democratic reform. This stream 
included the development of social thought in both the Protestant and Roman 
Catholic churches, in social research and sociology, and the emergence of 
pragmatism and instrumentalism. 
Both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism carried on extensive works of 
charity, developing new institutional structures for social work to meet the 
needs of the poor in the cities. In addition, within the Protestant churches, 
there emerged the social gospel movement which diagnosed the ills of society 
as lying in the institutional structures of society. Generally rejecting the 
pursuit of narrow economic self-interest as a basis for the economic order, it 
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turned to the strengthening of the democratic control of government and the de-
velopment of the service state, the fostering of labor unions, and the working 
toward a cooperative society. The characteristic doctrine of the social gospel 
was the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God was viewed by Walter Rauschenbusch1 
as divine in origin, progress, and consummation. It contains the teleology of 
the Christian religion, and is both present and future. It was initiated on 
earth by Jesus, who imposed the image of his personality on it, universalized 
it to include all men, and made salvation central. In the Kingdom of God, hu-
manity will and should be organized according to the will of God (which in-
eludes the norms of justice, righteousness and love). The Kingdom is the su-
preme end of life, embraces all of life, is the perspective from which all 
problems must be viewed, and to build the Kingdom is the purpose for which the 
church exists. 
Thus, the basic ethical thrust of the social gospel was forward look-
ing, inclusive of all persons and all institutions of society, and was con-
cerned for social justice, freedom, and order. The requirements of Christian 
love were seen as controlling both means and ends. Further, the whole perspec-
tive was grounded in convictions about the ultimate nature of reality and the 
destiny of man. 
The social gospel formed the basis for a critique of the existing so-
cial order, and lifted up new ideals of cooperative planning. These included 
concern for the structure of political, economic, educational, social welfare, 
and religious institutions. Rauschenbusch even discussed the role of the news-
papers in making possible cooperative intelligent community decisions. He 
pointed out that a responsible press " ... registers the facts, communicates 
~alter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1917), pp. 131- 5. 
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them to the centers concerned, and spreads before the community the data on 
which public action must be based." 1 The influence of the social gospel on 
the churches themselves can be seen in the organization of the Federal Council 
of the Churches of Christ in America and the adoption of the Social Creed in 
1908. 
The relationship between leaders in the social gospel movement and 
early city planning has not been investigated. It is significant, however, 
that "John M. Gleen, organizer and general director of the Russell Sage Founda-
tion served on important committees of the Federal Council of Churches 
during its first quadrennium of existence." 2 Also, Jane Addams was one of the 
leaders of the first conference on city planning in Washington, D.C., in 1909. 
That many leaders in the Protestant churches were seeking to orient themselves 
and their understanding of religion to the challenges and opportunities of 
urban industrial society seems evident. 3 
Between 1870 and 1900, the Roman Catholic response to urban conditions 
took the form of temperance movements, increased charities and institutions for 
the care of the poor, and a developing sentiment supporting the modification of 
the economic system through non-socialist labor unions. There was severe con-
flict in the church about the legitimacy of labor unions, but liberal leader-
ship exemplified by Cardinal Gibbons prevailed. 4 
~alter Rauschenbusch, Christianizing the Social Order (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1912), p. 284. 
~askell M. Miller, Compassion and Community: An Appraisal of the 
Church's Changing Role in Social Welfare (New York: Association Press, 1961), 
p. 5-
3Charles H. Hopkins, Yale Studies in Religious Education, Vol. XIV: 
The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism 1865-1915 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 245-46. 
4Aarron I. Abell, American Catholicism and Social Action: A Search 
for Social Justice, 1865-1950 (Garden City, N.Y.: Hanover House, 1960), pp. 
87-88. 
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Pope Leo XIII formulated a program for social justice in Rerum Novarum, 
issued in May, 1891. He defended private property as based on natural law, 
but took note of the condition of the world's poor. In addition to the require-
ments of charity, the encyclical discussed the "living wage" and the principle 
that government should be concerned with the general welfare. A form of indus-
trial guild organization was suggested which was readily interpreted as sup-
porting English and American trade unionism. 
One of the most vigorous spokesmen at the turn of the century was the 
Most Reverend George Montgomery, Bishop of Monterey-Los Angeles, California. 
He criticized the power of capital to buy special privilege from government, 
and argued that labor needed to support " . . . honest and conscientious repre-
sentatives and public servants. ,l Bishop Montgomery looked forward to more re-
sponsible government, income taxes, nationalization of transportation and com-
munications, and municipal socialism. 2 
The German ethnic group within the Roman Catholic Church played a sig-
nificant role in the leadership of social thought. The Central Verein published 
a magazine on social justice and in 1909 called for political reform, including 
the initiative, referendum, recall, and the commission plan of municipal govern-
ment.3 
When the National Conference of Catholic Charities was organized in 
1910, the first Convention " ... as a whole sounded the keynote that urban 
poverty and crime stemmed mainly from bad industrial conditions." 4 
The American Federation of Catholic societies established a Social 
Service Commission in 1911. 
1Ibid.' p. 87. 
3Ibid., p. 18. 
2Ibid.' p. 88. 
4Thid.' p. 167. 
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In statements and resolutions approved in successive conventions after 
1910, the federation declared its sympathy with the aspirations of the 
workers to better their conditions by organized effort in conservative trade 
unions, endorsed collective bargaining and trade agreements, and urged em-
ployers to recognize the fundamental right of workingmen to organize. The 
federation pledged its support to all legislative action for the elimina-
tion of unnecessary labor on Sunday, a living wage, reasonable hours of 
labor, protection of life and limb, abolition of child labor, just compen-
sation for injury, and proper moral and sanitary conditions in the home, 
shop, mine, and factory.l 
These activities and concerns of the Roman Catholic Church in the United 
States are related to the position which the new immigrants, largely of Roman 
Catholic faith, occupied in the society. For the most part they were in the 
urban working classes and the consequences of urban living and working condi-
tions were more than obvious. 
Roman Catholics and the social gospel leaders of Protestantism would 
agree that the state is a natural consequence of man's social nature. Thus, 
the state can be a servant of man's rational interpretation of his needs. This 
perspective tends toward a general optimism about the possibilities for social 
planning. 
However, some traditions in Protestantism (notably the Lutheran and 
Reformed) hold that the state is a dike which holds back the evil in man's will. 
To view the state as dominated by emotions rather than reason often 
encourages a simplistic attitude toward social and political reform (either 
make the incumbent more responsive to moral pressures or replace him) which 
sees the problems of political life as rooting in bad character rather than 
stemming from inadequate technical or political knowledge. It also encour-
ages a suspicion of everything proffered by politicians in the name of the 
state, and a cynical attitude toward one's obligations to that state. A 
third consequence of emphasizing the irrational character of the state is 
often apathetic disregard of means one could use for improving the function-
ing of the state for the public good.2 
That a wide range of responses to particular situations can be significantly 
1Ibid. J p. 179. 
~ichard D. N. Dickinson, "Roman Catholic-Protestant Dialogue" ( unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School, Boston University, 1962), p. 13. 
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understood in the light of these contrasting positions seems evident. 
The use of reason to diagnose problems and possible solutions was 
finding expression in other ways, also. Empirical urban sociology had its be-
ginnings in concern for social reform among religious and secular leaders. 
"Scientific research and social survey reports provided an arsenal of facts as 
l 
ammunition in the fight for a better world." Not only was this true of the 
beginnings of empirical research in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
but it was also true of the social problems, emphasis of courses, and writings 
. . l . 2 1n soc1a sc1ence. 
The concern for social reform by means of reason, scientific understand-
ing of society, and wise social policy implemented by government was given its 
classic late nineteenth century statement by Lester F. Ward. 3 Ward argued that: 
As man increases in virtue and knowledge, the fundamental laws of 
morals and of nature become increasingly effective in his life and the 
State relatively less necessary. The rationalists replied that the State 
should be made the servant rather than the master of its citizens. The 
planned use of this matchless instrument is the highest expression of hu-
man freedom. In brief, the prophets of the gospel of wealth insisted 
that collectivism and individualism are antithetical; the new humanists 
maintained that collectivism can be made the servant of individualism. 
Ward believed that ultimately social experimentation and intelligent so-
cial planning would produce laws so ,patently wise and just that they 
would be self-enforcing.4 · 
Sociology as it developed in the early twentieth century shared the 
urge to reform. 
Influenced by the humanitarianism of the day and the political renais-
sance of the common man, the new sociology was pulled along in the current 
1Glen W. Trimble, "The Implications of Field Experience in Action Re-
search for Studies of Church and Community" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Graduate School, Boston University, 1951). 
~oward Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, Social Thought from Lore to 
Science (2d ed. rev.; Washington, D.C.: Harren Press, 1952), II, 953-55· 
3Ibid., pp. 963-73· 
4Gabriel, op. cit., p. 225. 
of Progressivism. The discipline was no longer seen by its practitioners 
as a complicated way of justifying laissez faire. Men like Ross and 
Cooley refused to look upon the poor as unfit or to worship at the shrine 
of the fittest .... In his Sin and Society, 1907, Ross criticized the 
prevailing code of morals for failing to pierce the veil of the impersonal 
corporate relations of modern society and to fix blame for social ills on 
absentee malefactors. The spirit of reform had been set loose within the 
very discipline that Spencer had hoped would teach men to let things alone.l 
Diagnosis of ills and the awareness of the extent to which they were 
the product of human decisions readily led to the conclusion that if the deci-
sions were made in a different way the consequences would be different. This 
is obviously one of the foundation stones of any philosophy of planning. 
In addition to the social gospel, Roman Catholic social teachings, and 
the humanists who held that gradual change for the improvement of conditions 
was possible within the democratic framework of American institutions, there 
developed also the tradition of pragmatism and instrumentalism. 
Out of the epistemological and metaphysical speculations of this period 
came a philosophy and ethics whose central emphasis was the use of intelligence 
and reason in problem solving and planning. John Dewey shared the emphasis of 
Karl Marx on the role of ideas as a means to change the world. Not only his 
theory of knowledge but also his ethics were prospective. 
The moral issue concerns the future. Blame and p·unishment are no 
longer ends of moral investigation; they are instruments for the develop-
ment of responsible persons. In line with this approach he faces the old 
problem of determinism, and given an answer which is not only similar to 
that of Aristotle and Spinoza but which closely resembles the.position of 
Jonathan Edwards. Freedom is not interpreted as the absence of causes; it 
is the determination of the widest number of desires which have been in-
telligently evaluated in order to give them long range perspective. It is 
only the truth which can make men free. Culturally this implied freedom 
from the barriers of tradition, authority, class, and privilege; the widest 
possible sharing of experience and knowled~e of the conditions and conse-
quences of social life he terms democracy. 
~ofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, op. cit., p. 160. 
Srhe Development of American Philosophy, ed. Walter G. Muelder, 
Lawrence Sears, and Anne V. Schlabach (2d ed. rev.; Cambridge, Mass: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 347. 
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The emphasis on the use of intelligence in diagnosing the limits and possibil-
ities of a situation, the rational evaluation of long-range consequences, the 
perception of the self and its physical and social setting as part of a single 
unitary process, and the emphasis on democracy as the means by which a commu-
nity chooses its own future are obviously significant for both the goals and 
methods of planning. 
By giving philosophical expression to the demands for social reform, 
John Dewey helped to lay the ground-work for the New Deal. 
The social emphasis acquired by instrumentalism has, however, a larger 
significance. Dewey, who was born in the year when The Origin of Species 
appeared, survived James for a period in which two generations came to ma-
turity, and social criticism among men of academic standing became respect-
able. The beginnings of the Progressive era, moreover, coincided with the 
growth and spread of Dewey's ideas--the same period in which James himself 
thought he saw the competitive regime "getting wounded to death"; and it 
is easy to see Dewey's faith in knowledge, experimentation, activity, and 
control as the counterpart in abstract philosophy of the Progressive faith 
in democracy and political action. It is not far from Croly's appeal to 
his countrymen to think in terms of purpose rather than inevitable destiny, 
or from Lippmann's assertion that "we can no longer treat life as some-
thing that has trickled down to us" to Dewey's appeal for an experimental 
approach to social theory. If Dewey's belief in the efficacy of intelli-
gence and education in social change was justified, his own philosophy was 
more than a passive reflection of the transformation in American thought. 
The sight of a distinguished philosopher occupied with the activities of 
third parties, reform organizations, and labor unions provided a measure 
of some of the changes that have taken place on the American Intellectual 
stage since the days when Fiske and Youmans were dramatizing Spencer for 
an enchanted audience.l 
It remains then to note the ethical principles appealed to or implied 
in the judgments made by those participating in the city planning movement of 
this period. In the records of the first city planning conferences, the eth-
ical perspectives of several of the leaders can be clearly seen. Several 
broad principles emerge. 
l. Planning should be guided by the "best" ideals of the community.--
Raymond Unwin, e.g., said that " the realization of the best ideals of 
~ofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, op. cit., pp. 141-42. 
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l the Commonwealth cannot be too complete." This leaves open the problem of 
possible conflicts in ideals, the social process by which they are chosen, and 
the criteria by which ideals are constructed. However, Mr. Unwin did hold that 
city planning should stand under the judgment of community ideals. 
2. Persons should cooperate to achieve the realization of shared 
values.--A clear statement of the principle is found in the criticism of the 
operation of the "law of supply and demand" made by Frederick Law Olmsted. He 
pointed out that the normal operation of the market doesn't provide schools, 
. playgrounds, parks, squares, and main traffic thoroughfares for the 
larger movements of materials and passengers, all of which in some way 
are expected and the expectation of which largely gives marketable value 
to every building site, there is no commercial mechanism by which the 
demand can ordinarily beget supply ... [these] can only be provided by 
deliberate conscious cooperative action.2 
3. Institutional structures should be created that can implement 
planning for the good of the whole community.--The principle is implied in the 
criticisms of the then existing situations in municipal governments according 
to the view of Frederick C. Howe. 
Thus far, city planning in America has limited its vision to those 
sides of the question which do not conflict with the claims or abuses of 
private property.3 
In America ... the city is in chains to the state legislature, the 
real estate interests, and the franchise corporation. It has the most 
limited powers of city building, has little autonomy, and is so cramped, 
cabined, and confined with restrictions that its powers are of little 
value.4 
1Raymond Unwin, 11 Discussion, '' 
ference on City Planning (Cambridge: 
Proceedings of the Third National Con-
University Press, 1911), pp. 97-107. 
~rederick L. Olmsted, "Reply in Behalf of the City Planning Confer-
ence," Proceedings of the Second National Conference on City Planning (Cam-
bridge: University Press, 1911), pp. 3-13. 
~rederick C. Howe, "Municipal Real Estate Policies of German Cities," 
Proceedings of the Third National Conference on City Planning (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1911), pp. 14-37· 
4Ibid., p. 15. 
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4. The pursuit of personal gain should be subordinate to the well-
being of the community.--This is the principle which is implied in a recom-
mendation made by Frederick Law Olmsted. 
. . . the modification of the present building laws and other police regu-
lations and the modification in some instances of the methods of taxation, 
so as to make it relatively more profitable to build in a manner that will 
appropriate the best standards that are within the economic reach of the 
people and so as to make it impossible to build in a manner tending seri-
ously to depress the standard of health and happiness among the people; 
second, the exercise of real initiative in forecasting the probable future 
requirements of land for collective uses and in taking measures, wherever 
they can be shown to be expedient, for preventing the obstructive ~rivate 
occupation of such areas, especially in districts now undeveloped. 
5. Planning ought to be guided by the requirements of distributive 
justice.--Concern over existing inequalities, and the need to redress the im-
balance through providing physical settings adequate to the needs of all was 
expressed by Irving K. Pond. 
After all, in all this matter of city planning, and the relation of 
buildings to streets and site, we are not so concerned with the owners of 
fine houses and large grounds,--they can well be relied upon to protect 
themselves,--but we are concerned that the mothers of the tenements may 
have their burdens lightened, and the children of the tenements may have 
sunlight and air and grass and flowers and the convenient and easily acces-
sible public playgrounds.2 
6. Persons ought to be treated as ends and not merely as means.--This 
seems to be the underlying principle to which Olmsted appeals when he rejects 
the architectonic view of planning, and suggests that planning is a way of en-
abling persons in the future to act responsibly . 
. . . the principle applies throughout the field of city planning. We 
must disabuse the public of the idea that a city plan means a final record 
upon paper of a desire by some group of individuals prescribing, out of 
their wisdom and authority, where and how the more important changes and 
improvements in the physical layout of the city are to be made--a plan 
completed and put on file and followed more or less faithfully and 
l Olmsted, op. cit., p. 9. 
2
rrving K. Pond, "Discussion," Proceedings of the Third National Con-
~f~e~r~e~n~c~e~on~C~it~y~P~l~a=n=n=l~·n~g (Cambridge: University Press, 1911), pp. 107-10. 
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mechanically, much as a contractor follows the architects drawings for a 
house. We must cultivate in our own minds and in the mind of the people 
the conception of a city plan as a drive for peace of administrative ma-
chinery for preparing, and keeping constantly up-to-date, a unified fore-
cast and definition of all the important changes, additions and extensions 
of the physical equipment and arrangement of the city which a sound judg-
ment holds likely to become desirable and practicable in the course of 
time, so as to avoid so far as possible both ignorantly wasteful action 
and ignorantly wasteful inaction in the control of the city's growth. It 
is not a means by which one group of men or one generation may dictate to 
their successors or relieve the latter of responsibility. It is means by 
which those who become at any time responsible for decisions affecting the 
city's plan may be prevented from acting in ignorance of what their pred-
ecessors and their colleagues in other departments of city life, have be-
lieved to be reasonable contingencies.l 
7. City planning ought to seek to achieve those values which are held 
by the persons responsible for implementation.--This is the principle to which 
Arnold W. Brunner appealed when he said: 
The public officials and all those exerc1s1ng authority over the city's 
expenditure have assumed serious responsibilities by reason of their of-
fice, and it is due to them to have the case presented in a sensible, 
serious businesslike manner. 
The first impression which we must overcome is that the city is to be 
turned over to a number of artists who intend in some vague manner to make 
the city beautiful.2 
The "City Beautiful" failed--failed because it began at the wrong end . 
. Since utility and beauty go hand in hand, let us insist upon utility. 
Since we have in mind a combination of science and art, let us emphasize 
science.3 
There is potential conflict between this principle and the preceding 
ones. What if the persons in power are not concerned about distributive jus-
tice, cooperation, or the "best"ideals of the community? Brunner suggested 
that the values of beauty and art should be accommodated to the values of util-
ity and science when the latter are held by those in power. This may be called 
the principle of accommodation. 
l Olmsted, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
2Arnold W. Brunner, "The Meaning of City Planning," Proceedings of the 
Fourth National Conference on City Planning (Cambridge: University Press, 
1912), p. 22. 
3Ibid., p. 24. 
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8. In planning, choices ought to be made in accordance with the prin-
ciples of reason or sound judgment.--Although there was no discussion of the 
rational basis of ethical choice at the early planning conferences, there were 
a number of appeals to the standards of sound judgment or science. The first 
City Planning Conference in 1909 adopted a resolution calling for a committee 
to submit to the next conference " ... a well-considered project of organiza-
tion for developing comprehensive city planning in America." 1 As previously 
noted, Olmsted appeals to the need to prepare for changes " . . which a sound 
judgment holds likely to become desirable and practical." 2 
The appeal for scientific city planning also implies the use of reason. 
The Third National Conference on City Planning adopted the following resolution: 
Resolved: The advancement of scientific city planning in the United 
States is a matter of national importance depending upon fundamental prin-
ciples which are the same throughout the country.3 
9. Planning ought to select those means for achieving the desired 
ends which will achieve the ends in the most "efficient" and least wasteful 
manner.--That the means selected should achieve the ends desired was indicated 
by Raymond Unwin when he said, " . . . the detailed design . . . is to be the 
means of expressing the life of the community in a form at once adapted to the 
site and in itself suitable and dignified." 4 The appeal to norms of efficiency 
and least-cost was made by Frederick Olmsted, who suggested that it was desir-
able to avoid both " . . . ignorantly wasteful action and ignorantly wasteful 
inaction in the control of the city's growth."5 
~ational Conference on City Planning, "Resolution," Proceedings of 
the Third National Conference on City Planning (Cambridge: University Press, 
1911)' p. 261. 
2 Olmsted, op .. cit., p. 13. 
3National Conference on City Planning, "Resolutions," op. cit., p. 263. 
4u · ·t 102 nwln, op. Cl ., p. . 50lmsted, op. cit., p. 13. 
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The norms of efficiency and least-cost which play such a dominant role 
in the ethos of American business have similarly dominated much of the think-
ing, appeal, and work of city planning. 
10. Planning ought to seek to realize the best possible values in a 
given situation.--Appeal was fre~uently made to this principle. Olmsted 
thought waste should be avoided "as far as possible." 1 
It should be noted that the above principles were implied rather than 
made explicit in the ethical judgments of this period. Indeed, it seems to be 
characteristic of the use of "ought" in planning literature at least until 
World War II that there was little attempt to clarify the fundamental ethical 
principles implied in the specific judgments. 
By 1914, then, several main lines of social philosophy and ethics were 
beginning to emerge. The classical defense of free enterprise was more clearly 
articulated. Protestant and Roman Catholic social thought emphasized larger 
community responsibilities. There was radical criticism of the social order, 
particularly the economic sphere. Social research and sociology were provid-
ing factual and theoretical ammunition for reform. A pragmatic, humanistic 
faith in democratic social reform was developing. And in the cities, there 
was growing concern for the improvement of municipal government, living condi-
tions including housing and congestion, education, and acculteration of immi-
grant groups. The aesthetic aspects of city life had also been the object of 
at least a momentary concern. 
iii. City Practical and Business-Like: World War I-1932 
During the period following World War I the American economy grew rap-
idly. The forced production of World War I was followed by a recession and 
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then another boom. A 34 per cent increase between 1922-1929 in agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining, and construction was registered. 1 Among the leading 
products were automobiles, tractors, skyscrapers, oil, electricity, airplanes, 
radio, motion pictures, and plastics. 
With the automobile came new roads, a wide range of services ranging 
from service stations to roadside diners, and the problems of parking, traffic 
congestion, and mass slaughter on highways. Suburbs expanded in areas more 
distant from railroad lines. Travel expanded the range of experience of the 
growing middle class, adding to the mobility of the labor supply. 
Rising wages, mass consumption, sales promotion, and the extension of 
a shared culture went hand in hand. Magazines and radio introduced the new 
products along with the human interest stories of the day. The steel strikes, 
Scopes trial, Lindbergh flight, sporting events, crime, and the changing mores 
of women were in the limelight. The stature of the businessman was high al-
though intellectuals like Sinclair Lewis, Eugene O'Neill, Ernest Hemingway, and 
H. L. Mencken criticized Babbit and Company. Labor union membership declined 
from 5 million in 1920 to 3 million in 1931. 
The combined impact of the tractor and the better farming methods 
taught by the Department of Agriculture produced dramatic transformation of 
the farm which in turn made possible the increased growth of cities. In 1921 
the urban population became larger than the rural. 
New methods of finance increased the fluidity of capital and facili-
tated the expansion of productive capacity, but the structure was shaky. Real 
estate values as well as the stock market were subject to speculative booms 
and busts. 
In municipal government conflicting forces were at work. The municipal 
1Frederick L. Allen, The Big Change (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), 
p. 139. 
reform movements were met by new pressures for corruption growing out of the 
violations of prohibition. At the same time, increasing demands were being 
made on the city governments by the sheer necessities of expansion. Ethnic 
group conflicts continued to dominate the politics of many cities. Economic, 
political, and religious issues were combined in the struggles of workers to 
organize and business to break unions, the tightening of immigration barriers, 
the vigilante response to rumors of Bolshevism, and the rise of the Ku Klux 
Klan. 
The rising prosperity (although unequally distributed) following 1924 
brought a period of major gains for business. Although Prohibition was a dras-
tic case of government 11 interference11 with business, the principle was not 
generalized. Indeed, when government related to economic affairs it was largely 
at the beck and call of business. This included not only high protective tar-
iffs, favorable tax policies, the investment in roads, but also the emergence 
of city planning as a respectable, business-like, approach to land use. 
The basis for concern for city planning among the dominant economic 
interests was stated in some detail by John Iblder, manager of the Civil De-
velopment Department of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in 1925. 
He wrote: 
When stated in general terms the newly recognized needs of business 
bad some striking analogies to the proposals for city beautification. 
Gradually these proposals were recognized as having a basis of utility and 
we began to bear city planning described in terms of making our cities 
more useful. The realtors became interested in zoning as well as in side-
walk traffic counts; transportation men, noting the crowded conditions of 
downtown streets, advocated changing the location of freight terminals, 
and began to talk about store-door delivery. Merchants who bad invested 
in expensive buildings or bad long term leases began to realize that the 
losses due to the changing character of a neighborhood were due to a cause 
in large measure preventable. Manufacturers who bad thought they must 
have their plants in the city center found more than compensating advan-
tages in moving out. House owners who thought they bad made an investment 
discovered that they bad incurred a liability. Even that well known figure 
of speech, the tax payer, awoke to a dim realization that haphazard city 
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building was costing more and producing less than the practical American 
citizen has a right to expect. The result was that city planning began to 
appear in all sorts of business conventions and to become an occasional 
subject of discussion in trade journals,l 
It seems evident that regulation of property by government action was 
quite acceptable when it protected dominant property interests, regardless of 
how ideologically objectionable it might otherwise have been. This concern 
was expressed by the development of Master Plans which embodied zoning regula-
tions and maps indicating permissible land usages. So important was this as-
pect of planning that Edward M. Bassett could define city planning as the 
"determination of boundary lines. "2 That these "boundary lines" were related 
to ethnic group tensions was made explicit by Nels Anderson who noted that the 
desire to nprotect11 neighborhoods from 11 invasion11 was one of the forces moti-
vating zoning.3 
By 1927, realtors and businessmen were clearly in control. Fred Reed, 
a leading realtor, described the situation. 
The Hoover Master Plan Act of 1922, which [sic] was drawn after consulta-
tions with the most notable planners and other business men and Realtors 
of the nation who are interested in Planning Better Cities. It makes pos-
sible taking city planning out of the field of politics to place it in the 
hands of business men and trained planning experts. Cities in states 
which take advantage of this model bill will find themselves hereafter 
able to proceed expeditiously to thorough and comprehensive planning of 
their future without the hold-backs so often attending action by political 
bodies.4 
Reed goes on to describe the way in which coordinated action of real 
1John Ihlder, "The Chamber of Commerce and City Planning," City Plan-
ning, I, No. 1 (April, 1925), 43-46. 
~dward M. Bassett, "Editorial," City Planning, IV, No. 2 (April, 1928), 
p. 154. 
~els Anderson, "Zoning and the Mobility of Urban Population," City 
Planning, I, No. 1 (April, 1925), 155-59· 
4Fred E. Reed, "Realtors and City Planning Progress," Report of the 
City Plan Committee of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, City 
Planning, IV, No. 3 (July, 1928), 208-13. 
estate boards in California succeeded in getting adoption of zoning legisla-
tion as well as the structures for control of the planning process. It is 
significant that no criticism of the ethical issues involved in this kind of 
planning process are registered in the pages of City Planning during the dec-
ade of the 1920's. Nor was there any indication that there might be serious 
difficulty in the economy. 
The planning profession was becoming increasingly aware of the complex-
ity of the issues involved in city planning, the range of knowledge and infor-
mation which was needed, and the problem of developing a general conception of 
the "needs of civilization and how to meet them." 1 As early as 1925, Charles 
W. Eliot, 2nd, was noting that" city planning is a cooperative undertak-
ing in which the architect, businessman, engineer, landscape architect, lawyer, 
politician, realtor and people of many other pursuits properly have a part." 2 
Thomas Adams was consistently advocating the view that both science and 
art, fact and value, were involved in city planning. 
In the modern city we are dealing with a new type of development and 
are only beginning to understand, in an elementary way, what are its impli-
cations. We are still without any proper scientific foundation for much 
of our planning. Until the science and philosophy of planning is further 
developed, we cannot achieve real progress in the art of city planning or 
in framing a language to express the principle of civic design.3 
But for the most part, the 1920's contributed little to the theoretical 
advance or the clarification of major ethical issues involved in planning. 
Primary concern was given to getting power to plan and this meant serving the 
1Henry Vincent Hubbard, "Editorial," City Planning, III, No. 3 (July, 
1927), 201-203. 
2
charles W. Eliot, 2nd, "City Planning Instruction in American Colleges 
and Universities," City Planning, I, No. 2 (June, 1925), 113. 
3Thomas Adams, City Planning, I, No. 3 (November, 1925), 88. 
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middle class and dominant business interests. The concern for reform so much 
in evidence in earlier periods was noticeably lacking. 
Among the developments of the 1920's, urban sociology was one of the 
most significant for the future of city planning. In the United States, the 
early dominant tradition of urban sociology developed at the University of 
Chicago under the leadership of Robert E. Park and E. W. Burgess. In 1925, 
the American Sociological Society focused the attention of its annual meeting 
on urban sociology. These papers, edited by E. W. Burgess were published as 
The Urban Community. 1 
A wide range of research followed, most of which was characteristic 
of the analytical, specialized, statistical anti-theoretical bias of much 
American sociology. The attempt to match natural science by an objective, 
value-free social science tended to leave human beings as creative, valuing, 
choosing persons out of the equations. Thus, land-use patterns were inter-
preted as a simple function of least time-cost distance, or the minimizing of 
f . t• 2 TlC lOTI. That human beings with a wide range of values or purposes might 
be involved in selecting uses for land seemed an inconvenient addition to an 
otherwise neat system. 
Some characteristic assumptions guided much of the early work in urban 
sociology. It was assumed that urban life was characterized by social disorgan-
ization, moral disintegration, and was driven by technological development, 
population growth, and sub-social processes of competition and symbiosis. The 
effort to be descriptive rather than normative was a shift from the earlier 
1The Urban Community, ed. E. W. Burgess (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1926). 
2For an excellent discussion of land-use theory, see Walter Firey, 
Land Use in Central Boston (CAmbridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 18. 
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concerns for social reform which had spurred social research. This had the 
effect of reducing or eliminating the study of the role of values and norms 
in shaping urban society. 
Along with the increasing study of society was the development of prag-
matism and the emphasis on the role of intelligence in problem solving. The 
movement in social thought that "supplied the American mind of the twentieth 
century with the concepts of instrumentalism, progressive education, legal 
realism, the economic interpretation of politics, the new history, institu-
tional economics, and political liberalism" 1 was gaining momentum in the uni-
versities during the 1920's, helping to prepare the way for the New Deal. 
Pragmatism did face the key questions of fact and value. Dewey, Holmes, 
and Veblen agreed that there could be verifiable testing of assertions that 
certain things are desired. But how does one decide whether they ought to be 
desired? Does ought have any significant meaning apart from the adjustment of 
a biological organism to its environment? To these questions, the answer of 
these three writers seems to be in the negative (although the case of Dewey 
can be debated). Dewey's reluctance to formulate principles, ends, or norms 
apart from a particular situation greatly complicated the task of political 
engineering which he advocated. 
In contrast, Edgar S. Brightman was advocating the use of reason in 
the sphere of value experiences to develop a system of ideals which could 
. 2 
serve as guides to actlon. He paid tribute to John Dewey and Bertrand Russell 
for "uttering boldly the principles of social idealism which many professed 
~ite, Social Thought in America, op. cit., p. 236. 
~dgar S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals (New York: Henry HoJt and 
Co., 1928). 
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1 idealists have failed to avow." Brightman noted "by right of logic, social 
idealism is a necessary consequence of a metaphysical idealism which sees im-
perative ideals in the very structure of the universe." 2 He further suggested 
that it would take the work of a school of thought to develop the implications 
of this idea, and that the task of formulating such ideals was an on-going one 
in which new value experience and new possibilities must always be taken into 
account. According to Brightman, the life of reason can deal with end values 
as well as the relation between means and ends, finding coherent relationships 
among end values, and developing ideals which can guide action. This provides 
a foundation for normative judgments apart from simple descriptive statements 
of what people desire, and grounds such judgment in convictions about the na-
ture of reality. 
During the 1920's, there was a mixed response in Protestantism to so-
cial questions. Although there is some evidence for a decline of the social 
gospe1, 3 the churches did express concern for civil liberties, international-
ism, industrial reform (notably the report on the steel strike of 1919), world 
peace, prohibition, and race relations. 
Paul A. Carter suggests that social liberalism was healthier in the 
church than in the society at large during the 1920's. He cites the increas-
ingly important role which the Federal Council of Churches was playing. 
Together with the National Catholic Welfare Council, it campaigned 
against the open-shop 'American Plan' in industry; it entered the fight 
against the twelve-hour day in steel; it took part in the struggle for a 
Child Labor Amendment to the United States Constitution. Of no less sig-
nificance were its fact-finding studies of strikes, its social research 
1Ibid.' p. 195. 
3see a summary statement by Walter G. Muelder, Methodism and Society 
in the Twentieth Century (New York: Abingdon Press, 1961), pp. 89-90. 
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work, and its dissemination of a Social Gospel point of view through its 
Information Service (founded 1920), and, later, its Social Questions 
Bulletin.1 
Missing, however, was the kind of deep criticism of the social order 
which would be required to meet the challenge of the depression. Apart from 
the few socialist Christians, the churches were not discussing the ethical 
issues involved in the accountability of persons holding vast economic power, 
and the meaning of participation by the whole community in making decisions 
affecting its future. 
The internal conflict in the religious community which centered around 
theology should also be noted. In addition to the fundamentalist-modernist 
controversy, there were efforts to deepen the theological foundations of the 
social gospel and the doctrine of the church. These currents appeared in 
sharper perspective in the 1930's. 
In this period preceding the New Deal, there was rapid growth in indus-
trial output, ferment in city politics and industrial relations, intense ethnic 
group conflicts, and significant developments in social thought. However, city 
planning was for the most part tied to the vulgar pragmatism if not sheer ex-
pediency of the dominant property and economic interests. Engineering, effi-
ciency, business-like concern for least-costs, and middle-class protectionism 
were the dominant themes. It would take the major shake-up of the depression 
to force city planning to a new footing. 
iv. The Great Depression and Re-examination: 
1932--World War II 
The economic collapse of the 1930's was of great proportion and dura-
tion. The world-wide aspects of this collapse are traced by Karl Polanyi. 2 
~aulA. Carter, The Decline and Revival of the Social Gospel: Social 
and Political Liberalism in American Protestant Churches, 1920-1940 (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 126. 
2Polanyi, op. cit., pp. 237-48. 
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In the United States, the lives of millions of people were deeply marked for 
unemployment struck at the very heart of the self-esteem of the American worker. 
The response to this economic collapse produced major changes in the 
social structure, the most notable of which was the shift from economic self-
regulation to the assertion of governmental responsibility for the maintenance 
and limited direction of the economic system. This initially took the form of 
a mixture of hastily devised programs. 
While it is not necessary here to discuss the New Deal program in de-
tail, it should be noted that they involved a variety of government activities 
oriented toward the planning of the society and the meeting of community needs 
while maintaining private ownership of the major aspects of the economy. Re-
form measures adopted by the Federal government changed the rules of the econ-
omy and provided a system of umpires at crucial points. This included monetary 
management, the use of price supports and credit incentives, support of labor 
organizations, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and public housing. 
In this atmosphere, expansion of city planning activities would at 
first glance be expected. Yet, this is not the case. Under the New Deal, 
liberal Democratic mayors won control of the large cities at the very time that 
welfare and relief costs had virtually bankrupted the municipal governments. 
Further, the city planning commissions were in the hands of more conservative 
hold-overs who were regarded by business interests as watchdogs over the "poli-
ticians." In this conflict, budgets for planning were cut and master-plans 
began to gather dust in the basements and attics of City Hall. Concern for 
zoning was buried under more salient issues. 
The role of conflicting social forces can be seen in the development 
of public housing. On the one side were social workers, public health officers, 
architects, economists, city planners, liberal politicians, and socially 
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concerned individuals who formed the National Public Housing Conference in 
1932. This group worked with the National Association of Housing Officials 
in 1933 and stimulated the Labor Housing Conference of 1934. This Conference 
submitted a plan for federal legislation on housing to the convention of the 
American Federation of Labor in 1934. Concern for housing had existed in the 
labor movement since the first public housing in World War I, and had contin-
ued in the development of cooperative housing in the 1920's. 
In the legislative battle which finally produced the Wagner Housing 
Act of 1937, the opposing forces emerged clearly. Groups such as the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards, the United States Building and Loan League, 
and the National Retail Lumber Dealers Association joined forces to oppose 
government action. On the other hand, legislative representatives of the AFL 
worked closely with the professional architects, planners, and social workers 
in trying to get a bill which would meet the needs for slum clearance and new 
housing. Some of the features of the final bill, including the much debated 
provision which places limits on permissible income of occupants in public 
housing, were compromises offered to the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards in order to get the bill passed. 
In opposing government participation in housing, the above groups ap-
pealed to the basic norms of free enterprise and government non-intervention 
in economics. These same groups seemed untroubled by problems of consistency 
when supporting zoning, government guarantee of mortgages after World War II, 
and the land acquisition and redevelopment provisions of the Federal Housing 
Act of 1949. 
The supporters of public housing have often been accused of utopian 
expectations of what might be accomplished by public housing. However, it is 
only fair to note that the interdependence of housing with many other civic 
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problems was noted in the "Housing Program for the United States" developed by 
the first large conference of the National Association of Housing Officials, 
National Public Housing Conference, and the Labor Housing Conference in 1935. 
Public housing was not conceived as a catch-all for problem families or fam-
ilies relocated from redevelopment projects. These usages were forced on pub-
lie housing by developments following World War II. Rather, tenant selection 
was originally intended to be used to choose those families which could most 
benefit by an opportunity to have better living conditions. Further, housing 
was viewed as only one aspect of broad social planning. Just how that planning 
was to be done remained a major concern. It was evident, however, that with 
the broadening of goals, the planning process itself would have to be re-
examined. 
Ethical issues involved in the structure of the planning process were 
brought into focus by Robert Averill Walker in his study of The Planning Func-
l tion in Urban Government. Walker discussed the ways in which the goals of 
planning affect the conception of how planning should be related to the social 
structure. He then noted the changing conceptions of the goals of planning and 
made recommendations for the development of planning as part of a revised 
structure of urban government. It is worthwhile to look at each of these. 
The relation of goals to the structure of planning is seen in the con-
trast between public and private planning. The difference between public and 
private planning is, according to Walker, the difference between specific lim-
ited goals and general inclusive goals. "Corporations plan in order to make 
a profit; local governments should plan for maximum returns of public welfare." 2 
l Robert Averill Walker, The Planning Function in Urban Government (2d 
ed. rev.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). 
2Ibid., p. 109. 
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Walker then illustrates how the more limited economic concerns had come to 
dominate the planning process during the 1920's. In his examination of the 
composition of planning commissions of 31 larger cities, Walker found that 
over 50 per cent of the members were businessmen or realtors and an additional 
29 per cent were lawyers, architects, or engineers. 1 The initial justifica-
tion for giving the planning commission unique powers (generally a 3/4 vote of 
the city legislature body was required to override the commission) was that 
the commission would be "objective" and possess special competence and a long-
run view. Walker notes, however, that the commissions were not objective. 
Instead their composition made them conservative in social and political out-
look, unlikely to do much regulating, and unlikely to engage in controversy. 
The results was that the majority of the population (particularly labor and 
minority groups) were left without power or evan an effective voice. 
The goals of low taxes, property protection (through zoning), and cer-
tain public works projects such as streets and sanitation were relevant to the 
limited objectives of private business. Planning commissions as they had de-
veloped prior to about i935 were contributing to these goals. But the devel-
opment of broader goals calls for a different planning process. This larger 
conception of planning is indicated by Walker. 
To plan the future of a city today without including as a vital con-
sideration such matters as the condition of the local economic structure 
and its relation to the national structure, the deterioration of the 
downtown area, relief trends, slum clearance, and public revenue is to 
plan the superstructure without providing the foundation. These are al-
ready central problems in urban life and government, and planning cannot 
be truly comprehensive if it treats them lightly or not at all.2 
In order to achieve these goals, Walker argued that planning needs to 
be a staff function closely related to the administrative and legislative 
power of municipal government. He noted that planning should include functions 
and activities in addition to land usage. 
l . Ibld., p. 150. 
2Ibid., p. 128. 
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Whether as part of its coordinating or of its endorsing function, how-
ever, the planning agency should concern itself with municipal activity in 
the fullest sense. From the administrative point of view its job is to 
aid the responsible officials in taking a comprehensive view of their work 
and in relating all aspects of government activity to one another and to 
the future. In addition to physical usage, planning needs to include 
specifically the alleviation of disease and delinquency, housing and slum 
clearance, and relief and research programs related to relief.l 
But the unique function of the over-all planning agency, according to 
Walker, is "to assist officials in formulating public policy which treats the 
community as a closely knit whole." 2 To do this it needs 
a systematic program of assembling information about the city (re-
search), discovering what it means (analysis), and indicating what action 
it seems to call for (planning and specific recommendations) .3 
According to this view, the job of planning is to bring trained, com-
petent, informed judgment to bear on the achievement of broad community goals 
which are to be established by the political process. Planning is to be held 
administratively accountable by officials who in turn are accountable to the 
people through the political process including the vote. The growth of plan-
ning as a staff function is traced by Walker who notes that engineers and 
landscape architects have predominated in the profession and "persons trained 
for social research have, in fact, been generally overlooked in staffing plan-
ning offices." 4 
The need to relate local planning to larger planning agencies is also 
noted by Walker. The number of county and metropolitan planning agencies in-
creased between 1933 and 1936 from 85 to 506 of which 316 had official status.5 
Further the Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee indicated 
a larger role for the Federal Government, resulting in part from the fact that 
rural control of state legislatures tended to make them ineffective in dealing 
with urban problems. 
1Ibid.' p. lll. 
4
rbid., p. 200. 
2Thid.' p. 113. 
5rbid., p. 123. 
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A number of critical issues are raised but left unexamined by Walker's 
analysis: (l) What are the broad social values toward which planning should 
aim? (2) If these broad values are to be determined by the political process, 
what changes are needed in the political structure to make it more responsible? 
(3) What is to be the relationship between inclusive public goals and the lim-
ited goals of private corporations and organizations? 
A tentative answer was given to these ~uestions by the outbreak of 
World War II when the goal of winning the war focused the concerns of the na-
tion and resulted in broad social-economic planning. During the war public 
goals generally took precedence when in conflict with private interests. How-
ever, it was obvious that at the conclusion of the war these ~uestions would 
again be on the agenda not only for the planning profession, but also for the 
whole society. 
Protestant social thought during the depression continued to exhibit 
divergent tendencies. Among the most significant developments was the deepen-
ing criticism of the economic order. The profit incentive as a basic guiding 
principle in economic life was brought under the judgment of more inclusive 
ideals and norms, including basic minimum security for all persons, improve-
ment of working conditions, protection of family life, greater e~uality in 
the distribution of economic goods, and greater participation in the making 
of decisions in the economy (including the right of labor to organize and the 
development of cooperatives). The dominant strain of Protestant social thought 
supported change through existing democratic political institutions. 
Christians from many countries and representing many denominations 
were involved in a series of study conferences which had grown out of the 
Universal Christian Council on Life and Work which had been called together in 
1925 by Archbishop SBderblom of Sweden. These study groups culminated in the 
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Oxford Conference on church, community, and state in 1937. The preparatory 
volumes and reports of the Oxford Conference developed basic perspectives in 
Christian social thought. Capitalism as an economic system was criticized 
for producing extreme inequalities, being inherently unstable, promoting rna-
terialism and acquisitiveness, allowing the wrong goals to dominate production, 
and hindering the development of full Christian vocation. Efforts were made 
to indicate basic lines of responsibility of the church, the state, and the 
economic order. It was proposed that there should be greater social and polit-
ical control over economic power, and that economic power and accululations of 
property must be controlled by moral ends. The church must help inform these 
ends. 
Christian teaching should deal with ends, in the sense of long range 
goals, standards, and principles in the light of which every concrete sit-
uation and every proposal for improving it must be tested.l 
Included among such ends were: (1) right fellowship between man and man; (2) 
equal opportunity for education and development of personality, including pro-
tection of the family; (3) care for the disabled; (4) development of the worth 
and dignity of labor, which includes the duty and right to work, the rejection 
of the commodity view of labor, and the right to a living wage; and (5) the 
view of resources as gifts of God to the whole community to be used with proper 
regard for the needs of present and future generations. 
The definition of ethical aspects of property was also of considerable 
significance. Property rights were viewed as relative and contingent, and the 
duty of stewardship or trusteeship must be supplemented by a willingness to 
examine the accumulations of property in the light of their social consequences. 
1John W. Turnbull (ed.), Ecumenical Documents on Church and Society 
(1925-1953), 'Dxford Conference Report on Church, Community, and State in Rela-
tion to the Economic Order" (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1954), p. 75. 
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Further, existing property systems are partly a result of non-moral processes 
and every valid argument for property rights is also an argument for the widest 
possible distribution of these rights. The use of property is to be judged in 
the light of social consequences and the recognition of the contribution of the 
community to production. Further, the important distinction was made between 
property for use, and property for power. 
The above views express the perspective which guided much of the teach-
ing and social pronouncements of the Protestant Churches during the 1930's and 
are of basic importance to the fundamental concerns of urban planning. However, 
it should be noted that there is little indication to be found of an attempt 
to build systematic bridges between Christian social thought and "secular" city 
planning during this period. The dominant voices in planning expressed the 
scientific, naturalistic humanism represented by Lewis Mumford. 
The development of the views of Mumford, Wright, Stein and others work-
ing in city planning deserve more adequate treatment than can be given here. 
The growth of a body of theory about the values achievable by a variety of 
types of urban spatial arrangements is of course important for the concerns of 
land-use planning. The concern for green space, cohesive residential neighbor-
hoods, safe traffic patterns, varying population densities, proper use of sun-
light and fresh air, and adequate community facilities were the very stuff of 
planning discussions. However, there was little effort to develop a coherent 
system of values or a carefully worked out set of standards to apply to partic-
ular situations. And some of the basic difficulties in the underlying ethical 
perspectives have been indicated in the previous discussion of Dewey's prag-
matism. 
The rapid growth of urban sociology during this period must also be 
noted. Empirical community studies were conducted. Efforts to conceptualize 
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the whole community were progressing. Social science was developing to the 
point that when called upon during World War II for assistance in policy for-
mation, it could be of service. Although elements of a naive scientism con-
tinued to dominate much American sociology during the 1930's, the challenge to 
the democratic faith by Nazism, Fascism and Communism led to a re-examination 
of the role of values in social science, opening the door to a more penetrat-
ing view of the role of values in. society. 
v. New Starts and New Questions: 
World War II--1960 
World War II brought greatly increased planning of the economy at the 
national level. The shifts in production and population during the war created 
major problems for cities and found the existing city planning agencies and 
staffs unable to meet the demands. 
Here indeed was the time for planning agencies to provide a pattern, to 
co-ordinate the efforts of administrative agencies, to minimize waste, and 
to maximize the permanent value of emergency developments. But old city 
plans, prepared before the depression wiped out consultant budgets, were 
largely outdated, and local planning commissions with nonexistent or under-
manned staffs were scarcely in a position to lead into the breach.l 
Postwar planning was stimulated by the fear of a postwar recession 
and the need to have major public works projects ready in case of an unemploy-
ment crisis. This tended to undergird the emphasis on the physical improve-
ments side of planning, but was being done under a changed view of government. 
The welfare state was well-entrenched. The assumption that the government has 
responsibilities for full employment and the basic economic security of the 
community was well established. 
The postwar years were dominated by two major approaches. The first 
was the granting of financial guarantees enabling veterans and others to 
~alker, op. cit., p. 344. 
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purchase their own homes through ensured mortgages. The long-run consequences 
of insuring mortgages in the suburbs but not in the cities was not discussed 
during the passage of this legislation, yet it has probably been the most im-
portant single act of government in shaping the post war metropolitan areas. 
This is a classic example of unintended consequences out-weighing intended con-
sequences. The financing advantages of homes in the suburbs contributed to the 
shift of population to the suburbs and the depression of real estate markets in 
the city. 
In the cities themselves, the major public policy was oriented toward 
redevelopment under provisions of the Federal Housing Act of 1949.1 Sites were 
acquired through public powers of eminent domain, existing structures demolished, 
and the land sold to private developers or to public housing authorities. The 
redevelopment proposals were supported by the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards who have consistently opposed public housing. 
In terms of local government structure, however, the redevelopment pro-
grams meant the creation of a Redevelopment Authority. In some cities, this 
meant a new authority was added to the already existing Planning Commission and 
Housing Authority, while in other cities the Housing Authority was designated 
as the Redevelopment Authority. The setting up of yet another semi-autonomous 
authority further fragmented the powers of local government making coordinated 
action that much more difficult. This followed the pattern, however, of trying 
to separate local government activity from politics. The result frequently was 
the creation of a system of arbitrary power in which vital decisions affecting 
the community could often be made with little public debate and with only a 
very remote kind of accountability of the decision-makers. 
~or survey of major provisions and the thinking behind them, see 
Coleman Woodbury, "Survey of Conceptions of Urban Renewal," in Williams, op. 
cit., pp. 489-502. 
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New structures of power in industry and finance and the changing life 
patterns of elite groups are also significant. 1 The shift from resident owner-
manager of the major industries and banks to absentee diffuse ownership with 
power in the hands of managers has had major conse~uences for planning. The 
pride in the city and the support through gifts for city cultural institutions 
which was characteristic of the economic elite of many cities up until World 
War I declined considerably. But so has the opportunity for the exercise of 
political power that goes with long-term residence and the opportunity to es-
tablish leadership on the basis of skill. In addition, there has been a con-
siderable shift in the ideology of the upper echelons of the corporation. 
There has been a growing development of what has been called the managerial 
ideology as distinct from the "classical" ideology. 2 
Substantial change in what large industry and commerce need from the 
city has taken place. The move to the suburbs has left the downtown business 
interests vulnerable. Soaring tax rates and declining or stable sales volume 
created anxiety. Also, these corporations are on the other end of the land 
speculation issue. In the early phase of the development of cities, they were 
in a position to benefit by land speculation. Knowing where they wanted to 
build, corporations could purchase open land and benefit from the land values 
which increased as they built their plants and factories. 
But following World War II the situation changed. Vacant land close 
to the central transportation systems had been developed. The ring around the 
central core of the city was generally the oldest, most obsolescent and 
~or an empirical study of the business leader, see W. Lloyd Warner and 
James C. Abegglen, Big Business Leaders in America (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1955). 
2 For a study of the changing ideologies of businessmen see Francis X. 
Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, James Tobin, The American Business 
Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). 
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deteriorated section of the city and housed the lowest classes or most recent 
arrivals. These sections had high potential for redevelopment since they were 
closest to the central core and the residents were frequently the least artie-
ulate and politically mature. 
The stumbling block was the problem of assembling a site on the private 
market extensive enough for redevelopment. Persons suspecting that a developer 
was interested would buy ahead of the developer or hold on to the property ask-
ing for a speculative price. This problem made private redevelopment virtually 
impossible. Further, it was obvious that there were tremendous possibilities 
for profitable investment in the central city areas and capital accumulating 
in the rapidly growing pension and insurance funds was in need of opportunities 
for high security investments. Other businesses in the city looked favorably 
upon the establishment of new businesses in the city since that meant an in-
crease in ratables and a sharing of the tax load. 
Considerations as overwhelming as the above offered abundant incentive 
to overcome the ideological bias against government intervention. The support 
which business groups gave the redevelopment provisions in the urban renewal 
programs indicates the extent to which cold cash speaks above the roar of 
ideology. These factors meant that the Economic Development Committees repre-
senting the dominant financial and business groups could get behind city plan-
ning and urban renewal in good conscience and help supply the impetus for a 
major public relations effort to persuade the local citizenry of the benefits 
of the "New City."l 
It was not difficult to construct a public relations program for urban 
renewal. There could be abundant talk about neighborhood rehabilitation in 
N.J.: 
1An illustrative propaganda piece is Newark) A City Reborn (Newark, 
Housing Authority of the City of Newark, 1962 . 
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which each family could "participate." Community organization to sell the idea 
of planning was needed. Of course, there was need to undergird the economic 
future of the city and to provide adequate job opportunities by creating a 
good climate in which business would be attracted to the city. Highways would 
be needed and the tax rate must be controlled. Public housing had drawn in-
creasing criticism, even from its friends. Some additional units would be 
needed to provide homes for those families "relocated" by clearance projects. 
But in general it could be made to appear that there was something for everyone 
and that no one need be badly hurt in the process. 
As the programs developed, "hidden costs" began to appear. Keeping 
the tax rate down meant inadequate financing for education and school building. 
Increasing overcrowding, split sessions, and lower quality teachers appeared 
as the salary schedules of the cities fell behind those of the suburbs. 
In many cities, areas to be cleared tended to be those housing a high 
proportion of Negro residents. Discrimination in housing meant that new decent 
housing for Negroes was hard to find. This meant that many families were 
forced to pay higher rentals in overcrowded houses. Speculative real estate 
operators bought up multi-family homes, cleared the earlier residents (many of 
whom had been stable residents for many years), divided the apartments, doubled 
the rents, reduced maintenance, and offered the accommodations to Negroes or 
Puerto Ricans. 
In some cases, social fabric of neighborhoods was shattered. Mobility 
increased the problems of schools and community institutions. The focus of at-
tention on physical renewal seemed self-defeating as slums spread rather than 
being eliminated. In some cities, progressive clearance programs pushed the 
same people ahead of them in two or three stages. Needless to say, a reaction 
started to develop in the attitudes of persons thus affected. 
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Public housing was originally intended to provide an opportunity for 
families who needed, wanted, and could use a chance to better themselves ac-
cording to middle class standards. When such housing began to be used as an 
instrument for relocation of families from clearance areas, a concentration of 
problem families often resulted. This created difficult social and community 
problems. Physical safety became a prime concern. The reputation of public 
housing declined. "Tenant relations" programs within the projects faced more 
problems, and additional social workers were requested. 
In many cities, virtually no middle income housing was built. Apart-
ment buildings were constructed which rented for $40.00 to $50.00 per room per 
month. In addition, there were several developments of "luxury" apartments 
designed to rent to middle-age, upper management couples who were tired of 
mowing the lawn and commuting and, consequently, interested in moving into the 
city. 
But the absence of middle income housing meant that upwardly mobile 
families had to move to the suburbs. Further, neighborhood rehabilitation 
programs stumbled on a number of rocks. Housing code enforcement designed to 
protect and conserve houses in neighborhoods threatened by "blight" was almost 
universally unsuccessful. Real estate interests found it too easy to block 
enforcement at one level of city government or another. Funds for neighborhood 
rehabilitation were severely limited, as was the planning staff to work with 
such programs. The big programs involving millions of dollars in downtown re-
development had priority. 
The basic planning ideas which guided housing development have come 
under criticism. One of the most articulate critics, Jane Jacobs, pointed to 
the range of social consequences flowing from contemporary housing and rede-
velopment practices. 1 
1Jacobs, op. cit. 
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In the meantime, the city planning profession was growing rapidly. 
New ideas were emerging. The capital improvements budget of the city came to 
be viewed as a more important planning document than the Master Plan. The 
ideas embodied in master plans became increasingly sophisticated, both in terms 
of goals and the design of programs to implement them. In a few cases vigorous 
new leadership at City Hall discovered that there was political gold in the 
urban renewal hills, and that the citizenry was ready to give them the neces-
sary powers to conduct the mining operation. 1 The Federal Government was pre-
pared to assist in a variety of ways, mostly financial. However, "Workable 
Program" requirements of the Urban Renewal Administration of the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency gave the city planners increased leverage in City Hall. 
New patterns of community organization developed rapidly after 1954 
when the Urban Renewal Section of the Federal Housing Act provided opportuni-
ties for neighborhood rehabilitation. The social work profession and many 
church groups responded to new opportunities for organizing citizen groups for 
neighborhood improvement. Disappointment soon appeared at the meagre results 
of many of these efforts in generating pressure for changes in the urban re-
newal programs. 
The metropolis is in ferment. Questions are being raised which lift 
up the most fundamental ethical issues. The issues under discussion in the 
contemporary situation need examination. 
B. Contemporary Situation 
Ethical perspectives in contemporary planning revolve around three 
major areas: (l) the structures of decision-making to which planning relates, 
1
cf. Seymour Freedgood, "New Strength in City Hall," The Exploding 
Metropolis, Editors of Fortune (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 
1958), pp. 81-109. 
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(2) the planning process, (3) the relation of values, goals, targets, and norms 
in planning. 
i. Planning and Decision-Making Structures 
The question of the goals of planning and the structures by which plan-
ning is done are intimately connected. Yet, a legitimate distinction can be 
l drawn. Although there has been an obvious decline in the sharp ideological 
lines which separated the 11 interventionistsn and the 11 non-interventionists, 11 
there remain significant issues connected with the respective roles of the pri-
vate and public sectors of the economy. 
Some goal conflicts between public and private corporations have been 
reduced as the sharp lines between "profitability" and "public interest" have 
been somewhat blurred. While there is little agreement as to the extent to 
which large corporate management must consider the interests of labor, consumer, 
and possible political repercussions, as well as the investor, there is a gen-
2 
eral consensus that this is the direction of movement. On the other hand, 
"the public interest" has been subject to much criticism as a concept and as 
a political reality. 3 Further, unintended consequences of major policies seem 
to be nearly as large a problem for the Federal Highway Program as they are 
for General Motors. 
Although significant issues remain, the focus has tended to shift from 
major theoretical debates to discussions of pragmatic questions involved in 
particular situations such as how to adjust interest rates to stimulate home 
1
cf. the discussion of the distinction between the functions of pattern-
maintenance and goal-attainment by Talcott Parsons, "Outline of the Social Sys-
tem," in Theories of Society, ed. Parsons et al. (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 
Inc., 1961), I, 38-39. 
2 Sutton et al., op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
3see discussion in Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, 
Planning, and the Public Interest (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, Inc., 1955), 
pp. 322-29. 
buying or cooperative housing. Although the extreme conservatives are attempt-
ing to revive the earlier ideological questions, there seems little likelihood 
that this will become a live issue in city planning. 
However, a variety of new questions have emerged from the problems of 
trying to coordinate action of a wide variety of semi-autonomous decision-
making structures. This is a major problem within government as well as be-
tween government and the other institutions of society. There seems to be a 
general consensus that planning by agencies of government should seek to fore-
see consequences on the whole and in the long run. But problems of how to de-
velop coordinated action between local, metropolitan, state, regional, and 
federal programs remain. 1 
Questions involving decision-making structures for planned social change 
have brought into focus some of the ethical issues which were latent in land-use 
or economic planning. Social change generally refers to changes in patterns of 
interaction in small groups, organizations, or institutions. The nplanner11 has 
become the "change-agent" and the situation to be changed has become the "client-
system." For some writers, the problem of selecting among values has been sub-
ordinated to the question of process values or methodolo~y. Kenneth Benne 
tends to follow John Dewey in the analysis of the ethical situation, emphasiz-
ing the values inherent in the methodology and rejecting the analytical value 
of the distinction between means and ends. 
The goal of the process as viewed by Benne and others is the increased 
capacity of the participants to be self-directing and to solve problems. That 
there are value judgments hidden in the word "solve" and that more could 
~or a perceptive analysis of this issue see Luther Gulick, The Metro-
politan Problem and American Ideas (New York: Knopf, 1962), pp. 113-18. 
usefully be said about the axiological situation seems evident. However, 
Bennis, Benne, and Chin are forthright about the problems involved. 
No discussion of planned change would be complete without some atten-
tion to the perplexing philosophical issues--both valuational and ethical 
--that this subject generates. In these times of "hidden persuaders," 
"brainwashing," payola, conformity, manipulation, and so on, lay and intel-
lectual publics alike are exceedingly wary lest social and psychological 
knowledge bring about the specter of predictable--and thereby helpless--
man. We share this concern also, as a number of articles in this volume 
attest; but we also join Spinoza in saying that our job as men of knowl-
edge is not to weep or laugh, but to understand. One of our problems here 
is that our value-ethical positions are intimately related to our prag-
matic positions. For example, when we postulate that collaboration is a 
sine ~ua non of effective planned change, we are insisting on an ethical 
imperative as well as on a scientific objective. The value issues tinc-
ture almost every statement in the book. The best we can hope to do is 
make our own values as explicit as we can.l 
The concern for planned social change has focused not only the ethical problems 
-in structuring planning (e.g., the role and organization of the helping profes-
sions), but also the awareness of ethical problems in contemporary community 
life. 
"Community" can no longer be assumed as a basis of joint decision and 
action. Planning of social change must extend beyond the effective and 
humane management of accelerating technological change to the building and 
rebuilding of valid bases for "community" life. This means, of necessity, 
helping people to build and rebuild their value orientations as well.2 
ii. The Planning Process 
Several typologies of planning have been devised which indicate the 
ways in which the planning process varies depending upon what type of organiza-
tion is planning, where planning is located in the structure of an organiza-
tion, and toward what goals it is oriented. Thus, Perloff distinguishes be-
tween: (l) executive staff planning, (2) comprehensive physical planning, 
~arren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (eds.), The Plan-
ning of Change: Readings in the Applied Behavioral Sciences (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 6. 
2Ibid. 
(3) general socio-economic planning, (4) functional planning, (5) project plan-
ning for various public services. 1 
Types of planning can also be indicated on a time scale. Short-run 
planning would include such items as a budget. Medium range planning would 
include major projects and development plans. Long-rang planning would spell 
out basic goals and might have utopian elements. 
Another way of characterizing types of planning is in the relationship 
between values pursued and the situation. John Friedman has distinguished be-
tween: (l) adaptive planning which responds to actions of other segments of 
society or trends in society, (2) ameliorative planning which seeks to elim-
inate difficulties or problems, (3) developmental planning which seeks to 
2 
create new opportunities and values. 
There are certain general uniformities in the planning process regard-
less of the place in an organizational structure where planning is done or the 
time span involved. These include: (l) diagnosis of the situation, (2) goal 
setting, (3) analysis and evaluation of various means of reaching the goals, 
(4) setting targets for programs, (5) implementing programs, (6) evaluation 
and feed-back. 
The diagnosis of the situation and the setting of goals involves basic 
~uestions of values and choice of ends. Attempts to avoid the value ~uestions 
by a "naturalistic" diagnosis are still evident. This is illustrated by the 
static, descriptive, positivistic analysis of transportation systems which has 
dominated urban transportation theory until very recently. 
Distrustful of the city planner's judgmental and valuative approaches 
to land use planning, the engineer has been ~uick to adopt the positivistic 
l Perloff, op. cit., p. 141. 
2Lecture at Harvard University, December 7, 1961. 
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land use models as a means for substituting land use forecasting in the 
place of land use planning. The attractiveness of these models lies in 
their promise of a relatively simple and straight-forward method of por-
traying future land use patterns with the precision and the certainty 
that good engineering demands. 
Equally important, these models hold out the promise of eliminating 
the bothersome value questions. If land use patterns are determined by 
natural forces that are outside the control of men, then deliberation 
about the relative desirability of different city forms--about the rela-
tive merits and demerits of high-density subcentersi or many of the other 
concerns of city planners--become idle speculation. 
This approach has come under recent criticism from planners. 
Our present level of understanding indicates that future land use pat-
terns are not mechanistically predetermined by natural law but rather by 
the behavior of value-seeking people. The task of land use projection is 
therefore considerably more complex than the static-descriptive-positivis-
tic models suggest. 
These models are coming to be replaced by dynamic-behavioral-normative 
models that seek to explain how individual locators behave in the market; 
hence, how land use patterns of metropolitan areas develop and change over 
the course of time; and how changes in patterns might be so guided as to 
enhance over-all cultural and economic wealth. 2 
Once the positivistic framework is surpassed, however, the very diffi-
cult problems of selecting values and goals are raised. These problems include 
not only the choice of values or goals, but how and by whom they are to be 
selected. In addition, in complex interacting systems there is a wide range 
of consequences to be considered. If the principle is accepted that all the 
foreseeable consequences should be considered and approved on the whole and in 
the long run, then the planning process inevitably takes on a cooperative or 
collaborative dimension. 
It is a mandate on the professional to examine all of the reasonable, al-
ternative courses of action that lie open; to draw upon the total body of 
existing knowledge in an effort to trace the chain of consequences that 
lies implicit within each alternative course of action; to evaluate these 
consequences for all their probable value implications for the life pat-
terns of families, for the conduct of business and industry, for the fiscal 
structure of government, and for whatever other effects may seem to be 
~elvin M. Webber, "Transportation Planning Models," reprint from 
Traffic Quarterly (July, 1961), pp. 7-8. 
2Thid., p. 15. 
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relevant and important; and then to pose the bundles of alternative ac-
tions and their evaluated conse~uences for legislative consideration. 
0 ••• 0 ••• 0 •• 0 ••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••• 0 
Because we are all the inevitable victims of professional specializa-
tion, a comprehensive analysis of kind demands a gigantic collaborative 
effort by men from a number of fields--the various social sciences, the 
various fields of engineering, and the various welfare professions, in-
cluding public health, social welfare, public administration, city plan-
ning, recreation, and education. Such an interprofessional team can best 
bring the knowledge of the various metropolitan subsystems to bear on de-
cisions concerning any one subsystem.l 
Perhaps there might even be room for a social ethicist on such a team, or even 
a preacher~ 
There are also significant issues raised by the means employed to 
achieve stated goals. To the extent that means involve other persons (as they 
almost inevitably do), the relationships which are thus created are subject to 
ethical judgment. Basic ~uestions of cooperation, participation, manipulation, 
domination, and coercion are raised. The fundamental issue of respect for per-
sons as ends as well as means is involved when the types of participation are 
considered. 
The need for evaluation becomes more urgent once the positivistic frame-
work is rejected. The inade~uacies of programs of evaluation were noted by 
Martin Meyerson. 
Currently, we in planning agencies have no systematic means of analyz-
ing the effect of planning measures of programs of action. It is astonish-
ing, for example, that we have never analyzed the effects of zoning. We 
have never studied what the effects of this interference in the land mar-
ket have been on the monopoly position of different kinds of businesses, 
on the costs of land, on the encouragement or discouragement of certain 
types of development. 
I suggest that we maintain a constant feed-back of information on the 
intended and the unintended conse~uences of programs that are adopted 
locally . . . the more such a review function is performed, the more read-
ily it can be performed.2 
1Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
~artin Meyerson, "Building the Middle-Range Bridge for Comprehensive 
Planning," Journal of American Institute of Planners, XXII (1956), 62. 
72 
In the city planning profession there seems to be developing a general 
consensus that the whole range of consequences need to be considered, This is 
not true of planning theory in other organizations. There is a tendency to 
take the goals of the organization as given, and to use planning merely as an 
instrument for achieving those goals more efficiently. Evaluation is then 
very simple. Has membership increased? Was the program profitable for the 
corporation? A recent attempt to formulate planning theory discusses this 
issue. 
In a capitalistic economic society it is usually assumed that the ob-
jective of each business firm is to maximize profit ... 
In more recent years, arguments have appeared which contradict the 
premise that all businesses are operated to maximize profits. There ap-
pears to be significant evidence that motives such as desire for security 
and stability, fear of government or union action or fear of inviting com-
petition may influence the choice of a given plan. The point of this dis-
cussion is not to attempt to prove or disprove these arguments. It seems 
rather obvious, however, that the rejection of a given plan because of the 
fear of adverse reaction of government, unions, competitors, or customers 
is simply recognizing two undesirable possibilities. Either the short-run 
plan will not be realized because of the above influences, or, if realized, 
the long-run profit picture is likely to be affected by action of one or 
more of the above groups. In either case, the planner is able to evaluate 
the relative advantages (short- and long-run) of alternative plans.l 
Since profit (like all money) is a means to an end, it is obvious that 
the process of ·evaluation has been short-circuited. End values are not con-
sidered. Further, there is little or no attempt to evaluate the foreseeable 
consequences on the whole and in the long-run. Thus, one of the most impor-
tant issues in planning emerges. Is planning simply to be a process of doing 
more efficiently and on a larger scale that which is not worth doing in the 
first place? 
This is part of the background for concern about the social structures 
that guide the processes of thought, deliberation, and valuation in society. 
1Preston P. LeBreton and Dale A. Henning, Planning Theory (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 87. 
73 
GeorgeS. Counts notes that the principle of automatic adjustment has col-
lapsed not only in the economic sphere, but also in the intellectual and moral 
aspects of life. 
If the intellectual and moral vacuum created by the collapse of the 
principle of automatic adjustment in the field of human evaluations is not 
to be filled by some form of authoritarianism, then it must be replaced by 
deliberate controls which, without destroying freedom of thought and speech, 
will enable public deliberation to discharge its essential office in the 
present period. Obviously, these specifications will not be easily satis-
fied. But it may be said, with considerable assurance, that any successful 
attempt to fulfill them will entail two distinct, if mutually dependent, 
types of control. The first has to do with the establishment of the con-
ditions under which rationality in our society may prevail. The second in-
volves the discovery of a disciplined method for the control and guidance 
of public deliberation.l 
This raises the problem of freedom and order in a new form. The struc-
ture of public communication and discussion must come under the conscious dis-
cipline of process norms or methodology . 
. in the absence of an uncoerced community of persuasion, intellectual 
and moral authority in a democratic society can be vested only in a compe-
tent methodology of group deliberation, controlled and directed by disci-
plined procedures organically united with freedom of thought and expres-
sion. Given the current clash of doctrines and interests, it may well 
prove difficult, or even impossible, to formulate and establish methodolog-
ical standards capable of achieving this vital union. But it is important 
to note that continued failure at this point will mean the end of the demo-
cratic processes of free speech and discussion. And, it is important to 
note, also, that the establishment of a disciplined methodology which 
unites within itself both genuine freedom of thought and effective intel-
lectual and moral authority is not inherently impossible. For in the do-
main of the natural sciences, once almost as confused and as controversial 
as the realm of human evaluations today, scientific method has already 
achieved an organic and fruitful union of individual freedom and disci-
plined authority.2 
It has become evident that the ethical issues in the maintenance of the 
most basic structures of society are now being discussed. The argument is no 
1George S. Counts, "The Impact of Technological Change," The Planning 
of Change: Readings in the Applied Behavioral Sciences, ed. Warren G. Bennis, 
Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1961), p. 33. 
2Ibid., p. 34. 
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longer whether or not to plan, but how to plan to develop and maintain the kind 
of social structure that will permit the democratic planning process itself to 
continue. This opens rather than closes the door to considered ethical judg-
ments as one of the essential ingredients in the planning process. 
Viewed from this perspective, the development and elaboration of the 
idea of the responsible society in ecumenical Christian social thought takes 
on considerable significance for "secular" city planning. Common issues have 
been joined. Similar questions are being asked. The possibility of fruitful 
dialogue and emerging coherence seems evident. 
iii. Values, Goals, Targets, and Norms 
Contemporary planning reflects the tensions between values, goals, 
targets, and norms that arise when a rapidly changing, complex society has to 
re-examine the ends and standards which guide action. The following issues 
stand out: 
l. Methodological problems associated with values, goals, and targets 
are a subject concern. Planning theory has drawn on related fields, notably 
economics, sociology, and anthropology. However, there is a certain urgency 
in planning since the 11 Shoulds 11 and 11 0ughtS 11 of policy are an obvious component, 
and the escape clause of merely trying to be "descriptive" is not usable. 
The models of rationality developed in economics and game theory have 
been weighed and found wanting. Concluding a study of current conceptions of 
rational decision-making, John Dyckman notes that such models have been built 
on assumption of competition and adversity. However, "public planning is not 
defensive but armed at improving the condition of the client." 1 
The utilitarian foundations of economics have tended to view end values 
l John W. Dyckman, "Review Article: Planning and Decision Theory," 
JAIP, XXVII (1961), 342. 
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as individual, isolated, and incommensurable bits. 
Individual value is so deeply ingrained in our view of rationality 
that we have difficulty making social value the starting point of a defi-
nition of rationality. The rationality of cooperation, for example, is 
relatively undeveloped.l 
Planning in most fields involves cooperative efforts, and coordinated 
planning may be able to produce the kind of unified effort that could otherwise 
only be achieved by a unified coercive structure of authority. 
Not only is the rationality of cooperation underdeveloped, but the gen-
eral process of goal selection has had little attention. 
Studies on how to find goals, other than the traditional speculation 
of political philosophers and the self-fulfilling prophecies of adver-
tisers and marketers, are very skimpy.2 
At the very time when capacities have increased so greatly, the plan-
ning profession is becoming aware of the need for a clarification of the values 
that should guide the use of these capacities. 
2. There are a variety of ways in which value judgments get hidden or 
disguised. Criticism of such disguises and efforts to make the value campo-
nents explicit is a continuing effort. 
(a) Emphasis on physical design and physical means systems such as 
highways creates a tendency to short circuit value judgments by treating the 
designs or the physical systems as ends in themselves. Certain conceptions of 
"rightness" which may be a function of personal disposition or training may 
then be the sole basis of evaluation. John Dyckman noted that in one coopera-
tive planning effort, students from different universities reflected the dif-
ferences in their training. 
At the outset, the approach of Harvard students was oriented to the 
complete redevelopment outlook; the Illinois Tech students were schooled 
in Professor Hilberseimer's version of the linear city; the University of 
1Ibid., p. 342. 2Ibid . , p . 336 . 
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Chicago planners had their urbane, sociological distrust of the "neighbor-
hood" planning methods.l 
However, training in what constitutes a "good" design may and often 
has rested on relatively unexamined presuppositions about the impact of that 
design on the lives and value experiences of people who will have to live with 
the finished product. Such presuppositions have seldom been tested, if even 
made explicit. 
(b) Standards of efficiency and objectivity are a frequent cloak used 
to cover other value questions. Karl Bosworth has noted how this operates in 
2 the work of city managers. In a critique of urban government textbooks, 
Herson3 suggests that the views of administration and operation of municipal 
government are too often characterized by a limited service, high efficiency, 
least cost standards. Such perspectives tend to ignore the larger context, 
the range of functions, and the important value choices which are actually in-
volved in public policy. Dyckman suggests that "professional planners tend to 
regard their methods of procedure as 'scientific' and to regard themselves as 
'technicians'--as masters of a professional discipline which is objectively 
determined and superior to the ad hoc improvisation of politicians." 4 
However, the role of values in social science has been the subject of 
much discussion. The view that " there is no way in which any social 
1John Dyckman, Community Appraisal Study: A Summary of Current Pro-
posals, Published in behalf of the Collaborating Organizations by South Side 
Planning Board (Chicago, Ill.: Spring, 1952), p. 1. 
~arl A. Bosworth, 11 The Manager as a Politician, 11 Democracy in Urban 
America: Rea"dings on Government and Politics, ed. Oliver P. Williams and 
Charles Press (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1961), pp. 242-51. 
3Law~ence J. R Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," 
Urban Government: A Reader in Politics and Administration, ed. Edward C. 
Banfield (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), pp. 3-19. 
4 Dyckman, Community Appraisal Study: A Summary of Current Proposals, 
op. cit., p. 2. 
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scientist can avoid assuming choices of value and implying them in his work as 
a whole," 1 is increasingly representative. The planning literature shows an 
increasing sophistication on this question, including an awareness that value 
judgments needs to be explicit. 
There is confusion over the ground of values, including whether or not 
there is a legitimate distinction between what is "desired" and what is "desir-
able." There is a tendency in much planning theory to attempt to ground values 
solely in what is "desired" by the client. The contributions of cultural an-
thropology on the one hand and the experience of ethnic diversity on the other 
has stimulated the general awareness that values differ. However, the extreme 
"relativising" of value standards has been challenged at several points in more 
recent investigations. David Bidney notes the potential universality of norma-
tive standards associated with science. 2 Florence Kluckhohn notes that value 
orientations are not infinitely varied, but are instead types of responses to 
common human problems. 
Value orientations are complex but definitely patterned (rank-ordered) 
principles, resulting from the transactional interplay of three analytically 
distinguishable elements of the evaluative process--the cognitive, the af-
fective, and the directive elements--which give order and direction to the 
ever-flowing stream of human acts and thoughts as these relate to the solu-
tion of "common human" problems.3 
However, the awareness of diversity, the self-critical rejection of 
any "absolute" values has tended to contribute to a neo-positivistic approach 
which tries to ground policy solely on what people desire or may be anticipated 
to desire. The question of what is 11 desirable 11 rather than merely 11 desiredn 
1c. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1959), p. 171. 
~avid Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1953), p. 430. 
~lorence Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orien-
tations (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1961), p. 
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is fre~uently treated as meaningless or unanswerable. In this perspective, 
planning becomes merely giving people what they think they want, or what one 
anticipates they will want. But are there no standards for that which "ought" 
to be desired, as well as that which is desired? To a very large extent, this 
question has gone unexamined. The ground of value judgments is largely uncul-
tivated. 
3. The task of relating values (viewed as more general and basic di-
rectional tendencies) to goals (ends toward which policy is directed) to tar-
gets (specifiable and frequently quantifiable ends of program or specific ac-
tions) is difficult, fre~uently ambiguous, and often incomplete. However, if 
values should guide the formulations of goals, and goals should be the basis 
for target setting, then the task of clarifying value ~uestions and goals seems 
very important. David Riesman, discussing the growth of suburbs, noted that 
studies on suburban life were largely empirical sociological investigations 
dealing with "zoning, planning and recreational needs, on the location of in-
dustry and the journey to work; and on problems of suburban and regional admin-
istration." 1 However, the basic values of suburban residential living, as 
well as the impact of suburbs on the values of residents are not carefully 
studied. He describes his own approach as "seasoned subjectivity." 2 If such 
a basic planning ~uestion as the development of suburbs lacks careful study, 
then how can goals and targets be determined? 
Starting at the other end, that of target setting, it is interesting 
to note one of the more elaborate attempts to develop a theoretical basis for 
setting highway design targets. In a study at Yale, Greenshields attempted to 
~avid Riesman, "The Suburban Dislocation," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXIV (November, 1957), 125. 
2Thid. 
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develop a quantitative basis for the "quality" of traffic flow. The "quality" 
of traffic flow refers to the value judgments of drivers. Without making any 
empirical check as to how drivers in fact evaluate different elements in traf-
fie flow or their sense of frustration at different occurrences, assumptions 
were made about items such as average speed, change of speed, and frequency of 
change of speed. These were weighted on the basis of arbitrary assignment 
(e.g., using the square root of speed changes). With such quantification, 
careful measurement of traffic flow could be given a "qualitative" equivalent 
(e.g., Q = 4.37). That a slower but more scenic or aesthetically pleasing 
drive might be more satisfying to many drivers would have no place in such 
calculations. 
However, this study at least recognizes that targets (which are often 
such physical targets as miles of highway or numbers of houses) should be re-
lated to experienced values. But it also illustrates the long distance there 
is to go before the wide range of target setting decisions can be meaningfully 
related in an explicit way to goals and values. 
The problem of limited and specific goals or targets as a basis for 
norms and action, versus the plurality of values and goals seemingly required 
by public policy has plagued planning theory. This problem becomes acute not 
only in terms of reconciling individual demands (such as persons operating to 
conserve real estate values) but also the attempt to reconcile demands of the 
large occupation-type collectivities with their special and limited interests. 
Persons whose moral life is fragmented by the incoherent and unreconciled 
special goals attached to their differentiated roles (e.g., worker, consumer, 
citizen, home-owner) provide an inadequate basis for developing a coherent 
system of values to guide public policy. 1 
~his is well illustrated by the dilemma which the people of Chicago 
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The relationship of this problem to contemporary social structure will 
be explored more fully in the next chapter. It should be noted, however, that 
efforts such as the President's Commission on National Goals, 1 social policy 
studies and statements of the National Council of Churches, the Catholic Social 
Welfare Council and the wide range of professional groups which work toward the 
development of a coherent ideal of community are of critical importance for 
planning. Unless values and goals are brought into coherent relationships by 
persons as moral agents, the possibility of formulating values, goals, targets, 
and norms to guide planning seems very remote. 
The interrelatedness of contemporary society has resulted in increased 
emphasis on systems, rather than isolated fragments or bits. This is so evi-
dent, whether the discussion is of transportation, social work, education, 
rockets, or social science, that it hardly needs special notice. Yet the 
achievement of the creative integration of thought and effort in planning is 
by no means assured, as recent discussions of planning as dialogue recognize. 2 
The systematic nature of contemporary thought does need to be made ex-
plicit in ethics for there is still a tendency to regard values as isolated 
and fragmentary preferences, norms as simple isolated moral maxims, and rights 
or duties as distinct, "absolute" bits and pieces. 
placed before the politicians and planners. Acting in their role as morally 
concerned citizens they demanded the elimination of slums, but acting as the 
owners of real estate they vigorously rejected the prospect of having public 
housing with Negro residents in their vicinity. Cf. Meyerson, op. cit., pp. 
301-303. See also the analysis of differing conceptions of the "ends of -the 
whole public," pp. 323-29. 
l Goals for Americans, The Report of the President's Commission on Na-
tional Goals and Chapters Submitted for the Consideration of the Commission 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960). 
~obert C. Hoover, "A View of Ethics and Planning," Journal of the 
American Institute of Planners, XXVII (1961), 298. 
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It will be seen, however, that both the idea of the responsible so-
ciety and the system of moral laws contribute to an ethical framework which 
is ade~uate to the re~uirements of interrelated and interdependent complex 
systems. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CONTEXT OF ETHICAL CHOICE IN URBAN SOCIETY 
Developments in ethical theory and changes in social life have 
been closely related throughout history. The interaction of different 
cultures has challenged traditional systems of morality among the post-
Homeric Greeks as well as the inhabitants of twentieth-century American 
cities. The collapse of the relative independence of the Greek city-
states posed questions of ethics which Plato and Aristotle had not con-
sidered. Similarly, the collapse of the economic and political founda-
tions of medieval Europe posed difficult ethical problems for Christian 
social thought which Thomas Aquinas had been able to ignore. 
In twentieth-century industrial urban America the very foundation 
of political, economic, social, religious, family, and personal life are 
undergoing change. Thus, before exploring an ethical framework for urban 
planning, it will be useful to examine the context within which choice 
must now be made. This context includes urban ecology, technology, so-
cial structure, culture, and personality. 
l. Urban Ecology 
Human beings in the city are part of an intricate web of physical 
and biological relationships. Ecology originally referred to the complex 
patterns of competition and symbiosis observed among plans and animals. 
Equilibrium refers to the tendency of a given set of relationships to 
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maintain themselves if there is no outside interference, or to reach a 
new state of balance when a new factor enters. 
Patrick Geddes pioneered the study of cities using the concept 
of ecology to interpret their growth and evolution. In the United States, 
several writers including R. D. McKenzie1 and Don J. Bogue2 have used the 
concepts of ecology to analyze metropolitan communities. However, in ap-
plying the concepts derived from biology to cities, there has been ten-
dency to assume that the observable results in the development of cities 
were necessary consequences of a subsocial biotic process. The result of 
this view for planning was what might be called the "gardening view" of 
planning in which the planner trims around the edges and pulls out the 
weeds in order to facilitate natural processes. That persons are not 
plants, and that most people are potential gardeners tends to be over-
looked. 
But the failure of some writers to adequately distinguish the bio-
physical systems from the social systems, culture, and personality or 
their projection of concepts of causation from the lower to the higher3 
does not change the fact that bio-physical systems and spatial organiza-
tion are important aspects of the context of ethical choice. It is obvi-
ouF that munificent as the earth is, it will not "naturally" provide an 
environment for human life if men themselves destroy the underlying 
foundations. 
1R. D. McKenzie, The Metropolitan Community (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1933) · 
~on J. Bogue, The Structure of the Metropolitan Community: A 
Study of Dominance and Subdominance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1949). 
~or discussion of problems involved in conceptualization of lev-
els of causation, see Robert M. Maciver, Social Causation (New York: Ginn 
and Company, 1942), pp. 371-93· 
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The early industrial cities had a very difficult task in handling 
the problems of sanitation and disease control. Technology has virtually 
solved the problems of treatment of human waste and medicine has made 
great strides in eliminating disease. However, new challenges resulting 
from increased growth and technology are present. Air pollution, water 
pollution, lowering of the water table, and toxic substances in food are 
some of the ways in which the ecological relationships are disturbed. 
Poisoning the atmosphere through weapons' testing has become a fact of 
modern life. To believe that the biological and physical environment of 
cities has infinite resilience is to indulge in wishful thinking. 
The problem becomes even more complex, however, when it is noted 
that the city populations increasingly dominate the national government. 
Political decisions which may drastically affect the farmer and the coun-
tryside are becoming matters in which the city dweller has an ever larger 
share. Stewardship of the land can no longer be left to a powerful farm 
bloc. The cities and the nation are participating in decisions which af-
feet the whole biological and physical environment including rivers, 
oceans, atmosphere, land, and the fruit of the land. 
There is nothing in the market process that inherently represents 
the interests of future generations. One need not be an alarmist to 
question the mining of topsoil and the conversion of plains into deserts. 
There is little or no assurance in the words of an economist, even one 
as eminent as Kenneth Boulding, who says that in a commercial economy 
" . . we can afford to do this." 1 
~enneth Boulding in Man's Role in Changing the Face of the 
Earth, ed. William L. Thomas, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
J:95b), p. 432. 
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Only in conscious forethought, in intelligent and responsible 
planning, can the intricate balances of the physical and biological en-
vironment of human life be maintained or improved for future use. The 
delicacy of this job is well illustrated by the analysis of the interre-
lationships of values, norms, social dynamics, social structures, and the 
l 
resource complex which Walter Firey has recently completed. It is evi-
dent that the development of technology, the structuring of decisions, 
and the values held by ap urban society are critical factors for the 
whole network of ecological relationships on which the future existence 
of urban life depends. 
The spatial organization of cities is, of course, an increas-
ingly important aspect of these ecological relationships. Indeed, so im-
portant is space that much of the history of city planning has dealt 
largely with the questions of land-use. As urban populations increase in 
size and the social structure becomes more differentiated, questions of 
spatial organization become ever more important. 
Efforts to conceptualize and evaluate patterns of spatial organ-
ization at the level of the metropolitan area have been receiving increas-
ing attention. Kevin Lynch has recently reviewed some of the varied pro-
posals for alternative patterns ranging through high density core, the 
ring, star, and galaxy to the dispersed sheet and the multi-centered net. 2 
He suggests that the three vital factors in the form of the metropolis 
are: ( l) "The magnitude and pattern of both structural density . . . and 
~alter 
(Glencoe, Ill.: 
Firey, Man, Mind and Land: A Theory of Resource Use 
The Free Press, 1960), p. 256. 
~evin Lynch, "The Pattern of the Metropolis," in The Future 
Metropolis, ed. Lloyd Rodwin (New York: George Braziller, 1961), pp. 
106-27. 
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structural condition"; (2) "Capacity, type, and pattern of the facili-
2 ties for the circulation of persons"; and (3) "The location of fixed ac-
tivities that draw on or serve large portions of the population." 3 
In analyzing elements of spatial pattern, Lynch suggests that 
The most significant features of such patterns are the grain (the 
degree of intimacy with which different elements, such as stores and 
houses are intermixed), the focal organization (the interrelation of 
the nodes of concentration and interchange as contracted with the 
general background), and the accessibility (the general proximity in 
terms of time of all points in the region to a given kind of activity 
or facility) .4 
Different patterns of spatial organization combine these factors in 
various ways. 
In attempting to evaluate these various forms of spatial organi-
zation, Lynch dismisses criteria such as psychological well-being because 
"we are too ignorant of this aspect at present to discuss it further,"5 
and "efficiency of the environment in regard to production and distribu-
tion"6 because although it is "probably substantially affected by metro-
politan pattern, ... unfortunately no one seems to know what the effect 
is." 7 Lynch then uses the criteria of choice (" . . . as far as possible 
the individual should have the greatest variety of goods, services, and 
facilities readily accessible to him" ),8 social interaction, cost, com-
fort, participation, growth and adaptability, continuity and imageabil-
ity.9 He suggests that according to these criteria, a complex and dynamic 
pattern such as a multi-centered net might offer the best possibilities. 
It seems evident that far more research needs to be conducted on 
1Ibid 0' p. 104. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 
4
Ibid 0' p. 105. 5rbid., p. 119. 6rbid. 
7Ibid. Bibid. 9Ibid., pp. 119-22. 
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significance of spatial organization for personality development and so-
cial structure. A dialogue is needed in which discussion moves from vari-
eties of spatial organization to the range of consequences for personal-
ity, social systems, and culture, but the reverse is also needed. That 
is, discussion needs also to start with personality development and its 
needs, and social and cultural systems and their requirements. Then, en 
the basis of these needs and requirements, exploration can be made of what 
patterns of spatial organization can be created and developed. A starting 
point for personality might be the concept of developmental tasks at each 
stage of the life cycle, and the spatial requirement of these tasks. For 
the social and cultural systems, the increase in role differentiation and 
specialization might be a starting point, since persons occupying differ-
ent roles (ho~e, work, leisure, consumer, citizenship, etc.) must move 
from one center of activity to the next. Indeed, this may well be the 
strongest argument for relatively high densities. 
An additional conceptual tool might be that of "space-binding." 
An analysis could be made of the range of activities in which persons 
participate in terms of the degree to which they are space-bound, i.e., 
tied to a particular location or structural configuration of spatial ar-
rangements. Thus, shopping in a large department store is rather tightly 
"space-bound" but reading, painting, or listening to the radio have a 
relatively loose space-binding. 
Difficult as the problems are, it is evident that much more re-
search and thought are needed to develop an understanding of goals and 
alternatives for making the difficult decisions about spatial arrange-
ments. 
Critical issues arise with regard to the distribution among 
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persons of the rights to the use of space. In a low density of popula-
tion, this question hardly emerged except in a stable agricultural soci-
ety where the land system has always been of great importance. But in-
creasingly in an urban society with a population explosion, space becomes 
a scarce commodity. 
It is true that available space can be created by going up as 
well as out. Cities in the United States have been doing both. But 
equally important is the functional unity of distance-time relationships. 
Increases in speed of transportation and communication increase the avail-
able space by enlarging the area within a functionally usable time-cost 
relationship. The awareness of this fact has dramatically changed think-
ing about spatial organization in such matters as industrial plant loca-
tion. But the distance-time factor and the expansion of usable space by 
"going-up" both raise important economic considerations. Space and 
height are expensive. 
Because the pressure on space is great and will no doubt increase, 
important issues of distributive justice are raised by the allocation of 
space, including space such as a home, and outer space such as is needed 
for recreation. The most notoriously crowded housing in cities is almost 
universally in the area with fewest parks or open spaces. Racial dis-
crimination manifests itself in drawing lines around space available to 
Negroes. Teen-age gang troubles often center over the question of "turf," 
the area reserved for one particular group or another. Space has become 
one of the most important scarce "commodities" in the city. 
It may not be overstatement to suggest that in the emerging urban 
civilization few areas of decision-making will more radically affect the 
lives of people than the decisions about the distribution and use of 
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space. If this is true, then the ethical issues involved need the atten-
tion and concern of all responsible citizens. 
2. Urban Technology 
The basic source of power and means of transportation is one of 
the best organizing focal points from which to view the history of the 
city. Cities in the United States have gone through three basic techno-
logical revolutions. The first complex of factors included animal muscle, 
water power, and water transportation. The second was steam power, coal, 
iron, railroad, and the third was internal combustion, highway, air, oil, 
chemicals, light metals and electricity. The fourth revolution which has 
already begun is the use of electronic substitutes for brain power, and 
nuclear energy as a basic power source. The various changes added to 
earlier potentials and involved restructuring complex networks of rela-
tionships. 
Each of these phases has produced major revolutions in the life 
of cities. The Erie Canal gave New York its early predominance. Rail-
roads were the key to Chicago's boom. Pittsburgh, Gary, Birmingham were 
among the steel towns. The building of airplanes contributed greatly to 
the growth of Los Angeles, Dallas, and Atlanta. Oak Ridge and Los Alamos 
are almost synonyms for nuclear power. Not only the location and major 
industries of cities, but the transportation and communications systems 
that tie cities together are dependent upon technological developments. 
However, technological limitations are becoming less significant. 
With each technological advance, new possibilities are created while the 
old options for the most part remain open. This is not to deny the real-
ity of conflicts between technological systems. An expressway paralleling 
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a mass transit line will frequently destroy the latter. But the more im-
portant element is the increasing freedom and necessity of choice. 
We could centralize or decentralize, concentrate population or scatter 
it. If we want to continue the trend away from the country, we can 
do that; but if we want to combine town and country values in an 
agrindustrial way of life, we can do that. In large areas of our op-
eration, we could go back to old-fashioned do~estic industry with per-
haps even a gain in efficiency, for small power is everywhere avail-
able, small machines are cheap and ingenious, and there are easy 
means to collect machined parts and centrally assemble them. If we 
want to lay our emphasis on providing still more mass-produced goods, 
and raising the standard of living still higher, we can do that; or 
if we want to increase leisure and the artistic culture of the indi-
vidual, we can do that. We can have solar machines for hermits in 
the desert like Aldous Huxley or central heating provided for mil-
lions by New York Steam. All this is commonplace; everyone knows it. 
It is just this relaxing of necessity, this extraordinary flexi-
bility and freedom of choice of our techniques, that is baffling and 
frightening to people. 1 
It is not necessary here to examine the implications or potentials 
of emerging technology in detail. However, a few items are relevant. 
There has been much debate about future metropolitan forms. Is Manhattan 
or Los Angeles the pattern? Is greater congestion or urban sprawl, each 
with their different values and disvalues, to be the shape of the future? 
Transportation systems are frequently viewed as the key factor. Yet, 
mass transit is~ill at a nineteenth-century level of technology. Small 
electric-powered cars designed for use on highways as well as a high 
speed rail system could permit flexibility of point of origin and destina-
tion coupled with privacy and comfort. Technologically such a system is 
completely feasible. With such a system, the advantages of the downtown 
area could be preserved while still maintaining many of the desirable 
features of suburban living for much larger populations than those of 1962. 
Similarly, a technological revolution in paperbacks and recording 
l Goodman, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
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systems has made the dissemination of much of cultural life relatively 
independent of spatial re~uirements. Television has opened a window to 
the world that promises to enhance greatly the capacity of persons to per-
ceive and understand a complex community. 
But each of these possibilities, to say nothing of nuclear energy, 
merely serve to lift up the ~uestion of what ends are to be served. Tech-
nology is neutral. Men use it. For what purposes? The social structure 
of urban life provides the framework that in part determines how goals 
are chosen and who does the choosing. But the most significant fact about 
modern technology is that it increases the range of choice and places a 
heavier burden on ethical judgment. 
3. Urban Social Structure 
Patterns of relationships between persons in modern industrial 
cities are highly diversified and yet highly structured. Choices or al-
ternative possibilities calling for decisions are provided as well as 
limited by the social structure and the position occupied in that struc-
ture by a given person. But this social structure does not provide the 
same range of choices to every person. The power to influence the lives 
of other persons is unequally distributed. The ways in which this power 
is distributed, the limitations on its use, and the possibilities which 
are created all form important aspects of the context of ethical choice. 
However, the sheer complexity and rate of change of urban society 
makes difficult the task of analyzing the social structure. For not only 
is change taking place as part of the process within the structure, but 
the structure itself is changing. State constitutions are rewritten. 
Federal Courts accept new responsibilities. Corporations grow, develop 
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new lines of products, and take on new functions such as giving donations 
to educational and charitable institutions. Patterns of family life 
shift as mothers take up employment outside the home. Labor unions, in-
dustrial leaders, real estate interests and elected officials join hands 
to seek military expenditures or defense plants for a given city. 
Further, there are serious "boundary" problems. Where are limits 
to be drawn between institutions, social classes, or even between cities 
or nations? Geographical boundaries, political divisions, economic units, 
newspaper readership and administrative jurisdictions of religious, edu-
cational, or social welfare institutions seldom coincide. At one time, 
most cities had a hinterland all their own. This is no longer true of 
New York, Philadelphia, or even Chicago. It may be true of Salt Lake 
City. However, the servicing of a hinterland may be less significant for 
a city than a function which the city performs for other major cities, 
the nation, or even several nations. Motion pictures and television in 
Los Angeles, the Federal Government in Washington, D.C., and finance in 
New York are obvious examples. 
Peter Drucker has recently characterized the contemporary social 
landscape. 
Today the social scene is very much like the Himalayas. Here are 
the lofty ranges of the great corporations; there the rocky cliffs of 
the great labor unions guarding access to job and craft; there are 
the great--or at least large--universities, proud of the fact that 
they have made a big business out of learning and that they have 
bigger budgets--and budget deficits--than many a fair-sized country. 
But there are also the many other organized powers--the farm bloc, 
the various professional and trade groups, to name a few. Even the 
churches are infinitely more organized and infinitely more powerful 
politically in today's America than they were in 1900.1 
l Peter F. Drucker, Power and Democracy in America, ed. William 
v. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1961), p. 7· 
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In an effort to develop a systematic understanding of some of 
the key elements in the social structure, use will be made of the concep-
tual framework of the social system developed by Talcott Parsons in his 
1 
most recent summary statement. It should be noted at the outset that 
the social system is distinguished from the cultural system, personality, 
and the bio-physical environment. 2 The latter three constitute the bound-
aries of the social system. 
The social system can be viewed in three dimensions. The first 
is the dimension of inclusiveness of a concrete system. The societal 
level is the most inclusive. Within the society there are a range of 
levels or subsystems including the institutions, the goal-limited3 col-
lectivities, the diffuse-goal collectivities, and the primary or techni-
cal collectivities. The latter may be as small as two persons. A role 
is the basic component of a collectivity, referring to the "normatively 
regulated complex of behavior of one of the participants." 3 In a society 
or concrete system, there may be segmentation of similar units (such as 
family farms) or differentiation in which subsystems are distinguished 
from each other but mutually interdependent (such as the economic, legal, 
or educational subsystems). 
1 Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," Theories of Society, 
op. cit., I, 30-79· 
2Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
3Parsons uses the term "specific-function" rather than "goal-
limited." However, the particular problem of the goal-limited collectiv-
ity is that it has many functions, some of which may not be recognized in 
the formulation of its goals. Hence, the usage in this dissertation will 
be "goal-limited." For consistency, "diffuse-function" has also been 
changed to "diffuse-goal." 
4Ibid., p. 42. 
A second dimension of analysis of the system is the basic func-
tional prerequisites of each subsystem as well as the whole social system. 
Parsons sees four such prerequisites: (l) pattern-maintenance; (2) inte-
gration; (3) goal-attainments; (4) adaptation. 1 
In modern societies, Parsons notes that at the institutional 
level there is differentiation between these four functions. Pattern-
maintenance focuses on the problem of values and motivational commitments. 
Religious institutions have a primary responsibility in the articulation 
and cultivation of basic belief systems and value commitments. The inte-
gration function in modern society is the primary focus of the legal sys-
tern including the norms and instruments or agency for their development 
and management. Parsons suggests that the term "polity" is useful in de-
scribing the goal-attainment function of the social system. This refers 
to the complex processes of government by which goals are chosen and re-
lated in a system or scale of priorities. Government, in this sense, is 
a part of a wide range of organizational life. The adaptive function is 
related to goal attainment for it develops and provides disposable facil-
ities and services for use in attaining goals. Economic organization 
focuses on adaptation. Similarly, each subsystem may be analyzed in terms 
of the four functional requirements and may be internally differentiated. 
The third dimension of analysis is that of values, norms, goals, 
and motivation which interpenetrate with the various levels of the social 
2 
system. Values in terms of the social system are the most general, ap-
propriate to the societal level. Norms are function-specific, and goals 
situation-specific. These goals, norms, and values are internalized in 
1Ibid., pp. 38-40. 2Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
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personality, but may be institutionalized in society. Indeed, institu-
tionalization is the embodiment of culturally relevant norms in the social 
system. Goals are the application of norms to specific situations or the 
activities of persons in roles. Norms are analytically distinguishable 
from the roles defined by them, and are in turn legitimized by values. 
Values, in turn, are grounded in systems of ultimate beliefs, expressed 
in ritual, and internalized in the process of socialization. 
Social change needs to be viewed from two perspectives. The first 
is the internal operation of the system in which the basic patterns are 
maintained and to which the concept of equilibrium is appropriate. The 
second type is change in the patterns or structures themselves. This 
type of change is open-ended. It may result in transformation of the 
system, or breakdown and dissolution. Because so many significant issues 
involving ethical choice are related to the perspective from which social 
change in contemporary urban society is viewed, it will be useful to ex-
amine the nature of such change and evaluations of it in contemporary 
thought. Structural change will be examined first. 
i. Structural Change 
Several issues in contemporary urban society involve social change 
and its impact on the individual's capacity and freedom to choose a mean-
ingful course of action. Winston White has recently completed a study of 
the characteristic criticisms by intellectuals of the major developments 
in American society. 1 He found that the major criticisms could be grouped 
into two categories which he called the 11 moralizers 11 and the 11 refonners. 11 
lwinston White, op. cit., pp. 16-67. 
The moralizers attribute the instability of standards to a de-
cline of values that has come about because members of the society 
have failed to live up to them. It views the maintenance of values 
as depending primarily on the individual affirmation of them. Loss 
of values is due to loss of individualism. And loss of individualism 
equals an increase in conformity.l 
The implication here is that the more the individual shares com-
mon patterns or norms, the less individualistic he is. "The logic of 
this formulation is often called a zero-sum concept: there is a fixed 
quantity of choices available so that what one side gains the other in-
evitably loses." 2 The elitists tend to interpret the loss of standards 
as resulting from the decline of the importance of elites to set the 
standards. The fluctuation of standards of the other-directed peer-group 
leave the other-directed person as interpreted by Riesman "hard pressed 
to keep up with what he is supposed to conform to." 3 
On the other hand, the reformers accent the weaknesses of the 
social structure. 
The reformers locate standards in the organic community, where 
the individual can know them at first hand in meaningful relations. 
But alienation arising from the division of labor has destroyed that 
basis of evaluation, producing alienation, or estrangement from self. 
As alienated man becomes a commodity on the labor market, his a~ien­
ated personality also becomes a commodity on the so8ial market. 
With the loss of community, it is suggested, there is the loss of the 
unifying web that provides individuality, meaning, and stable standards. 
In the place of human standards come the "standards of efficiency in eco-
nomic production and in bureaucratic organization.n 5 
Neither of these views, however, seem adequate to interpret the 
nature of the social changes which are occurring. White suggests that a 
1Ibid.} p. 70. 
4Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
5Ibid.} p. 72. 
3Ibid., p. 71. 
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more appropriate model is "that of evolution: differentiation of struc-
ture and specialization of function and the complementary processes of 
reintegration." 1 This perspective highlights the following basic ideas: 
(1) Society has parts which are related to each other in a lim-
ited number of potential combinations. While order in this system is not 
to be assumed, but empirically investigated, continuity of the pattern of 
the system must be accounted for. 
(2) All societies have certain functional requirements as noted 
earlier. 
Function does not mean just any process (the action that takes 
place among the different parts) going on in the society, it means 
process in terms of its relation to meeting the requirements of the 
system. 2 
(3) The key question in analyzing a society is the degree of 
structural differentiation that exists in the society. That is, the de-
gree to which all of the essential functions are performed by one struc-
ture, or whether each of the structural components perform only a single 
function. These are of course polar types and actual societies will be 
somewhere in between. 
(4) When functions are "tied to" each other and united under a 
single structure, "they are ascribed to each other." 3 Because each func-
tion has its particular requirements (such as support and loyalty for po-
litical functions or capital, labor, and land for economic functions) when 
there is a high degree of ascription the resources cannot be generated 
independently. Thus, in the feudal system, labor, land, support, and 
loyalty were all tied to each other. 
(5) Functional specialization with increased functional capacity 
1Thid. J p. 73. 2Thid. J p. 74. 3Ibid. J p. 75. 
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tends to occur as structural differentiation occurs. Resources can be 
recruited separately, higher degrees of skill emerge, and decisions can 
be made independently. Illustrations of this are worth noting. 
The differentiation of the corporation from the family-firm has 
meant that the resource of capital--now largely generated by 'plowing 
back' earnings--could be emancipated from the necessity of individual 
family savings. The emergence of labor unions has helped to bring 
about the emancipation of the interests of labor from ascription to 
a particular firm. The rise of public education has meant that the 
training of children can be carried on independently of the resources 
--both financial and cultural--of the family. The differentiation of 
"pure" research from applied research has meant that advances in 
knowledge can be emancipated from ascription to particular practical 
problems .l 
(6) There is nothing inevitable about the increased functional 
capacity following the breakdown of ascriptive ties, nor is there anything 
inevitable about the development of differentiation of functions. Indeed, 
differentiation requires a break from traditional ways of doing things or 
the ascription of means to ends. Instead there is the need for rational 
analysis of the relation between means and ends, thereby permitting the 
utilization of new means when they can be proven to be more effective. 
In this development, technology has played an important role, but so has 
the development of certain value systems such as the Protestant Ethic, or 
the creation of certain personality characteristics including what has 
been called the "need-for-achievement." 
(7) Differentiation may not be inclusive of the whole society, 
for there may remain major sections of the society which do remain rela-
ti vely undifferentiated. "Extensity . refers to the degree to which 
differentiation permeates all structures of the same class." 2 
(8) Differentiation places greater demands on persons as well 
2Ibid., p. 79. 
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as society as a whole. "Upgrading refers to this increase in demands for 
l performance." These in turn can create strains, particularly at the 
points where problems of re-integrating the differentiated structures oc-
cur. Resources and work must be allocated, and relationships with the 
rest of society clarified. 
Above all, the expectations of the members of society involved 
must be restructured to fit the newly emerging social patterns. They 
have to make distinctions that previously were unnecessary. Until 
such reorganization with its new standards and expectations is at-
tained, some degree of uncertainty is bound to prevail, often result-
ing in human suffering. Whether or not the 'growing pains' are worth 
it is an evaluative question of costs, but it is a matter of histor-
ical record that the development of societies from a non-literate 
base cannot take place without them.2 
White further notes that such upgrading affects the decision-
making process. 
No matter how rugged an individualist the boss may be, he must 
depend on others for information and for judgment on matters about 
which he himself cannot, in the nature of the case, know very much. 
The old-style straight-line authority can no longer prevail. More-
over, the way in which the specialist presents his information and 
the kinds of questions he must answer depend on his fitting the in-
formation in with that of other specialists. Individual contribu-
tions cannot be measured ahead of time and tossed in independently 
of each other, like baking a cake. Thus, interdependence and working 
in groups is increasingly necessary, at some level of decision.3 
(9) Generalization of conception of the value patterns and norm-
ative order is related intimately to the process of structural differen-
tiation. This seems to be a vitally important aspect of social change 
which has been seldom noticed. Parsons refers to it as 
a shift from prescription of rules by a special class or unit 
in a special situation to more generalized norms having to do with 
more inclusive classes of units in wider ranges of situations. Thus 
the law that specifies that a railway engine must be equipped with a 
steam whistle to give warning at crossings has by court interpreta-
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 80. 3Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
tion been generalized to include any effective warning signal 
(since oil burning locomotives are not equipped with steam) .l 
It might be added that overpasses to eliminate crossing altogether are 
an even further generalization of conception, i.e., another way of elim-
inating the hazards of crossing and protecting life. 
The understanding of this process is vitally important to an ade-
quate approach to the problems and possibilities of planning in modern 
urban society. For it lies at the center of such concerns as meaningful 
participation, democratic decision-making, long-range goal setting vs. 
short-range target setting, and the respective roles and responsibilities 
of the technical specialist and the general citizen. With the generali-
zation of conception of norms and values, it is possible for there to be 
a wide range of consensus on general norms and values which then permit 
large organizations with technically specialized skills to go to work 
creatively and efficiently to implement those values and norms. If mean-
ingful participation means sharing the processes by which long-range 
goals and basic values are established, then this is potentially open to 
every citizen, even though no one person will have the range of technical 
knowledge which will be utilized in implementing these goals. 
It is interesting to note that such normative upgrading and the 
legitimation of social structures in modern urban life are still plagued 
at many points by a failure to transcend the prescriptions of an earlier 
rural pattern. 
The value attitude that regards the rural or the handicraft way of 
life as morally superior to the modern urban and--if you will--indus-
trial way (a common attitude in the Western world of today) is an 
l Talcott Parsons, "Youth in the Context of American Society," 
Daedalus (Winter, 1962), p. 104. 
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example of the failure of the adequate value generalization that is 
an essential part of institutionalizing the process of structural 
change.l 
The religious life of the society shares responsibility for transcending 
the "rural mystique" and developing an ethos that is relevant to the 
modern metropolis. 2 Using this conceptual framework and interpretation 
of social change, it is interesting to note some of the changes taking 
place in American society. Increasing numbers and proportions3 of per-
sons: (l) work outside the household; (2) work in large organizations 
with a high degree of internal differentiation; (3) are married; (4) live 
in large metropolitan areas; (5) participate in voluntary organizations 
including churches, labor unions, and professional societies; (6) work in 
professional, technical, managerial, official, and entrepreneurial roles 
(fewer persons now work as operatives and unskilled non-farm laborers). 
Further, "there is almost universal consensus that this process of upgrad-
ing will be continued--even at an accelerated rate--and that practically 
all jobs will require higher levels of preparation." 4 
The process of upgrading standards of performance, as well as re-
wards, raises new kinds of problems for persons or subgroups in the soci-
ety who do not share in this process. In the discussion of any concrete 
metropolitan area, it is important to bear in mind that the normative 
order which undergirds the major characteristics of the existing social 
structure may not be shared or internalized by all groups or persons 
within the collectivity. 
1Ibid.' p. 105. 
2
see Robert G. Howes, The Church and the Change (Boston: Daugh-
ters of St. Paul, 1961), pp. 56-87. 
3white, op. cit., pp. 80-85. 4rbid., p. 84. 
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It is not possible here to examine in detail the range of prob-
lems involved in the issues of social control and deviance. However, 
several factors stand out. 
(l) The primary means of social control in the modern metropolis 
is the internalization of norms by persons. 
(2) There are wide ranges of deviance which are permitted with-
out coercive negative sanctions being applied. The increased variety of 
job opportunities, for instance, permits the selection of work roles 
which can satisfy particular if not peculiar personality needs. 
(3) There has been considerable redefinition of types of devi-
ance with an extension of the concept of illness and an increased accent 
on goals of rehabilitation. This has been accompanied by differentiation 
of structures created to deal with deviance, and roles designed to help 
the persons who violate the normative order. 
There is increasing concern, however, that two cultures may be 
emerging: the first composed of three-fourths of the population which 
participates in the general patterns of social change with increasing af-
fluence, capacity, etc.; and the second a submerged one-fourth who are 
poor, uneducated, and for whom there is little opportunity for escape. 
Around the central core of most metropolitan areas are large numbers of 
persons in this submerged culture. 
Traditional methods of social control including individual case 
work social service are comparatively useless in dealing with the prob-
lems of the magnitude involved in this contemporary situation. This is 
particularly true when problems of social discrimination form major barri-
ers to advancement. Possible alternatives cannot be adequately explored 
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here. But it should be noted that this problem must form a major part of 
the backdrop for all problems of ethics in the metropolis. 
ii. Stages of Development 
The concept of stages of development is useful in interpreting 
social change. It helps to provide a frame of reference and to focus at-
tention on key areas of need. Developmental tasks may be as useful a con-
cept in social theory as it is in psychology and education. 
Stages of development in society are not random nor are they 
guaranteed. However, "certain types of development must be accomplished 
and consolidated before others can occur." 1 W. W. Rostow has developed 
this perspective in economic growth, referring to the stages as tradi-
tional society, preconditions for takeoff, takeoff, drive to maturity, 
and the achievement of high mass co~sumption. 2 But it is important to 
note that in the preconditions for takeoff, the society has to develop 
certain capacities in other areas. That is, a measure of political order 
and stability, a relatively well-defined legal order capable of rational 
change, development of technology and people to use it, and the desires 
or motivations of persons to achieve in the economic sphere. 
Similarly, Lipset in his study of the preconditions of democratic 
political structure3 notes that a variety of social conditions, including 
literacy, minimum economic resources, etc., are essential. The role of 
religious institutions and beliefs are also noted as being important. 
1Ibid., p. 159· 
2w. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The University Press, 1960), pp. 4-16. 
3seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics 
(Garden City: Doubleday, 19 0 , p 
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There are differing interpretations of the current stages of de-
velopment in urban life in the United States. Rostow suggests that hav-
ing reached the period of high mass consumption, the society is faced with 
the question of whether there will be a new challenge (apart from the prob-
lem of maintaining abundance in the face of the population explosion) .1 
In a different vein, Riesman2 suggests that the stage of the other-directed 
individual has been reached. In contrast to these positions, White argues 
that the current shift is not one from 
... producing economic resources to consuming them. It is a shift 
from emphasis on the development of economic resources to the devel-
opment of human resources--particularly, the capacities of personal-
ities.3 
The relation of stages of development to changing ethical concerns 
needs more careful investigation. The study of the development of the 
social teaching of the Christian church by Ernst Troeltsch4 might well 
be examined in terms of the develop~ent of particular aspects of the norm-
ative order of Western civilization. A careful analysis of the interac-
tion of various aspects of the social, cultural, and personality systems 
might well contribute to understanding of the priorities or major develop-
mental tasks for particular historical periods on which future development 
hinged. 
Developments in religion and the values undergirded by religious 
perspectives may be an essential aspect at each level or stage of 
l Rostow, op. cit., pp. 90-91. 
2Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, op. cit., 
3whi te, op. cit . , p. 162 . 
4Ernest Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 
trans. Olive Wyon (first published in English, 1931), Vols. I and II 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1949). 
105 
development and critical ethical issues may shift according to different 
phases. Thus, the relation of church and state may be a preoccupation 
during the development of political maturity. Religion and work may be 
at the center of attention during certain phases of economic life. The 
re-integration of a differentiated society which has achieved a high 
measure of economic maturity may occupy the attention of religious lead-
ers and persons particularly concerned with value and normative problems. 
When high functional capacity has been developed by specialization and 
differentiation, the problem may be viewed as how to develop a normative 
order and social structures which will utilize this capacity for the 
fuller self-realization of persons and communities. Similarly, the chal-
lenge in the contemporary period to develop a world-wide community with 
an ethos and institutional structures adequate to deal with present capa-
bilities for creative or destructive international relations has been an 
object of increasing religious concern reflected in the actions of partic-
ular denominations as well as in the creation of the World Council of 
Churches. 
The distinction needs to be made between the emergence of a new 
stage of development and the extension of the new development. The pat-
tern of the nuclear family may be characteristic of a small elite at one 
stage, the large majority at another. Yet, there may be pockets in a 
society in which earlier forms of kinship structure continue for long 
periods. Similarly, there may be the institutionalization of the norm 
that public officials and public servants should be universalistic in 
their response to persons, treating them in terms of the general frame-
work of values and laws governing administrative procedures. Yet, there 
may be large groups of persons, sometimes newly arrived in@igrants, or 
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sometimes the host group, who refuse to accept the general application 
of the norm. Thus, the hcst group may deny opportunity, and the new 
ethnic group may seek power in order to appropriate particular favors 
for itself. 
The norm of universal treatment under the law among other such 
norms may be originally defined and institutionalized by an elite, and 
only later, if at all, be extended to include the majority or even the 
whole society. The key issue here is that the problem of original defi-
nition and institutionalization of a norm needs to be viewed as analyt-
ically distinct from the extension of such institutionalization. 
Another significant issue for ethics is the relationship between 
differentiation of the social structure and the problems of pluralism. 
It seems evident that there can be basic value unity and an integrated 
normative order which undergird a differentiated social structure. The 
"pluralities" of institutional structures may represent functional spe-
cialization to better implement the value system and normative order of 
the society. Further, a pluralism in which most elements of the basic 
value system of the society are grounded in somewhat different theolog-
ical or metaphysical positions can obviously exist without too great a 
strain. However, a particularistic ethic with a high degree of specif-
icity and a rejection of participation in many roles in the larger soci-
ety (e.g., the Hutterite communities of South Dakota) can only exist as 
cysts in the society, maintaining their identity by a larger measure of 
communal self-sufficiency and the toleration of the larger society. They 
are almost of necessity a rural phenomenon. 
The question arises as to what happens to a particularistic or 
highly distinctive group in an urban environment. Here the creation and 
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the breakdown of the ghetto is instructive. The continued existence of 
a ghetto seems to be dependent upon the acceptance of the larger society 
of elements of a particularistic ethic in the work or occupational roles 
of the society. Particular functions, such as trading, professional, or 
unskilled menial jobs in the larger society must be set aside by tradi-
tion and practice for a particular ethnic group. However, if the larger 
society has universalistic norms regulating its occupational roles, so 
that all occupations are open to persons on the basis of performance ca-
pacities, then the ethnic groups are drawn in competition and intimate 
working relationships with the larger society. In such a situation, 
maintenance of social distance essential to the continuation of widely 
different languages, customs, traditions, and particularistic perspectives 
becomes increasingly difficult and unlikely. 
The differences among ethnic groups with respect to their selec-
tivity of work roles, internalized need for achievement, mobility in job 
seeking, readiness to undergo deprivation for training requned for jobs 
demanding higher competence levels are not to be automatically dismissed. 
The relationship of such characteristics to systems of meaningful beliefs 
and internalized norms on the part of different groups requires much more 
investigation. Also, the extent to which participation in work roles in 
the larger society affects citizenship roles (and internalization of the 
normative structure undergirding the political and legal aspects of the 
society) is a question which needs empirical examination. 
But the central point here is that when the larger society insti-
tutionalizes universalistic nonns governing the occupational roles, the 
maintenance of small enclaves of highly divergent groups becomes very 
difficult. The impact of a universalistic system of education is even 
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more obvious. The pluralism of segmented, relatively autonomous social 
units becomes transformed into the pluralism of specialized roles on a 
wide range of occupational-type collectivities and professions. Strains 
in South Africa and the impact of urbanism on the southeast part of the 
United States give support to the view that implementation of universal-
istic norms may be an essential element in modern urban industrial soci-
ety, capable of dissolving particularistic norms and the ascriptive ties, 
even those associated with the stubborn problem of racial identifications. 
4. Urban Culture 
The city needs to be viewed as a generator, and transmitter of 
culture. There are a variety of conditions in urban life which contrib-
ute to these functions. 
i. The City as a Generator of Culture 
The high density of urban living permits and indeed requires in-
tense interaction of persons. But more importantly, urban life permits 
as previously noted, a high degree of specialization and differentiation. 
Many of these specialized functions have a primarily cultural focus. 
Culture as used here refers to the patterns of orientation of persons to 
b t f 0 1 o jec s o experlence. This may include, of course, those orientations 
which seek to interpret the characteristics of objects toward which ex-
perience seems to point. The cultural system may include the processes 
by which such patterns of orientation are developed and maintained. In 
this sense, organizations with a primarily cultural focus (science, art, 
religion, e.g.) may be said to be a part of the cultural system. This 
1
see Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., II, 963-76. 
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raises difficult problems in the establishment of a clear boundary line 
between cultural, social, or personality systems. The awareness that 
such boundaries are hazy at best is a warning against "reifying" the 
l 
cultural or the social system. 
The four basic aspects of culture, science, art, ethics and 
theology or philosophy, each become the focus of specialized institu-
tions. The degree of specialization in science and art in contemporary 
social life hardly needs comment. It is significant, however, that 
ethics has also become so complex that Chief Justice Warren of the United 
States Supreme Court has recently called for the establishment of profes-
sional counselors in ethics. Groups like the Center for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions are emerging in an effort to clarify the basic 
ethical issues and problems raised by the emergence of the new complex 
metropolitan social structures and way of life. 
As previously noted, a central element in any social system is 
the normative definition of roles. The greater the variety and the more 
intricately related the roles, the more complex the normative order be-
comes. If the interpretation of social change as differentiation, spe-
cialization, upgrading of standards of performance and generalization of 
conception is correct, then the implications for the problems and com-
plexity of ethics are obvious. The city is generating the need for new 
developments in the ethical dimension of culture. The following chapter 
will explore more fully the problems involved in meeting this need. 
The historical role of the city in stimulating and supporting 
l For a detailed analysis of the variety of definitions of "cul-
ture" and some of the fallacies that have been involved, see Bidney, 
op. cit. 
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philosophy and theology must be noted. Lewis Mumford in The City in 
History discusses the role of the city as the environment in which phi-
losophy and religion have developed. He also explores the relationship 
between the types of civic conditions and the emergence of various 
philosophical positions. For present purposes, it is enough to acknowl-
edge these relationships plus the fact that in contemporary society the 
options of choice between philosophical and theological positions have 
continued to increase creating a situation in which any individual shar-
ing widely in contemporary culture must wrestle diligently with the prob-
lem of the grounding of values and ethics. This diversity of philosoph-
ical and theological perspectives is an important aspect of the context 
of choice. 
ii. The City as a Transmitter of Culture 
The city also needs to be viewed as a center for the transmission 
of culture. In his article on the changing uses of the city, John 
Dyckman takes up the theme of "The City as a Place of Learning." 1 He sug-
gests that the aim would be "to turn the city into an educational con-
struct, with a view to providing a constant presence of meaning and a 
democratized form of learning." 2 Universities have long had an affinity 
for the city, but the city offers far more in the way of adult education, 
museums, libraries, varieties of association of special interest, public 
affairs, economic activity, and religious centers. 
Dyckman suggests that the city needs to be open to participation, 
even at the expense of efficiency and production. Although specialized 
1Dyckrnan, "The Changing Uses of the City," op. cit., p. 159. 
2Ibid.' p. 160 . 
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formal training will increasingly be required for occupational roles, 
"there is still room for first hand learning in citizenship, social re-
lations, mass culture, and the management of one's affairs.n 1 
Creation of such a city is a challenge to physical design, organ-
izational and administrative creativity, and imaginative social vision. 
There is need for access to the whole city by all the residents. Current 
patterns in which slum dwellers stay tied to their neighborhoods while 
the rest of the city is open primarily to the upper middle class needs 
to be changed. Perhaps no better illustration would be found than the 
City College of New York which, offering free advanced education, has 
been the open door through which one ethnic group after another have come 
to participate more meaningfully in that great metropolis. The develop-
ment of "wider horizons" programs which expand the range of contact, per-
ception, and meaning of the city for children in depressed neighborhoods 
is a similar illustration of creative possibilities in the educative 
't 2 Cl y. 
But such education must not be oriented toward creating merely 
interested observers or passive wards. New opportunities to participate 
meaningfully are essential. These can include, e.g., far more sharing 
in planning and executing neighborhood rehabilitation. (The use of teen-
age drop-outs for construction work is one possibility.) Sharing in the 
dream, debating the merits of various proposals, voting on a choice of 
plans for the neighborhood or for the metropolitan area offer potentials 
largely untapped. 
1Ibid.} p. 161. 
2 For a discussion and evaluation of the wider horizons program, 
as well as a general study of the problems of education in low-status 
urban areas, see Frank Riessman, The Culturally Deprived Child (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 98-lll. 
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The previous discussion of social structure and the differentia-
tion of roles needs to be supplemented by an awareness that meaningful 
aspects of culture are related to these differentiated roles, and partie-
ipation has to be re-thought in terms of each of the collectivities. 
Dyckman cautions against accepting the notion that "democracy need be 
organized around . . . place belonging." 1 Because many of these roles 
are not tied to the place of residence, efforts to re-establish demo-
cratic participation on the basis of such a place alone (whether city 
neighborhood or suburban town) are obviously inade~uate. A metropolitan 
understanding of community is an aspect of culture which needs to be de-
veloped, since the metropolis is the basic social unit containing most 
of the roles of most persons. Developing such a relevant ideal of com-
munity is an important aspect of culture essential for making ethical 
choices in present urban life. 
One further point needs to be made about the modern metropolis 
as a transmitter of culture. New techni~ues of communication are extend-
ing this "transmission" until it includes the whole society. 
There is in America today a consistent decline in the differen-
tiation and social distance between countryman and urbanite. This 
rests also upon technological changes that have allowed a mastery of 
space never known before--one that makes possible rapid and precise 
communication and coordination of behavior across great differences. 
The culture of the large-scale society is urban in its essence; all 
ears are tuned to the nationwide communication networks, and behavior 
is ordered by the large-scale agencies of governmental bureau, cor-
poration, and national market.2 
This extension of mass culture means, of course, that while the 
options presented to a great many individuals have increased, new problems 
~yckman, "The Changing Uses of the City," op. cit., p. 166. 
2 Greer, op. cit., p. 195. 
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in the freedom and control of the "transmitters" have been created. The 
essential issue here, however, is that the large cities generate and 
transmit a culture that is coming to embrace or engulf the entire society. 
5. Personality in Urban Society 
Urban society needs to be viewed as both enriching and limiting 
the individual person. It provides greater opportunities and resources 
for personality fulfillment, but greater demands upon the person are 
msde in turn. The relation of persons to society has been the object of 
debate and analysis through the whole course of Western Civilization. 
While all the problems are not solved, there seem to be some emerging 
consensus and instructive theoretical understanding which are relevant 
to ethics and urban planning. 
Personality can be viewed as a socius with a private center. 
Pitts expresses essentially this view when, after examining the contribu-
tions of Weber, Durkheim, Freud, Meade and Thomas, he discusses interpen-
etration. 
The concept of the individual has been differentiated into the con-
cepts of organism and personality, while society has been differen-
tiated into the cultural and social systems. Instead of the biolog-
ical model of subject (man) adjusting to an object (nature), socio-
logical theorists today accept, at least implicitly, the concept of 
interpenetration. By interprenetration we mean that two or more dif-
ferent systems of analysis--each with its own principle of organiza-
tion--are all part of the same concrete data at the same time. This 
interaction involves both personality and social systems; not only 
must each be analyzed separately but the relationship between them 
must be sorted out in order to explain any concrete event.l 
The concept of role is the key analytical link between personality 
and social system. Roles and the norms which define them are the basic 
units of social systems, and internalized role-expectations are basic to 
1Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., II, 688. 
personality. Order in society arises out of the intermeshing of role 
systems, while change results in part from the fact that personality has 
distinctive relationships to the cultural systems which legitimize roles 
and the structures of which they are a part by relating them to patterns 
of meaningful beliefs. 
Some of the major characteristics and developments in personality 
related to contemporary urban society are significant for this discussion. 
Role differentiation and diversity present an increasing number of com-
plex choices and demands in a wide variety of contexts. 
A personality structure results which with varying emphases in 
each of the primary role categories, should be capable of playing 
differentiated roles simultaneously: in a family, procreation 
through marriage and parenthood; in a functionally specialized col-
lectivity, through occupation; in a setting of community responsi-
bility (especially in political terms); and in a setting concerned 
with the value-stability of the system, especially through religion.l 
This role differentiation and diversity provides freedom at cer-
tain levels, but also presents persons with many situations in which 
standards are not clearly defined or internalized, and sanctions are in-
definite. Competence comes increasingly to mean an awareness of the norms 
which are appropriate to different roles, and conformity at some levels 
opens possibility for free choice at other levels. A shared discipline 
in use of time in an office or factory, e.g., permits ease of communica-
tion and higher output. 
The demands for competence are a challenge to personality but are 
also the stuff of increased functional capacity. This has important im-
plications for the individuals' participation in groups. It means that 
each individual cannot by the nature of the situation have eQual compe-
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tence in a wide range of areas. Therefore, a person must relate himself 
meaningfully in voluntary associations with others who develop particular 
competences and can exercise leadership on different problems or areas 
of concern as they arise. This places heavy demands on the individual 
to clarify his goals so as to participate in the kind of consensus which 
permits support of efforts designed to achieve the implementation of 
shared values in a complex society. 
If the individual is to find meaning in the variety of roles, it 
is necessary to discover and think through their interrelatedness, and 
the way in which they contribute to the fulfillment of an ideal of per-
sonality and an ideal of community. It is only in personality that such 
interrelatedness of values and purpose can be found. Failure to develop 
integrity of purpose and commitment creates a situation in which the in-
dividual is likely to feel pushed and pulled by forces outside himself. 
Persons who do not perceive or internalize the normative order 
which is responsible for the structural differentiation of contemporary 
society will no doubt experience considerable strain. They may react to 
this strain in a variety of ways, actively or passively, with compulsive 
conformity or compulsive alienation. Or there may be regression which 
seeks the retreat to a simpler more secure pattern such as a return to 
the ascriptive relationships of a small undifferentiated community. 
At the same time that demands are increasing, however, there is 
reason to believe that capacity of persons is also growing. It is im-
portant to note the interrelationships between the newly emerging family 
patterns and personality development. It may be too early to tell def-
initely what the consequences are for personality, but it is worth noting 
some contemporary theories. The change of the family pattern over the 
past fifty years has been in the sharp reduction of the number of older 
adults in the home. This is part of the shift to the nuclear family pat-
tern. It means that the small child has a closer attachment and depend-
ence upon the parents, particularly the mother. There is a tendency for 
the parents to utilize this dependence to instill a high need for achieve-
ment in the child by making the supportive relationship conditional upon 
high performance standards. 
As the child moves into the early teens, he is still moving out 
from dependence upon the parents. The dependent relationship may then 
be shifted to the peer group. Riesman is no doubt correct when he notes 
the strong emphasis on conformity in the peer group, 1 but it needs to be 
viewed in terms of the developing independence or autonomy of the person-
ality. The age-grading of the peer groups plays a very significant part. 
The developmental tasks set by the one sex peer group of the early teens 
is changed to a very different set of developmental tasks in the hetero-
sexual peer group. At each stage, higher levels of competence and new 
social skills are re~uired, in addition to the advancing standards of 
academic or athletic performance. 
The development of a distinctive youth culture also needs to be 
noted. It seems likely that this is a necessary feature of a society in 
which ascriptive ties no longer function to dictate either vocational or 
marriage choices. The changes expected from one generation to the next 
mean that role models are not readily available and that youth are ex-
pected to be innovators. Hence, it is not surprising that there is a 
period in which young people experiment with alternative identifies in 
1Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, op. cit., pp. 67-77· 
-, "1"7 
_L.j 
the effort to discover and define themselves. During this period a 
"moratorium on commitment" can frequently be observed during which the 
parental values are called in question and the general norms and values 
of the society are held up for critical examination. 
That adolescence is a period of considerable strain is not to be 
denied. Yet, it is important to note that out of such a period may come 
a personality that has made its own choices and developed commitments 
which are more fully internalized and capable of critical re-examination 
in the light of experience than is the case of personality which develops 
in an ascriptive society. One consequence may be a more critical evalu-
ation of institutional or organizational structures, and the demand that 
they be subject to the test of whether or not they fulfill a legitimate 
function. Such criticism may be essential, however, in a society where 
the speed of change requires that the social structures be continually 
modified in a purposive and rational way. 
If each institution is called upon to justify itself, then there 
is always the danger that some more basic but less obvious institutions 
or organizations may have great difficulty in establishing their claim 
on commitment. Further, if personal commitments are rebuilt slowly, then 
the process by which mature and responsible participation are developed 
may require more attention and careful cultivation. 
In discussing the internalization of the normative order of so-
ciety, however, it must be noted that this is not a universal process. 
It may be more and more characteristic of larger numbers of persons. 
However, it is undoubtedly true that there are major sections of the pop-
ulation who do not internalize the normative order of the larger society. 
Newly arrived immigrants from rural areas may develop traditions and 
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patterns in the city which effectively seal themselves off for a consider-
able period of time. However, the tensions between first and second gen-
eration immigrants have long testified to the difficulties inherent in 
such efforts to achieve isolation. 
Further, there are no doubt substantial numbers of persons who 
do not become autonomous in any meaningful psychological or moral sense. 
Those who do not get the needed support from the mother or understanding 
which modifies the demands of the father may not be sufficiently respon-
sive to the needs of others to internalize a normative order. Also, 
those who fail to participate meaningfully in peer group culture may not 
escape from the idiosyncracies of disturbed parents or fulfill the devel-
opmental tasks which may be essential to the growth of autonomy. 
In addition, there may be persons so located in the society that 
they are deprived of the rewards for achievement because of remaining 
ascriptive ties to race or class. Or, there may not be the setting of 
tasks appropriate to the gradual development of skills which permit ac-
cess to many of the occupational possibilities of the larger society. 
In such cases, there may well be a rejection of the normative order of 
the larger society, or a failure to perceive such an order. A variety 
of responses are again possible, including active rebellion or passive 
.regression. 
Sub-cultures with differing normative orders are an important part 
of the vitality of urban life and the stuff of urban politics. Serious 
~uestions emerge for the whole society, however, when lines of conflict 
or exploitation become sharply drawn. A complete rejection of responsi-
bility for the larger society by a sub-culture, or the rejection of a 
sub-culture by the larger society can be fraught with danger. The most 
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serious illustration of this problem in American life is found in the 
response of a Negro protest group. 
The Black Muslims' violent attacks on the white man may prove 
to be a useful warning, but they are deeply dysfunctional in the most 
immediate sense. They threaten the security of the white majority 
and may lead those in power to tighten the barriers which already 
divide America. The attacks create guilt and defensiveness among 
both Negroes and white~ and offer to extremist elements on both sides 
a cover for antisocial behavior. Above all, the attacks promote a 
general increase in tension and mutual distrust. 1 
Lincoln correctly notes that it is the failure of the larger so-
ciety to implement the universalistic norms to which it gives lip service 
that creates the situation in which extreme rejection of the universal-
istic norms develops. 
There is serious need for much more careful study of the norms 
that guide behavior of different sub-cultures, the ways in which such 
norms get internalized, and the consequences for both persons and soci-
2 
ety. The development of means by which such persons and groups can 
move more fully into the life of the society, protect themselves from 
exploitation, and demand that institutions be more responsible is one of 
the major challenges facing most metropolitan areas.3 
But the core of the issue is that the individual in urban society 
1c. Eric Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1961), p. 251. 
2A summary of some recent literature is found in Regina N. Goff, 
"Culture and the Personality Development of Minority Peoples," in Negro 
Education in America, ed. Virgil A. Clift, Archibald W Anderson, and H. 
Gordon Hullfish (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962), pp. 124-50. For a 
discussion of political problems involved, see William Kornhauser, The 
Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1959) . 
3For a review of approaches to community development, see Marshall 
B. Clinard, "Perspectives on Urban Community Development and Community Or-
ganization" a paper presented at the National Conference on Social Welfare, 
New York, May 30, 1962. (Mimeographed.) 
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needs to develop considerable insight and appreciation to construct or 
come to appreciate an ideal of community that is ade~uate to give mean-
ing to the variety of roles which he fills and which he sees others oc-
cupying. To develop such an ideal of community, there is need to over-
come many of the misunderstandings of urban society, and to move beyond 
some of the false notions of what community is supposed to be like, many 
of which are still encouraged by religion and the churches. 
The context of ethical choice for the individual person in urban 
society opens up a wide range of possibilities but makes heavy demands 
upon the person to make meaningful choices. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE PLANNING 
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth an ethical framework 
which can serve as a basis for clarifying the issues involved in contem-
porary planning discussions. The effort must be largely devoted to de-
veloping the basic outlines of such an ethical framework drawing on so-
cial theory as developed by Talcott Parsons, the moral laws as developed 
by Edgar S. Brightman, Walter G. Muelder, and L. Harold DeWolf, and the 
idea of the responsible society as it has emerged in ecumenical Christian 
social thought. 
It is obvious that in developing such a framework there are many 
issues which cannot be adequately treated. There are ambiguities, un-
solved problems, and in some cases contradictory elements that are not 
easily resolved. There are problems of apologetics or defense of this 
emerging framework against alternative possibilities. This apologetic 
task must remain undone. In addition, there is the important question 
of how and when a view or perspective can become authoritative for any 
given community of persons. While attempting to work within the broad 
perspective of ecumenical Christian social thought, the effort here is 
to ex~lore as far as possible any emerging consensus without making 
claims of authoritative statement. The goal is the more limited one of 
seeking to participate in a continuing discussion. 
The first section of this chapter will look at the major 
~1 
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components and relationships in the ethical framework. Then the prob-
lems of methodology and the role of the moral laws will be noted. The 
third section will deal with the idea of the responsible society as an 
ideal of urban community, noting how it fits into the ethical framework. 
The final section will discuss planning in the responsible society. 
l. Major Components and Relationships 
in the Ethical Framework 
Central to the concerns of ethics are values and norms. Clarify-
ing the relationships of values and norms to the various components of 
the system of action is a key to developing an ethical framework. More 
specific attention will be given to the evaluative dimension of culture 
in its relationships to the other aspects of cultural systems. As has 
been noted above, this section will rely heavily upon the general theory 
of action as developed by Talcott Parsons. 
i. Norms and Values 
First, then, it is important to indicate the meaning of values 
and norms. There has been considerable confusion and disagreement about 
l the meaning of nvalue 11 and 11 norm.n The issues involved are central to 
many of the basic questions in philosophy as well as social theory. 
Brightman notes 
that the impersonality of science, the demand for verifiable 
knowledge, the aversion to subjectivity, the errors of tradition, 
and the destruction of war have all contributed (along with other 
forces) to distrust of persons and values.2 
It is not possible here to examine the range of issues involved, but 
Persons 
~or a discussion of 
and Values (Boston: 
2
Ib id . ' p . 13 . 
some of the issues, see Edgar S. Brightman, 
University Press, 1952) . 
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rather, to clarify the meaning of terms as they are used in developing 
the present framework. 
Value will here refer to the "experience of persons who approve 
or respect something." 1 Parsons' definition of values is similar. 
Values generally are patterned conceptions of the qualities of mean-
ing of objects of human experiences; by virtues of these qualities, 
the objects are considered desirable for the evaluating person.2 
Brightman accentuates the relationship between values and per-
sons when he notes that 
personality itself is taken 
respect for personality all other 
sonality, no other values exist. 
else is devalued.3 
to be an intrinsic value; without 
values are corrupted. Without per-
Unless personality is valued, all 
Parsons suggests that respect for persons may be the basis on which a 
type of society is considered to be good or a valued object. The sig-
nificance of conceptions of the good society are noted by Parsons. 
The value patterns that play a part in controlling action in a soci-
ety are in the first instance the conceptions of the good type of 
society to which the members of that society are committed. Such a 
pattern exists at a very high level of generality, without specifica-
tion of functions, or any level of internal differentiation, or par-
ticularities of situation.4 
There is an important distinction which needs to be made between 
the actual, empirical, concrete value experience, and the ideal values 
which are more generalized conceptions of such empirical values. In a 
sence, this is the relationship between the experience of desiring and 
the conception of the "desirable." It is obvious that in the above 
1Ibid., p. 18. 
2.ralcott Parsons, "Youth in the Context of American Society," 
Daedalus (Winter, 1962), p. 100. 
3Brightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 100. 
4Parsons, "Youth in the Context of American Society ;• op. cit., 
p. 100. 
statement by Parsons the reference is to the abstracted general patterns 
of gualities or characteristics which are considered to be desirable. 
For purposes of this discussion, value will generally refer to ideal 
values unless specifically referred to as empirical values. 1 Further 
refinements in the meaning of value will be important when discussing the 
place of values and value patterns in the cultural system. However, the 
key issue here is that values are the experiences of persons as they ap-
prove, respect, or desire something, and that values are "in, of, and 
for persons. n 
The concept of "norm" generally refers to a standard or rule for 
evaluation of a situation or object. Thus, Parsons says that 
... when we speak of norms, we mean rules applying to particular 
categories of units in a system, operating in particular types of 
situations. For example, individual adults may not be employed 
under conditions which infringe on certain basic freedoms of the in-
dividual.2 
It seems useful to attempt to indicate the basic components of 
a complete norm in order to clarify the way in which the normative order 
may be said to differ from and be an extension of the value patterns or 
system of values. 3 The following components of a norm may be distin-
guished. 
1. A designated subject.--A complete norm specifies the moral 
beings or persons who are involved. The designated subject could be 
1Brightman uses the term "norm" to refer to ideal values, but 
norm will here be used in a more specialized sense. Cf. Brightman, 
Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 18. 
~arsons, "Youth in the Context of American Society," op. cit., 
p. 104. 
3wbile the following analysis seems to be generally consistent 
with Parsons usage, it has been developed independently in an effort to 
gain greater precision in the use of terms. 
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universal or inclusive of all persons. It could refer to all the mem-
bers of a particular group, or to the occupants of particular roles, or 
even to one particular person. 
2. An "ought" claim.--An imperative demand oriented to the desig-
nated subject is an essential component. Such an "ought" is clearly im-
plied in the understanding of ideal values, for by their very nature they 
make a claim for realization. It should be noted, however, that the 
ought claim is often- disguised in the normative use of 11 isn or nmayn as 
in the above norm which Parsons used for illustration. 
3. An indicated activity.--The ought claim which makes a demand 
upon persons for a specified activity may be broadly or narrowly indi-
cated. Such an activity could include thinking, feeling, physical activ-
ity, evaluating, or seeking to realize a particular state of being (such 
as accurate measurement or logical coherence). The indicated activity 
could be the particular kind of functioning which is appropriate to a 
given role. 
4. The context of the activity.--Again, the situation in which 
the activity is indicated may be more or less specifically indicated, 
including such elements as the time, place, or the absence or presence 
of elements which indicate "appropriateness." 
5. A value to be realized.--The desired state or condition of 
experiences of persons which is the basis of the ought claim may be of a 
general or specific nature including such possibilities as a pleasurable 
experience, a condition of obedient or faithful response, or the creation 
of a situation which conforms to certain types of ideal qualities. 
In a complete norm the above elements are all included. An il-
lustration of such a norm with components numbered as above might be: 
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(l) All persons acting in the role of city planners (2) ought (3) to try 
to present the major issues requiring decision as clearly and precisely 
as possible (4) when offering their proposals for consideration by a 
city council and the public (5) in order that the city council and the 
larger community may participate meaningfully in making the significant 
choices. 
It should be noted, however, that frequently the various compo-
nents of a norm are not made explicit. When the omitted components are 
clearly implied by the context in which the norm is stated, no problems 
arise. However, missing components may well result from hidden assump-
tions and lead to considerable confusion. 
From the above analysis it is clear that values are an integral 
part of norms, and that norms are a bridge between values and situations. 
Norms may in turn be related to each other in a systematic way, and may 
thus be thought of as a normative order. It will now be useful to see 
how value systems and the normative order fit into the general theoret-
ical framework of action theory. 
ii. Norms and Values in the General 
Structure of Action 
In order to clarify the problems involved in constructing a con-
ceptual framework for ethical choice, it is necessary to place values 
and norms more specifically in the larger framework or context of ethical 
choice developed in the previous chapter. In Figure l the basic compo-
nents of the system of action are outlined including the biophysical, 
personality, social, and cultural systems with the metacultural1 ground 
indicated. 
l Parsons refers to the transcendent reference of cultural ground 
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A complete presentation wonld call for an analysis of the inter-
relatedness of the normative aspects to the other functions of each of 
the different systems. However, the discussion here will focus primarily 
on a clarification of relationships between the normative dimensions of 
the different systems. 
As can be seen from the accompanying figure, normative order or 
patterns of norms are an essential part of the cultural system. The re-
lationship of the normative order to the rest of the framework may then 
be noted. 
l. Norms are said to be institutionalized1 when they are embodied 
in the social system. 
2. Norms are internalized2 when they are embodied in personality. 
3. Nonns are implemented3 when action guided by them changes the 
bio-physical systems through the activities of persons. 
4. The normative order is said to be legitimized4 by reference 
to the value system (understood here as ideal values). Further, nonns 
which specify activities or roles in greater detail are said to be legit-
imized when brought into coherent relationship with higher order or more 
generalized norms. 
5. Specification5 is essentially the reverse of legitimation. 
It is the development of corollaries or subsidiary norms which spell out 
of meaning. This is essentially the meaning of metacnltural as used by 
David Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1953). 
~arsons in Theories of Society, op. cit., II, 976. 
2Ibid., p. 978. 3Ibid., P· 977-
4Ibid., I, 44. 5Ibid., p. 62, and II, 977-
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Fig. 1.--Basic components and relationships in an ethical 
framework. 
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the implications of norms for particular collectivities, roles, or situ-
ations. Goals generally refer to specification of the implications of 
nonns for particular situations. 
6. Norms and values may be said to be justified when they are 
shown to be authoritative for a person or group because of the relation-
ship of such norms and values to other basic commitments of the group. 
7. Validation may refer to the process by which norms are tested 
for coherence with other norms. 
8. 1 Finally, norms may be said to be grounded in meaningful be-
liefs. Some of these beliefs may refer to that which is beyond cultural 
and/or the experience of the subject. This may be called the transcend-
ent or metacultural ground. A special type of grounding is that of ap-
peal to normative or valuational components (thematic values) which may 
be found empirically to be universal to all known cultures. This may be 
referred to as the transcultural ground; 
It is important to note Parsons' warning that the distinctions 
between personality, social, and cultural systems are analytical. These 
distinctions are not to lead to the reification of the components. Never-
theless, the development and clarification of these distinctions has been 
2 
a hard-won achievement in social theory, and they make a significant 
contribution to the development of an ethical framework. 
1 Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., II, 970. 
2 Cf. A. L. Kroeber and Talcott Parsons, "The Concepts of Culture 
and of Social System," American Sociological Review, XXIII, 582-83. 
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lll. Normative Dimensions of 
Cultural Systems 
Having indicated, then, the involvement of the normative aspects 
of the action system in the various components, it is now necessary to 
note more specifically how the normative dimensions of culture are re-
lated to the other aspects of culture. The essential burden of this 
analysis is at the cultural level, i.e., it is an effort to develop a con-
ceptual framework which is a cultural achievement even though the objects 
with which the framework deals are inclusive of all parts of the action 
system. 
(l) Means-Orientation or Cognition 
Parsons distinguishes four functional sub-systems of cultural sys-
terns. In general they correspond to science, art and goal-orientation, 
ethics, and theology and/or philosophy. Expressed in another way, these 
four subsystems may be called: (l) "orientation to objects as objects 
of cognition in the empirical sense"; 1 (2) orientation to objects in terms 
of their "meaning as objects of goal-orientation of action systems"; 2 (3) 
"the orientation-mode we call evaluation"; 3 and (4) "the grounds of the 
orientations of meaning themselves. "4 
Parsons suggests that the above subsystems may be viewed along 
the internal-external and instrumental-consummatory ~xis. Cognition and 
cathexis are externally oriented (corresponding to the adaptive and goal-
attainment functions) and evaluation and grounding are internal to the 
cultural system (corresponding to the integrative and pattern-maintenance 
1Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., II, 964. 
4Ibid., p. 970. 
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functions). Cognition and grounding are viewed as instrumental and 
cathexis and evaluation as consummatory. The four subsystems are further 
regarded as being in an ascending hierarchy of control. 
Each of these four dimensions can in turn be analyzed in terms 
of four components using the paradigm based on the instrumental-consumma-
tory and internal-external axis. Thus, the cognitive subsystem is ana-
lyzed in terms of the following divisions: (l) codified or classified 
knowledge of facts; (2) solutions of empirical problems; (3) structure of 
theory itself; (4) higher-order premises (logical and epistemological 
premises) . This follows the "hierarchical order . . . of levels of gen-
l 
erality of conceptual components." An analogous hierarchical order is 
followed in the analysis of each of the other basic dimensions of cul-
ture. It is important to note that this 
is also a hierarchy of control, in that the meaning of prob-
lems controls interest in the meaning of facts; the place in theory 
controls the meaning or significance of particular problems; and the 
frame of reference controls the significance of the system of theory. 
But the obverse conditional relation also holds. So far as it is sci-
entifically significant, a problem not solved on the basis of vali-
dated data is not scientifically solved; a theory not validated by 
solutions of the principal empirical problems deriving from it has 
no scientific status; and a frame of reference which cannot serve as 
a framework for empirically scientific theory and its related prob-
lems has no place in science.2 
The interaction between the levels of cognitive meaning is impor-
tant to note since it is rather clearly understood with respect to scien-
tific methodology. It can be argued that a similar interaction (or need 
for coherence) between different levels of conception of ethics or evalu-
ative principles is equally significant. 
2Ibid. 
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(2) Cathectic Meaning or Goal-Orientation 
Cathexis is used by Parsons to refer to "any category of the 
meaning of an object with respect to which its significance in terms of 
goal-attainment or of blocking such attainment is paramount." 1 This in 
turn is seen to have four levels. 
l. At the lowest level is the object viewed purely as a means or 
in terms of its instrumental value. In economic terms, it is "an object 
of utility." 2 Such objects are generally physical or biological facili-
ties, and at the cultural level are the symbols by which such facilities 
are indicated. 
2. At the next or consummatory level are objects conceived as 
"goal-objects" in which a relation to the object, usually another person, 
brings fulfillment or is consummatory. 
3. But this relation between persons when conceived as a continu-
ing valuable relationship is viewed as a collectivity in which the valu-
ing person himself is included, adheres, or participates as a member. 
4. At the highest level of cathexis is generalized respect for an 
object which may both include the interaction process and stand above it. 3 
Parsons notes that this analysis of orientation in terms of goal 
attainment is an unfamiliar type of analysis. It obviously involves, 
however, the familiar distinction between means and ends, and could serve 
as a basis for the type of catalogue of empirical values developed by 
4 5 
such writers as W. G. Everett or W. M. Urban. 
4
walter G. Everett, Moral Values (New York: Holt, 1918). 
5wilbur M. Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics (New York: Holt, 1930), 
p. 164. 
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(3) Evaluation 
It is important to note that the evaluative component of cultural 
systems is conceived by Parsons to be the integrative orientation mode. 
Again, this integrative or evaluative mode can be analyzed according to 
four levels corresponding to the four functional prerequisites. 
l. In evaluating the instrumental or means value of objects, the 
primary considerations are "the evaluations of costs, i.e., of the utili-
ties of means-objects, in relation to their empirical properties." 1 How-
ever, in addition to costs, it would seem that "effectiveness" or useful-
ness in achieving a sequence of action leading to desired ends is also 
needed. 
2. Action-goals also need to be evaluated according to standards 
which estimate the "relative importance of different goal-objects as in-
2 trinsically desirable or undesirable." To this might be added the esti-
mates of probable compatibility, exclusiveness, or mutual enhancement of 
different action-goals. 
3. But facilities and action-goals are evaluated in a context of 
standards or moral principles according to which the evaluation of partic-
ularized goals and facilities become meaningful. 3 
These moral principles are essentially those appropriate,respectively, 
to the "interests" of each of the four major components or dimensions 
of cultural orientation. Thus where empirical cognition has primacy 
it is a matter of standards of empirical validity; in the context of 
expressive symbolization it is those of expressive adequacy; in that 
of evaluation as such, of moral integrity and in that of the grounding 
of ultimate meanings, of what may be called philosophical adequacy and 
depth. It should be noted that, from the point of view of the cultural 
1Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., II, 969. 
1~ 
system more generally, these are all of moral significance, since 
they concern the prioritl system of the commitments assumed by cul-
turally oriented actors. 
4. At the highest evaluative level is the reference to those 
meaningpof reality which are relevant to the problems of evaluation. 
Thus, the conception of the ultimate nature of reality as involving ten-
sion between the "is" and the "ought" is a grounding of moral action. 
Further, there is at this level the evaluation of interpretations of 
reality as a "field of opportunity for 'worldly' achievement" or "as a 
system of order into which human action should be fitted." 2 
In an important sense, the commitment to or grounding of a basic 
methodology such as the search for empirical coherence or reliance on a 
particular type of "revelation" is an important aspect of this highest 
evaluative level. It will be useful to use this fourfold classification 
of the aspects of the evaluative dimension of culture in the discussion 
of the moral laws and the idea of the responsible society. 
(4) Grounding of Orientations of Meaning 
The dimension of culture which focuses on the grounds of meaning 
"concerns the most general world-views or definitions of the human condi-
tion that underlie orientations to more particular problems." 3 A four-
fold classification similar to those above can be distinguished here, 
also. 
1. The ground of the meaning of instrumental action or "work" 
is the first level. Such action, e.g., may be viewed as a 11 curse 11 or as 
a "calling" depending on whether it is viewed as being grounded in divine 
2Ibid., p. 970. 
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punishment for disobedience, or the fulfillment of an invitation to par-
ticipate in building a Kingdom of God on earth. 
2. The ground of meaning of action goals is the second level. 
Action goals may be viewed as essentially and ultimately deceitful, or 
they may be seen as potentially leading to a fulfillment of personality 
which is divinely intended. Given the attempt to ground such goals in a 
"naturalistic" system of meanings, they might be viewed as the illusory 
choice among the least painful experiences or even the highest pleasures 
attainable by a creature which is essentially driven by lower-order or 
biophysical necessity. 
3. Above commitments to action goals is the ground of the mean-
ing of the normative order, or the patterns by which choices are made. 
This would involve, for instance, explorations of the ground of the moral 
law. 
4. Finally, the most basic ground of meaning is found at the 
religio-philosophical level. Here the various components of culture are 
brought together and basic premises or presuppositions are made explicit. 
Existential beliefs of a non-logical kind are thus the ultimate ground. 
The next problem that arises is how or by what method these com-
ponent parts of the normative order are brought into relationship. This 
leads readily to a discussion of the moral laws. 
2. Methodology and the Role of the Moral Laws 
It is not the intention here to develop a full analysis of the 
moral laws or a full restatement of the proofs of the laws. This has 
been done by E. S. Brightman. 1 Rather, the procedure here will be to 
~rightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., pp. 81-253· 
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state the laws, to note their relationship to the structure or framework 
that has already been elaborated, and to note some of the implications 
of each law for planning. For it is the contention here that these prin-
ciples are not something which are imposed on planning, but rather, that 
they have in fact been implicit in much of the discussion and internal 
criticism in the development of planning and are related to the emergent 
principles examined earlier. 1 
The moral laws can be viewed as an effort to bring the various 
components of the system of action into an integrated framework according 
to an explicit methodology. The formal laws make explicit the methodol-
ogy. The axiological laws indicate the application of this methodology 
to the sphere of values; personalistic laws to persons; communitarian laws 
to society; and the metaphysical law to the problems of the ground of 
meaning. It will be useful to examine each of these groups of laws. 
l. The Formal Laws 
Basic to the whole system of the moral laws are the two formal 
laws referred to as the logical law and the law of autonomy. 
The Logical Law as stated by E. S. Brightman is: 
All persons ought to will logically; i.e., each person ought to 
will to be free from self-contradiction and to be consistent in his 
intentions. A moral person does not both will and not will the same 
ends; this property of a person is called his formal rightness.2 
Essentially this law expresses the imperative to seek consistency or in-
tegrity in willing. 
Parsons recognizes the fundamental ~uality of the logical law 
when he writes that "the first imperative of a system of norms is its 
l Cf. p ~rightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 98. 
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internal consistency." 1 However, in a changing society, such internal 
consistency is never complete or fully worked out. Indeed, the challenge 
facing contemporary social structure is in large part that of developing 
flexibility in the content of normative patterns while maintaining a 
basic commitment to the search for coherence. For only in this way can 
there be the necessary adaptation and creative response to new circum-
stances and possibilities. 
It seems evident that the logical law is one of the fundamental 
presuppositions of planning. The idea that planning should be guided by 
ddt td 1 .. 12 reason or soun ju gmen was no e as an ear y prlTIClp e. The very es-
sence of planning is the effort to bring intentions into a coherent rela-
tionship. Further, the search for coherence in intention involves the 
continued process of self-criticism, both in terms of the internal con-
sistency of previous commitments but also the re-evaluation made neces-
sary by new experience. Much of the history of the modern city planning 
movement is understandable in this light. 
The Law of Autonomy states that "all persons ought to recognize 
themselves as obligated to choose in accordance with the ideals which 
they acknowledge. Or, self-imposed ideals are imperative."3 This law 
recognizes the freedom of the moral being to choose in accord with the 
ideals which he formulates and expresses the principle that desires should 
be disciplined by ideals. It indicates that the "end and aim of choice" 4 
should be disciplined by the acknowledged ideals. 
1Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., I, 58. 
2 
3Brightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 106. 
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Again it is obvious that this is an essential principle of mean-
ingful cooperative planning. Unless persons exercise the discipline in-
valved in making particular choices under the guidance of shared ideals 
all cooperative efforts must collapse. It is only as persons are able to 
discipline their choices and bring them into coherent relationship that 
action can be anything but a maze of fragmented impulsive strivings. 
Responsible action and moral maturity are clearly involved in 
the law of autonomy. 
Moral responsibility, as a corollary of the Law of Autonomy, means 
that man is responsible to himself. The ideals which he recognizes 
and imposes on himself are ideals which he has no excuse for not 
obeying. If, however, he does disobey them, reason requires that he 
give an account of himself of what he has done, judge his conduct by 
his ideals, hold himself responsible. Such responsibility is moral 
maturity; until it has been achieved one may be said to be morally 
still an infant. Responsible persons are subjects of ethical conduct; 
others are only its objects, for they must be treated responsibly, 
even though they cannot treat themselves so.l 
It is also clear that the development of autonomy is dependent 
upon the development of relevant ideals. This presents a considerable 
challenge as the social and cultural systems increase in complexity and 
differentiation. Specialization of function may permit the development 
of greater functional capacity, but since autonomy for the individual 
person is dependent on acting in accordance with self-imposed ideals, such 
individual is challenged to develop ideals inclusive enough as well as 
specific enough to give meaning to specialized roles. 
Autonomy in a highly complex and interdependent urban environment 
is thus dependent on shared ideal values and their normative definition 
being "institutionalized" in cooperative action. Parsons notes that 
1Ibid 0} p 0 119 ° 
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... high levels of "responsible freedom" can be attained only 
through positive institutionalization, through systems of norms and 
sanctions imposing the obligation of accepting responsibility and 
utilizing freedom over wide areas.l 
Responsible planning may be viewed as the effort to clarify 
ideals and norms in such a way as to coordinate action and increase in-
dividual autonomy. On the other hand, arbitrary planning may seek the 
imposition of the ideals of an elite upon the actions of others. This 
would violate the law of autonomy, however, for one cannot coherently 
will autonomy for oneself without similarly willing it for other persons. 
This, however, involves difficult problems. For inconsistent or 
irrelevant ideals or lack of responsibility of some members of society 
may mean that they are neither aware of nor interested in important deci-
sions. In such a situation, the law of autonomy would seem to indicate 
that persons taking part in responsible planning should have as one of 
their goals the increase in potential meaningful participation of all 
persons affected by the plans. 
The second set of laws are the axiological laws toward which the 
discussion has already moved in its reference to values and ends. The 
formal laws deal with the rational principles of values chosen." 2 The 
formal laws demand sincerity, while the axiological laws require intel-
ligence. 
ii. The Axiological Laws 
The Axiological Laws relate the formal moral principles to the 
ends of action or the values sought. In tenns of Parsons framework the 
l Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., I, 59· 
~rightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 125. 
formal laws are the basic principles at the third level of the evaluative 
dimension of culture, i.e., the level of basic standards by which all 
value judgments are tested. They are the principles of moral integrity. 
The Axiological Laws are a spelling out of the formal principles 
in terms of the second level of the evaluative dimension, and indicate 
relevant characteristics of the situations in which all value choices 
must be made. 
The basic Axiological Law says that "all persons ought to choose 
values which are self-consistent, harmonious and coherent, not values 
which are contradictory or incoherent with one another." 1 This law rec-
ognizes the fact that all men make value choices, and that the choices 
which are made should be brought into a coherent relationship with each 
other. This means in part that when potential values conflict, we must 
choose between them. Also, this law involves recognition that values may 
be complementary or mutually enhancing. However, it does not resolve the 
problem of the origin of value experience, the relationship between empir-
ical and ideal values, or instrumental and intrinsic values. 
Five other Axiological Laws indicate the necessity of viewing con-
sequences, choosing the best possible, most specifically relevant and most 
inclusive ends under the guidance of ideal values. The Law of Conse-
quences may be viewed as a bridge between the evaluative and the cognitive 
subsystems of culture. 
The Law of Consequences is that "all persons ought to consider 
and, on the whole, approve the foreseeable consequences of each of their 
choices. Choose with a view to the long run, not merely to the present 
1 Ibid. 
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act . ,l It t mus be recognized that every choice has consequences, and 
that 
in proportion as we are intelligent, and desire to know what 
we are doing, we shall extend our knowledge of the effects of our 
choice from those now actually foreseen to all those which we can 
foresee with improved methods of investigation.2 
In a sense, the Law of Consequences might well be called the basic 
law of planning. That is, planning in as much as it is a deliberate ef-
fort to take into consideration the range of consequences of action and 
to choose between alternative courses of action in terms of their conse-
quences. John Howard explicitly recognizes this basic norm when he says 
"that there is need to pay attention to all the consequences."3 The Law 
of Consequences requires that the widest range of consequences be viewed. 
This undergirds the need for comprehensive planning as viewed, e.g., by 
Melville Branch. 
Comprehensive planning seeks to optimize the total productive 
accomplishment and effective existence over time of the organism to 
which it is applied. It is therefore coordinative, inclusive, and 
projective in its viewpoint. As the descriptive adjective indicates, 
it is not limited to physical planning nor is it otherwise segmented 
in nature. In fact, one of the primary purposes of comprehensive 
planning is the inte~ration of various functional and other partial 
planning activities. 
As has been noted earlier, one of the major challenges in contem-
porary society is the development of large structures of power which pur-
sue limited goals, violating the Law of Consequences by failing to take 
into consideration the range of consequences of major decisions. This 
1Ibid., p. 142. 2Ibid., p. 14 3 . 
3John T. Howard, "The Planner in a Democratic Society--A Credo," 
in JAIP, XXI (1955), 62-65. 
Study," 
burgh: 
4Melville C. Branch, "Comprehensive Planning as a Field of 
Planning and the Urban Community, ed. Harvey S. Perloff (Pitts-
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1961), pp. 199-200. 
organizational focusing on special goals often produces unintended or 
unconsidered consequences for the whole community. 
There are two other problems which the Law of Consequences poses 
for planning. The first is that of developing the capacities to predict 
consequences in a highly interdependent and complex society. As Branch 
notes, 
Coordination in planning not only presents problems of mechanical or 
material interconnection, but also requires the correlation of highly 
disparate elements, the tangible and the intangible. As a single il-
lustration, an industrial facility is composed of a multitude of 
physical and material elements which are considered and correlated, 
integrated into a design solution, and translated into three dimen-
sions. If we extend this correlation to a higher level for more com-
prehensive corporate planning purposes, a new set of financial, psy-
chological, and human engineering elements is introduced which we 
cannot now integrate by scientific analysis. This limitation leaves 
very important questions to be answered by the most proximate judg-
ments or intuition.l 
It is perhaps no wonder that when consequences are so difficult to pre-
diet as well as to evaluate major areas of decision-making are based on 
narrow specific types of goals. Yet it is equally evident that the Law 
of Consequences and the fact of observable consequences in contemporary 
society point to the ethical inadequacy of such decisions. 
The other problem which the Law of Consequences highlights is 
the tension between democratic decision-making and competent decision-
making. All persons are not equal in their capacity to foresee conse-
quences. Indeed, the estimation of consequences is often a difficult and 
specialized task. If according to the Law of Consequences competence in 
foreseeing consequences is a moral requirement, how is this to be related 
to the idea that all persons should participate in making basic decisions, 
particularly when some persons do not have either the developed facility 
1Ibid., p. 204. 
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or interest in foreseeing conse~uences? This is perhaps a re-statement 
of the age-old issue of rule by philosopher-kings or democratic decision-
making. 
This dilemma will be noted again in the discussion of the idea 
of the responsible society. But it is well to note that competence in 
prediction is a solidly grounded aspect of ethical choice. The ideal of 
competence and the ideal of participation need to be seen in polar ten-
sian. This tension is one which must be resolved by every social system, 
and is handled in different ways by representative democracies. The set-
ting of general goals, and the establishment of constitutions or basic 
structures for decision-making are processes in which wide participation 
is possible and necessary. The implementation of these general goals 
and the enactment of particular pieces of legislation are the points 
where specialized competence is needed. The structures by which persons 
with special competence are held accountable for their performance are 
basic processes of a responsible society. 
The acceptance of the ideal of competence by members of a respon-
sible society will lead them to encourage, develop, and utilize special-
ized competences. Further, it seems likely that one such "specialized" 
competence might even include persons trained in comprehensive planning, 
i.e., "specialized generalists," who themselves will be held accountable 
by the larger society. 
The Law of the Best Possible is that "all persons ought at all 
times to will the best possible values in the total situation; hence, if 
1 possible to improve every situation." This law recognizes both the 
1Thid.' p. 156. 
possibilities and the limitations of every situation, and the responsi-
bility to achieve in each situation those potential values which are 
there. Brightman notes that the Law of the Best Possible heightens the 
other laws by emphasis on the best but moderates them by recognizing the 
limits of the possible. Further, it calls not merely for "a consistent 
organization of the values actually given in individual and social life, 
but it means a critical selection, improvement, and creation of values." 1 
The limitations and possibilities of situations have been gen-
erally recognized as important aspects of the situation in planning. 
The opportunity area consists of all of those acts or courses of ac-
tion which the effectuating organization is not precluded from tak-
ing because of some limiting conditions.2 
Definition of the opportunity area is an important dimension of planning. 
Evaluating the possibilities in terms of those which will achieve the 
best possible values is dependent upon the analysis of the opportunity 
area. 
The Law of the Best Possible clearly undergirds rational action 
as defined by Parsons: 
Action is rational in so far as it pursues ends possible within the 
conditions of the situation, and by means which, among those avail-
able to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end for 
reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science . 
. . . The starting point is that of conceiving the actor as coming 
to know the facts of the situation in which he acts and thus the con-
ditions necessary and the means available for the realization of his 
ends. As applied to the means-end relationship, this is essentially 
a matter of accurate prediction of the probable effects of various 
possible ways of altering the situation (employment of alternative 
means) and the resultant choices among them.3 
~eyerson, Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest, op. cit., 
p. 316. 
3Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., p. 58. 
In addition, however, the Law of the Best Possible indicates that 
the choice among possible ends should be based on an estimate of the best 
or most ideal values. This is indicated more precisely in the Iaw of 
Ideal Control. 
The Law of Specification states that "all persons ought, in any 
given situation, to develop the value or values specifically related to 
that situation and most readily attained in that situation." 1 This law 
notes that action always takes place in a particular situation, and that 
the choice of values must always be made in terms of their relevance to 
actual choices. Thus, this law "points out that we always deal with a 
concrete, empirical situation of a particular kind, with its own spe-
cific experiences of value." In terms of planning it requires that moral 
principles, universal ends, general values, and major goals finally must 
be brought into relationship with particular targets and specific action. 
It indicates the moral necessity of specification as indicated earlier. 
It avoids the moral failure of merely abstract idealism. 
But more than that, this law also is a reminder of the plurality 
of ends which are possible, and the necessity for looking for distinctive 
values in each situation. This is a familiar theme in planning noted 
earlier as a basic principle3 and continues to occur in a variety of con-
texts. Lewis Mumford in his critical reviews of developments in archi-
tecture and city planning frequently appeals to this principle. For in-
stance, in discussing Honolulu's street plan, he notes that one of the 
most distinctive features of the city is a beautiful harbor. 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. l 71. 
2Ibid., pp. l7lf. 3supra 
The visual neglect of the water has been a conspicuous defect in the 
development of Honolulu's Street Plan. Hence, the need for a water-
front parkway; hence, the need of occasional broad boulevards leading 
down to the water.l 
The implications of the Law of Specification for structures of 
decision-making are important. It undergirds the development of special-
ized roles when such roles lead to increased functional capacity. But 
in addition, it warns against the effort to develop top-heavy structures 
in which too many prescriptions are handed down from a decision-making 
elite. Instead, the Law of Specification would seem to undergird aware-
ness of the value of 
. keeping the regulatory norms at a sufficiently high level of 
generality so that much of the adjustment can be left to the spon-
taneous, i.e., unprescribed, action of the units themselves.2 
It is obvious, however, that specialization is dependent upon integra-
tion. This raises the problem of freedom and order which will be dwelt 
with more specifically in the discussion of the responsible society. 
The Law of the Most Inclusive End states that all persons ought 
to choose a coherent life in which the widest possible range of value is 
realized. 3 This law points to the fact of diversity of experienced val-
ues and interests, the dislike of monotony, the mutually enhancing qual-
ity of many values, and the need to see values united in some kind of 
coherent plan. Brightman suggests that the rigidity of a plan can be 
overcome by maintaining openness and that the "actual life plan should 
lL . ewls 
p. So. 
Mumford, City Development (London: Seeker and Warburg, 
2 Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., I, 58. 
3Brightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 183. 
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be rigid enough to be reasonably definite but loose enough to be suscept-
ible to frequent revision and correction. ,.l 
This law is a basic principle that has gained increasing accept-
ance in planning theory. Planning has come to be seen as a process 
rather than a product, and flexibility is increasingly seen as essential 
to good planning. 
The unforeseen necessity, the new interpretation of duty and re-
lationship, ought by every law of causality to demand adaptations 
unprovided for in a master plan.2 
The shift from rigid land-use master plans to general policy planning 
reflects this concern. 
One of the most frequently stated goals of contemporary planning 
is the maintenance of diversity and the wide range of opportunity for in-
dividual choice. Yet it is increasingly evident that the goal of diver-
sity requires a coherent and planned effort to achieve and protect that 
diversity. 
The role of public and quasi-public action as a source of diver-
sity is acknowledged by Jane Jacobs. She then goes on to further exalt 
diversity as a central goal of planning. 
However most city diversity is the creation of incredible numbers 
of different people and different private organizations, with vastly 
differing ideas and purposes, planning and contriving outside the 
formal framework of public action. The main responsibility of city 
planning and design should be to develop--insofar as public policy 
and action can do so--cities that are congenial places for this great 
range of unofficial plans, ideas and opportunities to flourish along 
with the flourishing of the public enterprises.3 
1Ibid., p. 192. 
2 Joseph Hudnut, Architecture and the Spirit of Man (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 96. 
3Jacobs, op. cit. 
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The inadequacy of diversity as a complete goal is faced, however, 
when the question of the size of diverse units is raised. Are individ-
uals to be the unit, each very much different from the other? Or is there 
to be a plurality of groups with different life styles, traditions, and 
aspirations? And if there is to be a pluralistic society with different 
groups, must there be certain basic norms which are universally accepted 
for such groups to co-exist? 
These questions focus on the other pole of the Law of the Most 
Inclusive End. Diversity does have limits and pluralism requires a mutual 
respect for the rights of others. According to the moral laws, diversity 
itself and a pluralistic society which permits and encourages diversity 
ought to be willed as a part of a larger goal and more inclusive end in 
harmony with the whole moral law. 
The Law of Ideal Control states that "all persons ought to con-
trol their empirical values by ideal values." 1 This law systematizes 
and unifies the earlier laws and points to the need for a distinction 
between empirical or spontaneously experienced values and criticized 
values. The challenge to control of particular value-claims by general-
ized value judgments has often come from persons who assert that people 
should simply be more !!natural, 11 but in this sense, ,,naturaln is a 
highly generalized value judgment or ideal. 
The basic ideals of a society have been called the system values 
by sociologists. 
System values . . . refer more directly to those over-all goals of 
the society that distinguish it from other societies--e.g., the 
gentleman's way of life, concern with a particular type of religious 
salvation--in short, the answers to the Weberian problem of ultimate 
meaning. 2 
~rightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 194. 
2Jesse R. Pitts, "Introduction," Theories of Society, II, 700-701. 
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A society, of course, never experiences value. The moral life 
and coherence of ideal values are in the experience of persons. But part 
of the basic problem is to find ways to share ideals so that they can be-
come common spring boards for action. General policies planning which 
searches out bundles of norms applicable to the complex system that is a 
city is an effort in this direction. These issues will be discussed 
more fully under the Law of Ideal of Community. 
The Law of Ideal Control raises the question of the relationship 
of 11 0ught 11 and nis. 11 The issues involved in this historic concern of 
ethical theory need not be reviewed here. It is enough to note that 
planning assumes that at least to some extent the future is subject to 
human decision and choice. That the "ought" of planned action can influ-
ence what is to be is implied in all planning efforts. At the same time, 
however, there is the awareness that ideal values although exercising a 
claim on action are not expected to be fully realized. Rather, such 
ideal values are growth-direction and a searching after the unfolding 
sensitivity to true values. The grounding of value experience in the na-
ture of reality and the source of the moral life become significant ques-
tions not only for the Law of Ideal Control but for all planning efforts. 
These concerns will be posed more sharply in the Metaphysical Law. 
iii. The Personalistic Laws 
The next three laws are personalistic laws concerned with the ob-
ligations of persons to themselves, others, and the ideals that should 
guide personality development. 
The Law of Individualism states that "each person ought to real-
ize in his own experience the maximum value of which he is capable in 
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harmony with the moral law." 1 This law recognizes that the person is 
the moral unit, and that there is an obligation to seek to control the 
realization of values in one's own life. 
The social dimension of personality is not denied by this law. 
Rather, the person as a private center and unity of experience is empha-
sized here, even as the social aspect of personality is accentuated in 
the communitarian laws. But these polar aspects of personality are held 
in tension in the moral laws, just as the relation of personality devel-
opment to the social, cultural, and bio-physical systems is explored in 
contemporary social theory. 
The significance of the Law of Individualism is enhanced by mod-
ern urban life. The individual faces a wide range of choice created by 
specialization of roles, differentiation of the social structure, the 
loss of the tight controls of a traditionalistic society, and high levels 
of affluence. The response of a frenetic pursuit of new experience and 
a lack of integrity in the range of roles a person plays are obvious re-
spouses to this situation. The Law of Individualism acknowledges the 
validity of the fullness of life which these new opportunities for diver-
sity permit, but calls for the growth of integrity in the moral life. 
Much of the anxiety about urban life reflects a lack of confi-
dence in the capacity of persons to re-integrate their lives under the 
guidance of broad and valid ideals. However, the discovery of dedicated, 
creative, and sensitive persons who are intensely involved in the core 
of urban society enhances awe and respect for personality and the sources 
of moral life which are tapped by such persons. 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 204. 
The awareness that integrity of personal life emerges as persons 
come to discover ways of giving of themselves and sharing with others in 
devotion to common ideals prevents the Law of Individualism from endors-
ing selfishness. This is the fact of experience that provides the bridge 
to the Law of Altruism. 
The Law of Altruism states that "each person ought to judge and 
guide all of his acts with respect for all other persons as ends in them-
selves."1 This law recognizes that 
if each person ought to respect 
then each person ought to res~ect all 
and so as ends in themselves. 
himself as a realizer of value, 
others as realizers of value 
Respect for persons obviously needs to be supplemented by the axiolog-
ical laws and a loyalty to coherent values. 
An easy acceptance of the Law of Altruism prompted by familiar-
ity3 is apt to miss the cutting edge which this law has. For it is not 
enough to "do good" at others, or to seek to create values in the experi-
ence of others. Rather, respect calls for an expectation that other per-
sons are active willing persons capable of initiative, discipline, in-
sight, judgment and obedience to the moral laws. 
If respect is understood in these terms, then the Law of Altruism 
speaks directly to the problem of participation in city planning and de-
velopment. Altruism requires, of course, that the goals of planned action 
~eWolf, op. cit., p. l. 
~rightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 225. 
3See Brightman's discussion of the historical background in 
Christian thought and its classical formulation in Kantian ethics. Ibid., 
pp. 226-29. Also, note that the principle that persons should be treated 
as ends and not merely as means was appealed to in the early history of 
modern city planning. 
should, as far as possible, include the increase of value in all persons 
who are affected. But beyond that, respect for persons requires that all 
persons should as far as possible be involved in the planning process as 
active moral agents. Social work, public assistance, or city planning 
which views people as passive recipients of efforts and programs (even 
those thought to be on their behalf) lack genuine respect. 
In current city planning practice, community organization is 
sometimes viewed as an instrument of "selling" a city plan. This denies 
the respect for persons that sees them as moral beings sensitive to need 
and capable pf initiative and partnership in cooperative planning. 
Even more serious, however, is the problem of racial, ethnic, 
and social class differences which form the basis for lines of respect 
and disrespect. The fact that urban renewal programs are most likely to 
involve neighborhoods of low status persons or minority groups means that 
problems of meaningful participation and the sharing of initiative, in-
sight, and goals are among the most difficult challenges facing current 
city planning. The Law of Altruism provides the ethical foundation for 
efforts to find new ways not only of eliminating slum housing but even 
more important the development of social structures and processes includ-
ing city planning that elicit participation of all persons as responsible 
moral beings. 
The Law of Ideal of Personality states that "every person ought 
to judge and guide all of his acts by his ideal conception (in harmony 
with the other Laws) of what the whole personality ought to become." 1 
This law does not specify a particular ideal of personality, but 
~eWolf, op. cit., p. l. 
lSJ 
does require that each person should form an ideal which is in harmony 
with the moral law. The uniqueness of each individual and each historical 
situation would prohibit imposition of any single idea. 
The particular form that the ideal shall take in the life of any 
individual or group is, within the limits set by the Moral Laws, a 
matter of individual creative imagination and aesthetic taste. The 
number of possible ideals is infinitely great. Each individual dif-
fers in some way from others; and it would be far from ideal if a 
uniform standard were to be imposed on all in such a way as to erase 
these differences. Each family, each group, each nation, has a 
unique contribution to humanity and so a distinctive ideal to fulfill.l 
The Law of Ideal of Personality rather than restricting imagina-
tion, creativity, and diversity undergirds these characteristics of per-
sonality. In so doing, it avoids a static ideal, and requires that the 
ideal be in a continuous process of development. However, according to 
this law action ought to be guided by the highest ideal of personality 
available at the time. 
The difficulty in constructing an ideal of personality adequate 
to contemporary urban society has already been noted. It remains only 
to note that the professional literature in city planning is almost de-
void of efforts to develop such an ideal as one of the guides for plan-
ning and action. Such ideals obviously exist but are more implicit than 
explicit. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to attempt the 
formulation of such an ideal. It is important, however, to note the 
necessity for developing a clearer picture of what personality can and 
ought to become as a basis for making decisions about what kind of 
physical environment ought to be developed. Persons, not things, are 
ends in themselves. Plans for the development of houses, streets, 
schools, factories, and churches ought to be guided by the needs of 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., p. 250. 
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persons, and these needs are discovered by bringing together the picture 
of what persons are and what they ought to become. 
iv. The Communitarian Laws 
The Communitarian Laws explicitly recognize the fact that many 
values are shared values which can only be attained as persons join to-
gether in common endeavors. Muelder and DeWolf have developed three 
Communitarian Laws. They are the Law of Co-operation, the Law of Social 
Devotion, and the Law of Ideal of Community. 
The Law of Cooperation states that "all persons ought as far as 
possible to co-operate with other persons in the production and enjoy-
l 
ment of shared values." The positive responsibility to work with other 
persons clearly set forth in this norm. There is also a recognition 
that self-interest, at least when it assumes that all values are essen-
tially competitive, is rejected as inadequate. 
The need for cooperative action is clearly evident in urban so-
ciety if any values are to be sustained. Appeals by early planning were 
d t th . . . l 2 rna e o lS prlnClp e. This cooperation must extend to the process of 
setting goals as well as carrying out policy, and cannot be done by spe-
cialists in any single segment of the social structure. Howard recog-
nizes this when he says: 
The leadership in setting the goals, as directions of desirable 
change, comes not from government officials as such, but from indi-
viduals--religious leaders, political leaders, perhaps philosophers. 
Until both the knowledge of our planners and the wisdom of our gov-
ernments are greatly increased, this very loose nteamn operation is 
as close to "comprehensive" planning for society as it may be wise 
to attempt.3 
~eWolf, op. cit., p. l. 
3 John T. Howard, "The Planner in a Democratic Society--A Credo," 
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXI (1955), 63. 
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Howard has recognized here the problem of the limitation of spe-
cialists in setting goals, but has not faced squarely the problems of 
the elite. The Law of Cooperation, if valid, is applicable to all per-
sons and the task of setting goals as directions of desirable change is 
one in which all persons ought to participate. 
But the tendency to seek for an elite to set such goals may re-
fleet the widespread anxiety about basic goals and cfirections adequate 
for serving the needs of a unit of cooperation as large and complex as 
the new metropolitan communities. Robert Weaver speaks to these concerns 
when he writes: 
. there emerges the larger question of how we shall make the 
modern metropolis a community as well as merely the physical setting 
of social life. 
As we look at many of the problems which confront the planner 
and public administrator, it is apparent that attempts to cope with 
these problems will require a more widespread sense of interdependence 
and common purpose than presently exists among the residents of most 
metropolitan areas. The new organizations which are required to deal 
with problems common to metropolitan areas as a whole and to plan for 
the future environment, will necessitate that local autonomy and 
parochialisms be submerged in the pursuit of larger goals. Cleavages 
of race and class must be bridged if urban areas are to emerge as co-
herent societies and not merely collections of hostile or indifferent 
groups and areas. The resources of rich suburbs and the poorer cen-
tral cities must be pooled in programs to improve education, provide 
needed social services and public facilities.l 
In addition to cleavages of race and class in the metropolis that 
are major barriers to cooperation, there are also biases in favor of in-
dividualized decision-making particularly in economic affairs. In some 
ways, of course, individual choice operating through the market mechanism 
permits individual participation and allows the efforts of many persons 
to produce reciprocal if not shared values. 
1Robert C. Weaver, "Urban Planning Problems," a paper for the 
American Orthopsychiatric Association, Los Angeles, Calif., March 22, 
1962, p. 21. 
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The difficulty arises when the individual consumer model of eco-
nomic life is projected as adequate or appropriate for all economic 
choices, or morally superior to group decision-making. This group deci-
sian-making is clearly a political process, although the political unit 
need not always be a large one. 
Where purchases are by groups, decisions as to how much to spend 
must be political ones; but the issue of citizen participation can 
be simplified in several ways as compared with the situation where 
budgetary decisions are made by large political units. If the pur-
chasing group is more homogeneous than the whole community, any de-
cision is more wholly satisfactory to a larger percentage of the 
members. Even if the small group is no more homogeneous than the 
large, individuals may participate more effectively in small-group 
decisions. 
While user charges and the demand-supply rule can simplify the 
budgetary problem, they do not divorce public enterprise operations 
from the political process; political participation in many decisions 
is essential, including the crucial decisions respecting organiza-
tional form, investment policies, and integrating the particular 
function with other community services. For instance, the quantity 
of services to be supplied by a basically enterprise type of opera-
tion may be extended by public decision and public subsidy beyond 
the amo~ts which could be made available at cost-of-production 
prices.l 
Alternative types of structures for cooperative decision-making 
which seek a balance between the claims of a group large enough to 
achieve shared values and small enough to permit meaningful participa-
tion are suggested by Fitch. The wide range of structures of coopers-
tion which are intermediary between large governmental units and the in-
dividual such as cooperatives, credit unions, a variety of types of cor-
porations and voluntary associations need to be recognized. And the 
political process by which decisions are made in these voluntary associ-
ations as well as in government needs to be frankly and explicitly ap-
preciated as a basic aspect of cooperative endeavor. 
l Lyle C. Fitch, "Metropolitan Financial Problems," The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXIV (Novem-
ber, 1957 , 72 · 
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The individualistic or competitive bias of our society is seen 
in the recent developments in game theory which in its efforts to work 
out the basis for rational action might be of some use to some aspects 
of planning. In a review of recent game theory literature, John 
Dyckman points to one of the undeveloped aspects. 
Game theory extended the rational model by taking into account the 
actions of competitors, assuming that all concerned would do their 
"worst," and devising a maximum solution. But this was rationality 
of adversity, and public planning is not defensive but aimed at im-
proving the condition of the client ... 
Individual value is so deeply ingrained in our view of ration-
ality that we have difficulty making social value the starting point 
for a definition of rationality. The rationality of cooperation, 
for example, is relatively undeveloped.l 
Shared and mutually enhancing values are fundamental to urban 
planning whether they be safe and efficient transportation, an aesthet-
ically attractive lake-front, or full employment or equal educational 
opportunity which reduce the negative costs of crime and public welfare 
expenditures. Increasingly values of great importance cannot be achieved 
by persons acting in isolation. The rationality of cooperation needs to 
be worked out and the structures for cooperative decision-making and ac-
tion are needed. 
The Law of Social Devotion states that "all persons ought to de-
vote themselves to serving the best interests of the group and to subor-
dinate personal gain to social gain." 
This law recognizes the fact that any kind of activity has costs 
as well as benefits, and indicates how these costs and benefits should 
be distributed as between the individual and the larger group. It 
1John W. Dyckman, "Review Article: Planning and Decision 
Theory," JAIP, XXIV, No. 4 (1961), 342. 
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reflects the principles noted earlier that personal gain should be sub-
ordinate to the well-being of the community. 1 
This law, however, points to rather than resolves some of the 
most difficult problems in ethics and social policy. It assumes a stand-
ars for estimating personal and social gain not only quantitatively but 
qualitatively as well. In addition it assumes the ability to estimate 
consequences as well as the moral maturity and quality of inner disci-
pline required to subordinate self-interest to the larger social good. 
A full examination of these issues is beyond the immediate concern of 
this dissertation. But the implications for city planning do need ex-
ploration here. 
Contrary to some public relations efforts, any significant civic 
activity, public or private, has costs. Not everyone benefits, and in 
no case do all persons benefit equally. This is as true for physical re-
newal as it is for economic or social change. In high density urban liv-
ing, almost any physical change means that homes must be torn down, lives 
disrupted, old patterns and associations lost. The law of social devo-
tion acknowledges costs and unequal distribution of gain, and points to 
the larger good as the goal of action in spite of cost. 
But some difficult issues need to be faced. In calculating the 
larger good, it has been easier to estimate economic costs and benefits 
than other less readily quantifiable values. The least cost principle 
which has guided so much civic action2 leads to the demolition of dwell-
ings and neighborhoods whose physical value is least. There is little 
doubt in such cases that the heaviest cost is born by those already least 
l Supra 2 Supra 
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advantages, and this cost is often in terms of social values that are 
difficult to quantify but must be considered if planning is faithful to 
the Law of Social Devotion. 
Planning is a change agent. Wherever change occurs in the urban 
scene there are social and economic benefits to some and costs to 
others. Physical planning, perhaps inadvertently, has tended to 
benefit the holders of considerable resources at the expense of the 
have-nots. Such change in the city may be beneficial physically, 
while being destructive socially.l 
When the tendency to develop policy on the least cost basis is added to 
the fact of political life that the culturally or educationally deprived 
groups are often the least powerful politically, then one of the major 
problems of developing urban renewal programs that embody the law of so-
cial devotion becomes clearly evident. 
Social research also betrays a lack of concern for the Law of 
Social Devotion at many critical points. Although increasing numbers of 
persons are living in high-rise apartments, there is virtually no re-
search that explores the impact of such dwellings on family life, social 
participation, inter-group attitudes, etc. The same thing can be said 
of public housing. What research has been done is almost exclusively 
market research designed to check not the social gain but the probable 
return on the investor's dollar. 
Planning that acknowledges the Law of Social Devotion will focus 
attention on needed research and study, and will seek to develop an ideal 
of community that provides a basis for choosing the larger social good. 
In so doing, the full range of specialized skills can be called into play. 
1Clyde J. Wingfield, "Power Structure and Decision-Making in 
City Planning," a paper presented at the Fall Conference, Western Great 
Lakes Chapter, American Institute of Planners, Chicago, Ill., December 
7, 1962, p. 6. 
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Aiming to stimulate differentiation and variety of thought and 
action, rather than retreat into dead-end specialization, the genu-
ine planner will so "touch the informed pride" of the specialist 
that even the hardened professional will rise to planning stature in 
his own right. This can only happen as the specialist comes to view 
his skill as an instrument of a transcending complex of community 
growth--directions in the formulation and discovery of which he is 
taking a critical part.l 
The Law of Ideal of Community as formulated by DeWolf states that 
"all persons ought to form and choose all of their ideals and values in 
loyalty to their ideals (in harmony with the other laws) of what the 
whole community ought to become; and to participate responsibly in groups 
to help them similarly choose and form all of their ideals and choices. "2 
This law indicates the need for a system of ideal values which 
are bound together in a way that includes the whole community and pro-
vides a basic framework for all value choices. This law is clearly im-
plied in and required to supplement the laws of cooperation and social 
devotion. That planning should be guided by the "best" ideals of the 
community was the first emergent principle noted earlier. 3 However, the 
need for an ideal of community as an indispensable aspect of planning 
has on occasion been lost under the maze of technical details. 
Too often, we tend to think of urban planning problems in the 
narrow sense of the technical issues surrounding the physical form 
of the city, the special arrangement of urban functions and the con-· 
trol and allocation of land. At the end of the planning process, 
decisions about land use, the location of transportation and the pro-
vision of housing and community facilities must be made. But before 
these issues can be decided, before the planner's map can be drawn 
and colored, there must be debate and decision about the goals of 
urban life, and the values and ends toward which the urban environ-
ment is to be shaped . 
Increasingly there is a recognition that both the form and spirit 
l Robert C. Hoover, "A View of Ethics and Planning," JAIP, XXVII, 
No. 4 (November, 1961), 299. 
2 DeWolf, op. cit., p. 2. 
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of urban life in America are changing and that the problems we con-
front are both a challenge to traditional values and an opportunity 
to improve the quality of our co~~on life. 1 
The speed and depth of change in current society, however, pre-
sent major problems for the development of an ideal community. John 
Dyckman suggests that 
The difficulty for planning is that the speeding up of change 
makes the vision of the future more difficult, and, if change extends 
to laws and social mores, the strain on normative imagination may be 
incapacitating.2 
Part of the confusion seems to be the fact that new opportunities 
get all mixed up with preferences, and one step toward clarifying an 
ideal of community might be the careful estimation of what opportunities 
do in fact exist. 
The first step in utopian decision may be the analysis of existing 
opportunities and the separation of opportunity functions from pref-
erence functions. For though the forms may also be uncertain clear-
ing up the opportunity "facts" may help with the confergence of the 
preference function, as Boulding has argued. Unless we can do that 
much, the difficult preference problems with which normative decision 
theory has been preoccupied may be untouchable.3 
But even this suggestion has serious limitations, for the range 
of opportunity at many points has become so great that even initial ex-
ploration requires some sense of direction governed by an emerging ideal 
of community. But where does one turn for such an ideal? Morton White 
notes that the leading intellectuals of American history have almost uni-
versally disliked the city. 
When Jefferson warned of the dangers of what he called the city 
mob, when Emerson complained of the cities artificiality and conven-
tionalism, when John Dewey lamented the decline of neighborliness, 
~eaver, "Urban Planning Problems," op. cit., pp. l and 2. 
~yckman, "Review Article: Planning and Decision Theory," op. 
cit . , p. 34 3. 
3Ibid. 
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all of them thought of the city as a place in which certain basic 
human values were being subverted, values which are cherishable today 
as they were in the eighteenth century of Jefferson, the nineteenth 
century of Emerson, and the twentieth century of John Dewey. And 
what are these values? Jefferson's worry about the mobs of the city 
rose from doubt about the American city's capacity to educate its in-
habitants in a way that would preserve and extend the democratic 
process. And when Emerson worried about the growth of artificiality 
and conventionalism in the city, he was thinking, as were his con-
temporaries, Kierkegaard and John Stuart Mill, about the increase in 
conformity, about the decline of individuality which was proportional 
to the increase of urbanization in America. Dewey's main concern was 
with the improvement of human communication within the city; and by 
communication he did not mean the exchange of information alone. He 
valued the capacity to discuss with, to learn from and intelligently 
persuade others, and to live with them in the profoundest sense.l 
Each of these writers had concern for an ideal of community that 
the city seemed to threaten. What the city could mean as a base for the 
creation of these and other values was unexplored. 
Another potential source of an Ideal of Community might be the 
planners themselves. However, Dyckman's judgment here seems all too ac-
curate when he states: 
The difficulty lies in the problem of determining community values. 
At present, the planners are content to assume that they know the 
"good" ends, and that these ends will be received unhesitatingly by 
the public .... There is a tendency to project the values of the 
middle-class, professionally trained, occupationally secure segment 
to the entire population. These values are reflected in the confu-
sion of certain cultural standards with requirements for health, 
learning or leisure. Other values may be hangovers from past eras 
and movements which are carried over without testin~ against the pre-
vailing interests and preferences of the community. 
If the ideal of community projected by historical figures and 
contemporary planners are inadequate, then another alternative might be 
careful studies of emerging empirical values. However, not only are 
~orton and Lucia White, "The American Intellectual versus the 
American City," Daedalus (Winter, 1961), pp. 178-79· 
2John Dyckman, "Scientific Approach to Community Planning," 
American Association of Scientific Workers Newsletter (Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania: March, 1954), pp. 2-3. 
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these in short supply, but even the question of how to find them is rela-
tively unexamined. 
Studies on how to find goals, other than the traditional specu-
lation of political philosophers or the self-fulfilling prophecies 
of advertisers and marketers, are very skimpy.l 
This is not to say, of course, that there are no basic value 
systems guiding the emerging urban society. Williams, e.g., has at-
tempted to formulate the basic values around which American culture is 
. d 2 organlze . He suggests the following major value-orientation in Amer-
ican life: achievement and success; activity and work; moral orienta-
tion; humanitarian mores; efficiency and practicality; progress; material 
comfort; equality freedom; external conformity; science and secular ra-
tionality; nationalism and patriotism; democracy; individual personality; 
and racism and related group superiority themes. 
It is obvious, however, that there are basic conflicts between 
some of these value themes including the tension between freedom and 
equality. Democracy and respect for persons contends with racism and 
group superiority. The empirical values of American life fall short of 
an ideal of community required by this moral law. 
There is the beginning of an ideal of community inherent in the 
moral laws themselves. Muelder notes the main features of such an ideal. 
The whole system of moral laws favors an ideal of community in 
which the following elements inhere: l) organic pluralism, or human 
solidarity coherent with personal individuality; 2) the perspective 
of mankind as the unit of cooperation; 3) an understanding of cul-
tures as wholes; 4) a concern for persons in the transformation of 
l Dyckman, "Review Article: Planning and Decision Theory," op. 
cit., pp. 335-45. 
tat ion 
2Robin M. 
(New York: 
Williams, American Society: 
Knopf, 1956), pp. 397-470. 
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cultures; 5) provlSlOn for the possible continuation of a multi-
group society both domestically and world-wide; 6) the possibility 
and validity of purposive change; 7) the preparation and implementa-
tion of fundamental hu~an rights and freedoms; 8) the positive ap-
preciation of religious values and norms in the life of persons and 
groups; and 9) the positive role of ultimate ideals.l 
These broad outlines of a coherent ideal of community are clearly 
applicable to modern urban life in a rapidly shrinking world. The work-
ing out of the implications for particular metropolitan areas is a task 
that challenges the very best efforts of all persons who acknowledge the 
moral laws as the basis for their moral life. The implementation of 
such an ideal in a complex urban society will call for a higher order of 
cooperative planning than has yet been seen. Further aspects of an ideal 
of community will be discussed in the concluding section on the respon-
sible society. 
v. The Metaphysical Law 
The Metaphysical Law as stated by DeWolf is "all persons ought 
to seek to know the source and significance of the harmony and univer-
sality of these moral laws, that is, of the coherence of the moral order." 2 
DeWolf notes that this law is a "transitional law standing between ethics 
on the one hand, and metaphysics, philosophy of religion and theology, on 
the other . "3 
In Parsons' framework, this law expresses the requirement of pur-
suing the ground of the normative order in the systems of meaningful be-
liefs or affirmations about the nature of the transcendent ground. While 
this law does not prejudge the outcome of the metaphysical or religious 
~alter G. Muelder, "Theology and the Responsible Society," 
(unpublished manuscript, 1962). 
2_ t 2 3Ibl' d. DeWolf, op. ci . , p. . 
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quest, it does suggest that ethics provide some valid data for that 
quest, i.e., the coherent nature of the moral laws. Brightman correctly 
affirms that there is a measure of autonomy in ethics. 1 But it is obvi-
ous that if religious affirmations are valid, then the Law of the Best 
Possible and the Law of the Most Inclusive End require the cultivation 
of the experience of the holy and the enrichment of all value experience 
which occurs with the awareness that persons and values are grounded in 
the nature of the universe. 
The Metapnysical Law has considerable significance for planning. 
It is evident that much city planning has been purely pragmatic and that 
there have been only the most limited efforts to explore the theological 
or philosophical ground of city planning. In the United States, the re-
ligious pluralism may have contributed to this failure since it is neces-
sary for planners to work in a society where large religious groups hold 
conflicting positions. 
If this is true, then any emerging consensus about the basic 
ground of ethics or even a social philosophy that provides a common basis 
for discussion among Protestant groups and between Protestant and Roman 
Catholics is of major significance. In a rapidly shrinking planet there 
is a growing need to find a common basis for cooperative action that can 
unite such divergent groups as Christians, humanists, Buddhists, Moslems, 
and Hindus. In this perspective, the idea of the responsible society as 
it has emerged in recent ecumenical discussions takes on added signif-
icance. 
~rightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., pp. 256-87. 
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3. The Responsible Society 
A methodological note can provide a bridge between the idea of 
the responsible society and the preceding discussion of the moral laws 
and the major components of the normative order. 
i. Methodology and the Idea of 
the Responsible Society 
The question of methodology has not had careful explicit develop-
ment in relating the general norms of the responsible society to more 
specific norms. However, the method actually used is one of emerging co-
herence according to Richard Nesmith. 
A definite method was not recognized in the course of the ecumen-
ical discussions for the development of the subsidiary axioms which 
in turn provided the more specific content and meaning for the idea 
of the responsible society. In fact, however, a general method of 
working coherence between the ultimate Christian ideals, the past ex-
perience of the churches with reference to the issue, and the issue 
itself has evolved as the formulative process for subsidiary axioms. 
This process functioned in a dialectical fashion with some axioms de-
veloped from the ideal downward into the situation and others upward 
out of a pragmatic insight which was then incorporated under the 
ideal because of its coherence with it.l 
This working coherence in ethical judgments is, of course, made 
explicit in the moral laws. 
The basic elements in the normative order are noted by Nils 
Ehrenstrom when he suggests that the church needs to 
... gain a clearer sense of the meaning of her own ethos, its cen-
tral affirmations, main criteria, and practical implications, both 
for the ordering pursuits of daily life and for the exercise of 
Christian responsibility toward the larger issues of a changing so-
ciety.2 
1Richard D. Nesmith, "The Development of the Concept of theRe-
sponsible Society: Stockholm to Evanston" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Boston University, 1957), pp. 240-41. 
2Nils Ehrenstr~m, M. F. Dibelius, William Temple, et al., Chris-
tian Faith and the Common Life (New York: Willett Clark&~ 1938), 
PP· -9. 
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These basic categories readily fit the framework developed by Parsons as 
well as the system of moral laws. 
The dialectical process involves interaction of general affirma-
tions and norms and the insights arising out of diagnosis and moral in-
sight in specific situations. Again, Nesmith observes that this has been 
the historical process by which ecumenical Christian social thought has 
emerged. 
Often the subsidiary axioms do not develop out of a direct re-
flection upon the transcendent ideal or efforts to create a deductive 
system of axioms. In this case they will usually arise out of the 
attempt to work through to a practical policy or action which appears 
under the circumstances to be the most just and responsible policy 
among the possible alternatives. If at this point, the policy ap-
pears to be compatible with the central norms and the transcendent 
ideals it will probably be thought of as an axiom ... 
On the other hand subsidiary axioms have been developed from the 
top or the ideal down to the situation in a direct attempt to find a 
more relevant and explicit expression of the meaning of the concept 
of the responsible society when applied to the specific problem areas.l 
This process is a general characteristic of the normative order 
of a differentiated social system. 
There is ... a hierarchy of generality of the patterns of norm-
ative culture institutionalized in a social system, one that corre-
sponds to the general hierarchical relations of its structural com-
ponents. Each subunit of the society, as collectivity, will have its 
own institutionalized values, which should be conceived as specifica-
tions, at the appropriate level, of the more general values of the 
society. To cope with its own internal differentiation of function, 
then, each subunit will have a set of differentiated norms, which 
should be regarded as specifications both of the subcollectivity val-
ues and of the more general norms applicable to it and other types 
of subcollectivity. The principle of specification restricts the 
generality of the pattern of culture by introducing qualifications 
arising from specialization of function~ on the one hand, and from 
specificity of situation, on the other. 
The need for the specification of norms is commonly recognized 
1Nesmith, op. cit., p. 211. 
2Parsons, Theories of Society, op. cit., I, 45. 
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in Christian social thought. This has led to the call for middle axioms 
between the general affirmations and specific applications. 
Hence, between purely general statements of the ethical demands 
of the Gospel and the decisions that have to be made in concrete sit-
uations there is need for what may be described as middle axio.ms. It 
is these that give relevance and point to the Christian ethic. They 
are an attempt to define the direction in which, in a ~articular 
state of society, Christian faith must express itself. 
That such middle axioms are historically necessary as well as 
limited is also acknowledged. 
The Christian ethic guides us in determining the goals which rep-
resent the purpose of God for our time. These are not absolute and 
~11-inclusive goals but the next steps that our own generation must 
take. The Kingdom of God in its fullness lies beyond our best achieve-
ments in the world but God does have purposes for us that can be real-
ized. To live for them is to live for the Kingdom now.2 
The idea of the responsible society is an effort, then, to pro-
vide an integrative ethical formulation which unites basic Christian af-
firmations, values and goals, guides for evaluating and developing so-
cial structures, and a "focus for the social concerns of the churches."3 
The Evanston Assembly clarified the normative role of the idea of the re-
sponsible society. 
The Responsible Society is not an alternative social or political 
system, but a criterion by which we judge all existing social orders, 
and at tlle same time a standard to guide us in the specific choices 
we make. 
It remains, then, to examine the idea of the responsible society 
and its implications for urban planning and development. 
~.A. Visser 't Hooft and J, H. Oldham, The Church and Its 
Function in Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1937), p. 124. 
2John c. Bennett, Christian Ethics and Social Policy (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), pp. 76-77· 
3Nesmith, op. _0-t., p. 40. 4Ibid., p. 3. 
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ii. Affirmations and General Norms 
The classic definition of the responsible society was developed 
at the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches meeting in 
Amsterdam, Holland, in 1948.1 The concern was to develop a statement of 
social policy and judgment that would be applicable to different nations, 
both East and West. The following definition emerged. 
Man is created and called to be a free being, responsible to God 
and his neighbour. Any tendencies in State and society depriving 
man of the possibility of acting responsibly are a denial of God's 
intention for man and His work of salvation. A responsible society 
is one where freedom is the freedom of men who acknowledge responsi-
bility to justice and public order, and where those who hold polit-
ical authority or economic power are responsible for its exercise to 
God and the people whose welfare is affected by it.2 
An additional paragraph provides further norms and guide lines. 
Man must never be made a mere means for political or economic 
ends. Man is not made for the State but the State for man. Man is 
not made for production, but production for man. For a society to 
be responsible under modern conditions it is re~uired that the people 
have freedom to control, to criticize and to change their governments, 
that power be made responsible by law and tradition, and be distrib-
uted as widely as possible through the whole community. It is re-
~uired that economic justice and provision of e~uality of opportunity 
be established for all members of society.3 
Like the moral laws, this statement of the responsible society 
holds several elements in dynamic tension. These elements include as-
pects of an ideal of personality, society, basic values and their ground-
ing in the nature of God and his intention for man and society. Muelder 
1For an historical perspective on the development of the idea 
of the responsible society in Christian ecumenical discussions see Walter 
Muelder, Foundations of the Responsible Society (New York: Abingdon 
Press, 1957), pp. 15-19. 
2Amsterdam Assembly, Man's Disorder and God's Design (New York: 
1949), III, 192. 
3Ibid. 
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notes that several critical concerns of contemporary culture are lifted 
up in this statement including: 
. . (l) the role of religious norms in the just and free society; 
(2) the conception of man, his dignity, rights, and self-realization 
in community with others; (3) the nature, authority, and scope of 
the modern state and its functions in relation to the community; (4) 
the interpenetration of the political, economic, and social spheres 
of society; (5) the tension of such ideals as e~uality, freedom, and 
justice within the general idea of responsible living; (6) the re-
sponsibility of persons to domestic and international orders of free-
dom and justice; (7) the accountability of power groups within na-
tions; and (8) the responsibilities of nations to one another and to 
the future of responsible international order. 1 
In discussing the components of the responsible society, it will 
be useful to relate them to the framework developed earlier. The tran-
scendent ground or religious component is clearly stated. God is the 
creator of man, and God's intention is the ground of freedom and respon-
sibility of persons and society. God's intention can be violated by ir-
responsible use of man's freedom in the violation of e~uality of oppor-
tunity, or the treatment of persons as a mere means. Respect for per-
sons as persons and society as the locus of the development of persons 
is grounded in God's intention for man and his unfolding purposes or work 
of salvation. 
. . . our obligation to the neighbour spring not so much from our 
recognition of man's native dignity as from the Christian revelation 
of God's purpose to restore that dignity through the redemption that 
is in Christ. The obligation is therefore a duty towards God and 
continues to be operating even when the neighbour does not obviously 
demand or deserve respect.2 
This transcultural ground of ideal values and persons in community as 
~uelder, op. cit., p. 20. 
2oxford Conference Study Series based on the Message and Reports 
of the Oxford Conference on Church, Community, and State, "The Church 
and the Economic Order," New York, Universal Christian Council, n.d., p. 
10. 
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the locus of value means that the person is set free for responsible 
social participation. 
Since his responsibility is to God, his basic security is in 
God, and this frees him from seeking it primarily in the flux of 
circumstances. In the second place, it frees him from the anxious 
either-or of social pressures and allows him to transcend the con-
flict without retreating from it.l 
The ground of persons and values, then, is not merely an intel-
lectual exercise but is the very stuff of moral and religious life. 
"Accountability to God makes human dignity, freedom and justice ultimate 
issues. n 2 
The idea of the responsible society obeys the metaphysical law 
as it points to the source and significance of general moral principles 
and the moral life. 
In addition to the transcendent ground, the idea of the responsi-
ble society holds the other components of the framework in tension. Per-
sons ought to be related to each other in particular ways, and certain 
roles or systems of roles (such as in the political or economic system) 
are to be limited by and subject to the judgment of the whole person or 
whole community. 
The key concept for this tension between persons in society and 
God is "responsibility." Responsibility suggests a "relationship of ac-
countability or liability between two factors." 3 This permits flexibil-
ity or development in history and permits the idea of responsibility to 
"incorporate new meaning into itself." 4 Responsibility is essentially 
a personal category and a relationship between two subjects and not two 
~uelder, op. cit., p. 22. 
3wesmith, op. cit., p. 164. 
2Ibid. 
4Ibid., p. 165. 
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objects or a subject and an object. "I" and "Thou" are the key words. 
To 11 respond 11 is to exercise the freedom of saying ,,yesn or nnon to a 
given presentation of experience and to be responsible is to recognize 
other persons as concerned with and involved in one's own response and 
its consequences. This tension of responsibility is the tension between 
freedom (the response of persons) and order (the consequences and rela-
tionships in which all are involved) . 
Responsibility is a general principle which does not predeter-
mine "the cultural content of specific responsibilities." 1 In terms of 
Christian social thought 
it provides an applicable working structure which acknowledges 
the interacting demands of freedom and order while being open to 
meaning centering in this Christian absolute of love and the ideal 
of the Kingdom.2 
The ethical tension between the "is" of concrete situations and 
the "ought" of ideal values is acknowledged and maintained in the idea 
of the responsible society. This has been "directly associated with the 
problem of the relationship between the Kingdom and the world in the 
course of ecumenical discussions." 3 In Christian thought the ideal of 
community is grounded in the Kingdom of God. When the idea of the re-
sponsible society suggests that persons exercising economic or political 
power "are responsible for its exercise to God and the people whose wel-
fare is affected by it," 4 there is the demand that the responsible person 
must look both to ideal values (including the needs of persons) and the 
actual preferences which people hold. Respect for persons o-bviously 
~uelder, op. cit., p. 21. ~esmith, op. cit., p. 166. 
4 Amsterdam Assembly, op. cit., p. 192. 
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includes respect for their judgments and preferences and their right to 
share in making decisions and suffering or enjoying the consequences. 
This points to one of the basic dilemmas of the planner who sees, e.g., 
what an ideal physical arrangement of houses, play areas, and streets 
might be, but faces the fact that the community to which he is responsi-
ble and accountable will not support such a plan because they are look-
ing not at the whole but only at the points where special interests are 
involved. This dilemma is reflected in the early principles1 which in-
dicated that the planner ought to be guided by the "best' ideals but ought 
also be guided by the values of those in positions to implement the plans. 
Although the ideal of person and community upheld by the idea of 
the responsibility allows for flexibility and development in its value 
content, there is a basic assertion about moral and ethical analysis as 
it applies to the social system which is at the very core of the idea of 
the responsible society. This assertion is that no part of the social 
system is an end in itself and no ethical analysis is adequate which stops 
short of the well-being and self-realization of all persons in the whole 
community. Free persons are required to "acknowledge responsibility to 
2 justice and the public order." The rightful claims of all persons and 
the structures or system of relationships necessary to respond to these 
claims must be seen as components which free men must adknowledge, sup-
port, and seek to improve. 
Not only must persons generally acknowledge responsibility to the 
whole community, but even more importantly, persons acting in their roles 
in the political and economic systems must not set as the court of last 
1 Supra 2Amsterdam Assembly, op. cit., p. 192. 
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appeal the growth or maintenance of the particular corporation or govern-
ment in which they are working. Neither production nor the maintenance 
of political power are legitimate ends apart from the consequences for 
persons and the community. It is not enough just to count profits or 
votes and to assume that these are self-legitimizing. Planning which 
seeks only the "how" of making profits or getting or keeping power is 
ethically inadequate. In terms of the large-scale limited interest struc-
tures of power in contemporary urban society, internal planning which seeks 
only to maximize the limited interest of the particular structure without 
integrating this limited interest into and disciplining it by the plural-
ity of values in an ideal of the whole community is condemned. This judg-
ment can fall as heavily on some church planning which seeks only to max-
imize membership and budget as it may on General Motors or the City Coun-
cil of Chicago. The Oxford Conference Report on the Church and the Eco-
nomic order spoke forthrightly to this issue. 
As long as industry is organized, primarily, not for the service of 
the community but with the object of producing a purely financial re-
sult for some of its members, it cannot be recognized as properly 
fulfilling its social purpose.l 
The ends or goals of action of the major institutional structures of so-
ciety are a major concern for Christian social thought. 
Christian teaching should deal with ends, in the sense of long-
range goals, standards and prjnciples in the light of which every 
concrete situation and every proposal for improving it must be 
tested. 2 
The consequences of existing structures must be evaluated in terms of 
their impact on persons. 3 Important among such consequences are the 
l Oxford Conference, op. cit., p. 17. 
2Ibid., p. 24. 3Ibid., p. 26. 
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resulting attitudes and character of persons effected. An observation 
and judgment upon gross disparities in the distribution of economic 
power has relevance to current metropolitan problems. 
Economic, like political, autocracy is attended doubtless by certain 
advantages. However, it is liable to produce both in individuals 
and in society a character and outlook on life which it is difficult 
to reconcile with any relationship that can be described as Christian. 
It tends to create in those who weild authority, and in the agents 
through whom they exercise it, a dictatorial temper, which springs 
not from any defect of character peculiar to them, but from the in-
fluence upon them of the position which they occupy. The effect of 
excessive economic power on those over whom it is exercised is 
equally serious. Often it makes them servile; fear of losing their 
jobs, and a vague belief that, in the end, the richer members of so-
ciety always hold the whip-hand, tends to destroy their spiritual 
virility. Often, again, it makes them bitter and cynical; they feel 
that force, not justice, rules their world, and are tempted to dis-
miss, as insincere cant, words which imply a different view. 1 
This is a two-pronged judgment. It provides a foundation for 
critical evaluation of the roles and attitudes of "planners" as they 
come to exercise increasing influence or become agents of the existing 
institutional structures. On the other hand, urban mass movements may 
reflect the negative, cynical, and bitter attitudes which underlie both 
apathy and convulsive action. The result may be ruthless and destructive 
organization and action which rejects responsibility for the larger so-
ciety and is self-defeating in the long run. 
The idea of the responsible society judges the inadequacies of 
both of these responses as well as the institutional structure which 
give rise to them. This means that responsible planning must be con-
cerned not only with the consequences for persons of the actions taken 
within existing structures, but also the continual transformation of the 
structures themselves. 
1Ibid., p. 19. 
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In the discussion of the development of modern city planning, 
the changing role of planning was noted as one part of the changing struc-
tures of urban society. The growth in planning as a specialized function 
is obviously related to the problem of the estimation of consequences in 
l 
a complex system. The only way of taking into consideration the conse-
quences for the whole community in a system as complex as a modern me-
tropolis is through careful planning. Planning may become a responsive 
sharing of intention and commitment which makes possible projections of 
the future. These become part of the context for decision-making and 
permit higher levels of responsibility than are possible when each per-
son must decide in a vacuum created by isolation and ignorance. In this 
very basic sense, the idea of the responsible society requires responsi-
ble planning in every part of the society along with the effort to bring 
this planning under the discipline of a shared coherent ideal of com-
munity. 
But such comprehensive planning must not be a function of govern-
ment alone, and the sanctions imposed which are concerned with implemen-
tation must be carefully limited. These limits or restraints on power 
(particularly when power refers to the imposition of negative sanctions) 
are indicated in the original definition of the responsible society. 
Governments, e.g., must be limited by general approval, and people must 
2 be free tr to control, to criticize, and to change their governments. 11 
In other words, there must be structures of accountability paralleling 
lines of responsibility. 
An important aspect of these structures of accountability are 
l Supra 2 Amsterdam Assembly, op. cit., p. 192. 
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the established framework of norms which govern the use of power by oc-
cupants of roles, as well as the norms governing role occupancy itself. 
Power ought to be "made responsible by law and tradition." 1 Further, 
these structures of accountability ought to be as inclusive as possible. 
In politics, this means that power ought to be "distributed as widely as 
possible through the whole community." 2 In economics, it means that the 
costs and benefits of economic activity should be brought under the 
claims of justice, and "equality of opportunity established for all mem-
bers of the community." 3 
Controls on the exercise of pcwer, particularly on power to im-
pose negative sanctions, is one part of accountability. The limits on 
the use of negative sanctions appropriate to various parts of the social 
system raise serious problems for the implementation of plans. If plans 
cannot be imposed on recalcitrant parts of the society, then are they all 
for naught? What happens when a wide variety of interests are involved 
and each one of them has a veto power and nobody can impose a plan on 
anybody else? This is, of course, one of the basic dilemmas of contem-
porary planning and speaks again to the tension between freedom and order. 
One alternative, of course, is to extend the use of negative sanctions4 
(extension of the right of eminent domain for a variety of land clearance 
purposes is a case in point). The other alternative is to extend the 
consensus building aspects of society and increase the sphere in which 
4 For a discussion of the necessity of some coercive elements in 
society, the need for constant criticism of such coercion, but the re-
jection of the assumption that Christian love will ever make possible 
the complete elimination of coercion, see Oxford Conference, op. cit., 
p. ll. 
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persons and groups are willing to act responsibly. The more persons and 
groups are ready to sacrifice short run or narrow selfish interests to 
long-range more inclusive values, the wider the sphere of cooperative 
planning and action becomes which can proceed without negative sanctions 
which are often self-defeating. 
The ethical dimensions of the distribution of power in a society 
need careful examination. The problems of power in metropolis are not 
only of a different scale but also a different order from those in an 
undifferentiated rural or small town society. Each person faces limits 
to the number and complexity of the choices which he can reasonably make. 
If choices are presented in fragmented bits and pieces, then each person 
may have the illusion of freedom and power. But what happens when the 
results of these choices fall apart or refuse to function? An illustra-
tion can be found in the problem of purchasing an automobile. Most peo-
ple can choose between a Plymouth, a Cadillac, or a Lark. But what if 
the choice were a variety of bolts, pistons, and fenders? It would be 
surprising indeed if a very high percentage of the results of such choices 
would get very good mileage, or any mileage at all. How much more diffi-
cult, then, is the choice between different possibilities for the develop-
ment of a metropolitan society? It seems unlikely that any citizenry 
could make the choices between different alternatives for development on 
a piece-meal basis unless they could see what the alternatives are and 
how the parts fit together. This presentation of coherent and possible 
alternatives may well be the most important planning function. 
What does this say about the distribution of power? The coordi-
nating of action in a complex system obviously calls for a coordinating 
center or a 11 power elite. 1' For as long as the 11 power elite 11 are serving 
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a widely held system of values and goals under the regulation of a set 
of commonly approved norms and hold their positions of responsibility 
on the basis of public accountability, then they are instruments of the 
exercise of power on behalf of the society. Such a "power elite" may 
not contradict the widest possible distribution of power. It may be an 
essential ingredient in the development of power adequate to meet the 
growing needs of a metropolis. 
An additional question emerges, however, which requires both em-
pirical and ethical analysis. When and under what condition ought and 
do people authorize the development of structures of power adequate to 
meet needs or carry forward programs of development? A full examination 
of this question is beyond the present endeavor. The hypothesis may be 
projected, however, that persons and a community tend to authorize power 
(which can function without the use of extreme negative sanctions) when 
there are common shared goals, norms, and persons who have shown them-
selves capable and dedicated to the pursuit of such goals according to 
the accepted norms. If this is true, then the development of goals and 
norms may be a prerequisite to the development of adequate structures of 
power to meet the needs of the modern metropolis. 
This focuses attention on the dimensions of society which are 
primarily concerned with values and norms. If the churches declare that 
they have a primary concern in witnessing to the basic values and moral 
principles which should guide human life, and planning is an effort to 
relate fundamental values to basic social policy and its implementation, 
then these mutual concerns are seen to be of the utmost significance for 
the emerging metropolitan society. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several major conclusions emerge from the course of inquiry of 
this dissertation. These conclusions include an understanding of the 
significance of ethical inquiry for urban planning, the basic outlines 
of a constructive ethical framework, and the implications of such a 
framework for the process as well as the content of urban planning. 
Ethical inquiry has fundamental significance for urban planning: 
(l) The history of modern city planning in the United States re-
veals a growth in the number and complexity of factors taken into consid-
eration in planning. 
(2) Basic questions of values and norms are increasingly recog-
nized as significant for planning. General policies planning is an ef-
fort to develop a system of norms for guiding future development. Al-
though there is increasing acknowledgment of the basic ethical dimensions 
of planning, there has been little systematic exploration of these eth-
ical concerns. 
(3) The freedom of choice permitted by an affluent society focuses 
attention on the basic goals and purposes for which technology will be 
used, and the relationships between persons which will result. 
(4) The complexity of the social, cultural, and technological 
systems on which metropolitan society is based require either a rejection 
of that society or an ethical system adequate to inform, undergird, and 
improve the society which has emerged. 
lRO 
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A systematic ethical framework which can serve as a basis for re-
sponsible planning in a complex and highly differentiated metropolitan 
society was developed. 
(l) This ethical framework seeks to relate the transcultural 
ground of values to basic norms for the social system which can inform 
the judgments and loyalties of persons as they relate to each other and 
develop and use their physical environment to realize values in persons 
and communities. 
(2) The basic methodology of this ethical framework is the search 
for emerging empirical coherence which seeks to relate basic affirmations, 
empirical and ideal values, the various levels of the normative order, 
and the on-going decisions and processes of persons in society. The moral 
laws which embody this framework were related individually and as a system 
to the process of urban planning. 
(3) The idea of the responsible society grounded in basic Chris-
tian affirmations is seen as the basis for an open ended ethic which in-
cludes respect for persons; acceptance of the interdependence and tension 
between freedom and order; acknowledges the necessity to develop institu-
tions which provide structures of responsibility and accountability and 
enable persons to share in decision-making; and undergirds the necessity 
for planning as a necessary instrument of responsible decision-making. 
Implications of this ethical framework for the process and con-
tent of urban planning were indicated in the preceding discussion. Among 
the most significant implications are the following: 
(l) Planning should be regarded more as a process than a product 
and should be open-ended and flexible rather than closed and rigid. Only 
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in this way can it be responsive to new experience and respect the free-
dom of choice of persons at a future time. 
(2) Planning is a necessary adjunct to responsible decision-
making in a complex social system since it makes possible the presenta-
tion of coherent alternatives. 
(3) Planning to be responsible must be related to structures of 
power which are also responsible. Such structures must have lines of 
accountability paralleling lines of responsibility. Responsible partic-
ipation of persons in leadership roles as well as general membership or 
citizenship roles are required. 
(4) Persons who occupy specialized planning roles have a dual 
responsibility which includes acting responsibly in terms of the role re-
quirements but also seeking to improve the role and the structures to 
which it is related. 
(5) In the absence of responsible structures, one of the goals 
should be to improve such structures and increase meaningful participa-
tion in decision-making by all persons involved. 
(6) Planning which seeks to obey the moral laws ought to be based 
on coherent ideals of personality and community, seek to achieve the best 
possible and most inclusive ends, and estimate the whole range of conse-
quences for persons and society. Planning which accepts limited targets 
as the uncriticized ends of action is ethically inadequate. This becomes 
a critical problem in the face of limited-interest power structures of 
modern society. 
(7) Planning ought to include at many points the process by which 
persons can make choices rather than attempting to specify the particular 
choice. At the same time, there ought to be means available for restricting 
such choices or opening new opportunities when the net result of many 
individual choices is an end which no one desires. 
(8) Responsiveness to persons ought to include the awareness that 
planned action as well as unplanned action exacts costs in terms of human 
suffering and loss. The price of urban development is high, and respon-
sible planning ought to acknowledge these costs. 
In an important sense, this dissertation raises more ~uestions 
than it answers. The current confused shape of urban life reflects the 
uncertainty about basic values and ideals which perplexes the residents 
of our metropolitan areas. 
But while the frustrations of the mixed up mess of metropolitics 
and the anonymous mass of the great city present a kind of formless 
futility, they have another and encouraging side. Whatever else 
they may be, they are not trivial. The issues of metropolitan life 
and momentous. The resources of the emerging metropolis are such 
as to challenge the imagination. The possibility, even the neces-
sity, of a great age of cities confronts us. These cities will 
either be the theaters of a cultural and political renaissance or 
their promise will be lost in a shapeless, mindless mass of metics 
whose best hope is to be well-administered and only moderately 
plucked for the pains.l 
To retreat to narrowly defined personal pursuits, even though 
that includes the enjoyment of one's family and narrow circles of 
friends, is to retreat from moral responsibility and deny oneself the 
experience of participation in the brokenness as well as the wonder of 
the new communities of persons which God has called into existence. To 
accept responsibility is to move out into the ethical issues involved 
in urban planning and development. 
1Norton E. Long, "Institutional Framework for the Development 
of Responsible Citizenship," in Responsibility, ed. Carl J. Friedericks 
(New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 231. 
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Problem: The problem of this dissertation is to relate ethical 
issues in modern city planning in the United States and the emerging 
context of choice in urban society to a systematic ethical framework 
which can serve as a normative foundation for responsible planning. 
Method: The dissertation is developed in three stages 1 first, an 
historical study of the development of ethical issues in city plan-
ning in the United States; secondly, an analysis of the context of 
choice in contemporary urban society; finally, the development of a 
systematic ethical framework for urban planning which explores the 
emerging coherence between Talcott Parsons' theory of action, Edgar 
s. Brightman's formulation of the moral laws, the idea of the respon-
sible society, and contemporary discussions of planning theory. 
Conclusions : Conclusions emerge from each of the major sections of 
the dissertation. Examination of the history of city planning reveals 
internal conflicts in city planning movement related to basic con-
flicts in American society and developments in social philosophy and 
urban sociology. Developments include the increasing complexity of 
factors considered in city Planning, a sharpening of issues involving 
the process by which planning takes place and a growing awareness of the 
problems of values and norms in PLanning theory. 
The context of choice in urban society involves the differentia-
tion and specialization of urban social structure, the growing com-
plexity, extensiveness, and diversity of urban culture, and the in-
creasing control over the physical environment which technology makes 
possible. The result is an upgrading of both possibilities and require-
ments which confront individuals and groups in making meaningful 
choices. 
The ethical framework which is developed examines the relationship 
of values and norms to the general system of action. The moral laws 
are related to this system of action and provide a systematic exposi-
tion of the basic principle that the ends or values which a person wills 
should be coherent. The idea of the responsible society relates basic 
Christian affirmations to values, goals, and criteria for evaluating 
social structures. 
On the basis of this framework, the following conclusions emerge: 
1) The development and presentation to the community of major 
alternative possibilities is one of the most important functions of 
planning as a specialized activity and is an essential ingredient of 
the responsible society. 
2) General policies planning offers a way to develop a policy 
framework or normative order that can be understood, approved, or 
rejected by the citizenry and provide guidelines for responsible 
action by a "power" or "decision-making" elite. 
:3) Responsibility requires both an acceptance of structured 
relationships and openness or flexibility, but there is always the danger 
of rigidity, closure, or the limitation of more significant values by 
plans and decisions oriented toward less important ·t&~ets. 
4) Planning must consider not only the content of particular 
decisions, but also the process by which such decisions are made. There 
is danger that planning and planners will become agents of a power 
structure that excludes meaningful participation by low status, eco-
nomically or educationally limited groups. 
5) No part of the social system is an end in itself and no ethi-
cal analysis or planning program is ethically adequate which stops 
short of the well-being or self-realization of all persons in the com-
munity. Planning which is oriented only toward the maximizing of 
profits, votes, or other limited targets of large goal-limited or 
special interest organizations is condemned as ethically inadequate. 
6) The area of mutual concern of the churches and urban planning 
is developing rapidly as urban planning moves in the direction of 
seeking to relate fundamental values and social policy to programs of 
action, and the churches develop an articulate social philosophy and 
ethics adequate for urban society. 
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